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Attack Tree Analysis for addaleax/natives

Objective: RCE or DoS via natives Exploitation (CN)

Attack Tree Visualization

[Attacker Goal: RCE or DoS via 'natives' Exploitation] (CN) | [1. Abuse 'getSource()' Functionality] (CN) | [1.1 Leak Sensitive Source Code] (CN & HR) | ---- | [1.1.1 Read Files Outside Intended Scope] (CN & HR) [1.1.2 Read Environment Variables (if exposed via getSource())] (HR) | [2. Abuse 'isNative()' Functionality] | [2.1 Bypass Security Checks] | ---- | [2.1.1 Spoof 'isNative()' to Bypass Checks] (CN)

Attack Tree Path: Abuse getSource() Functionality

  • Description: This is the primary attack vector, focusing on exploiting the getSource() function of the natives library. The attacker aims to leverage this function to gain access to information they shouldn't have.
  • Why Critical: This is the entry point for the most severe potential vulnerabilities, leading to information disclosure.

Attack Tree Path: Leak Sensitive Source Code

  • Description: This sub-vector focuses specifically on using getSource() to leak sensitive information. The attacker tries to trick the application into revealing source code or other data that should be protected.
  • Why Critical & High-Risk: Information disclosure is a high-impact vulnerability that can lead to further compromise of the system.

Attack Tree Path: Read Files Outside Intended Scope

  • Description: This is a path traversal attack within the context of getSource(). The attacker provides manipulated input (e.g., ../../../etc/passwd – although this specific example wouldn't work directly, it illustrates the concept) to try to access files or modules outside the intended scope of the application's getSource() implementation. The vulnerability lies in the application's lack of input validation, not in natives itself.
  • Example: If the application has a function like getNativeModuleSource(userInput), and userInput is not sanitized, an attacker could try to access a module that contains sensitive information or even attempt a (likely unsuccessful) path traversal to a system file.
  • Likelihood: Low to Medium (Depends heavily on application implementation.)
  • Impact: High to Very High (Disclosure of source code, configuration files, etc.)
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

Attack Tree Path: Read Environment Variables (if exposed via getSource())

  • Description: This attack relies on a highly unlikely scenario: environment variables being exposed within the source code of a native module and that module being accessible via getSource(). The attacker would use getSource() to retrieve the source code of that module, hoping to find sensitive information like API keys or database credentials.
  • Example: If a poorly configured native module included a hardcoded secret (which it shouldn't), and the application allowed access to that module's source via getSource(), the attacker could retrieve the secret.
  • Likelihood: Very Low
  • Impact: High to Very High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard

Attack Tree Path: Abuse isNative() Functionality

  • Description: This attack vector focuses on exploiting the isNative() function.
  • Why Critical: This is the entry point for the bypass security checks.

Attack Tree Path: Bypass Security Checks

  • Description: This sub-vector focuses specifically on using isNative() to bypass security checks.
    • Why Critical & High-Risk: Bypassing security checks is a high-impact vulnerability that can lead to further compromise of the system.

Attack Tree Path: Spoof isNative() to Bypass Checks

  • Description: This attack targets applications that incorrectly rely solely on the isNative() function for security-critical decisions. The attacker would try to find a way to make a non-native module appear native, or to load a malicious native module, to bypass security checks that are intended to apply only to native modules. The vulnerability is in the application's flawed logic, not in natives itself.
  • Example: If the application has a rule like "only native modules can access this sensitive resource," and the attacker can somehow load a malicious module that is considered native (or trick the application into thinking a non-native module is native), they could bypass this check.
  • Likelihood: Low (Requires poor application security design.)
  • Impact: Medium to High (Depends on the bypassed security check.)
  • Effort: Medium to High
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard