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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for addaleax/natives

Attack Surface: 1. Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) via Internal API Manipulation

  • Description: Attackers exploit natives to modify or call internal, undocumented Node.js functions, leading to the execution of arbitrary code within the Node.js process.
  • How natives Contributes: Provides direct access to internal functions and objects that are not part of the public, secured API. This is the core enabling factor.
  • Example:
    • Using natives to overwrite the Buffer.from function's internal implementation with malicious code, causing any subsequent buffer creation to execute the attacker's code.
    • Modifying internal functions of the child_process module to execute arbitrary shell commands without any sanitization.
    • Directly manipulating the vm module's internal state to escape a sandbox.
  • Impact: Complete system compromise. The attacker gains full control over the Node.js process and potentially the underlying operating system.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoidance (Primary): Do not use natives. This is the only truly effective mitigation.
    • Strict Input Validation (Extremely Limited): If natives is absolutely unavoidable, implement extremely rigorous input validation (whitelist-only) to prevent attackers from specifying arbitrary module names, property names, or values. This is highly unlikely to be fully effective.
    • Code Reviews (Mandatory): In-depth code reviews focusing exclusively on any code that touches natives.
    • Least Privilege: Run the Node.js process with the absolute minimum necessary privileges.
    • Sandboxing (Limited Effectiveness): Use vm, containers (Docker), and process isolation, but understand that natives is designed to bypass these boundaries within the Node.js process. Multi-layered sandboxing is essential, but not a guarantee.
    • Monitoring: Implement robust monitoring and logging to detect unusual activity, such as unexpected module access or modifications. This is for detection, not prevention.

Attack Surface: 2. Denial of Service (DoS) via Internal API Instability

  • Description: Attackers leverage natives to call internal APIs in ways that cause the Node.js process to crash or become unresponsive.
  • How natives Contributes: Provides direct access to unstable, undocumented APIs that may have unexpected behavior or crash when called with invalid inputs or in specific states. This is the core enabling factor.
  • Example:
    • Calling an internal function with incorrect argument types, deliberately triggering a segmentation fault.
    • Accessing internal data structures in a way that corrupts memory, leading to a crash.
    • Modifying internal state in a way that causes an infinite loop within a core Node.js module.
  • Impact: Application downtime, service unavailability.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoidance (Primary): Do not use natives.
    • Input Validation (Limited): Rigorous input validation, even for seemingly non-code-execution scenarios. This is difficult to achieve comprehensively.
    • Error Handling (Limited): Implement error handling, but be aware that many internal errors may be uncatchable.
    • Process Monitoring: Use process monitoring tools (e.g., PM2, systemd) to automatically restart the Node.js process. This is a reactive measure, not preventative.
    • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting to prevent attackers from repeatedly triggering crashes. This is also reactive.

Attack Surface: 3. Security Mechanism Bypass

  • Description: Attackers use natives to disable or circumvent security features built into Node.js or its modules.
  • How natives Contributes: Allows direct manipulation of internal modules and functions, bypassing security checks or altering security-related behavior. This is the core enabling factor.
  • Example:
    • Modifying the crypto module's internal functions to disable signature verification or force the use of weak ciphers.
    • Disabling or altering module loading mechanisms to load malicious code, bypassing integrity checks.
    • Bypassing file system permission checks by directly modifying internal fs functions.
  • Impact: Compromised application security, increased vulnerability to other attacks. This can enable other attack vectors.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoidance (Primary): Do not use natives.
    • Code Reviews (Mandatory): Focus specifically on identifying any potential security bypasses.
    • Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing.
    • Hardening: Implement system-level hardening measures to limit the impact of a successful bypass. This is a defense-in-depth strategy.