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Attack Tree Analysis for airbnb/lottie-web

Objective: Achieve Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) or Client-Side Denial of Service (DoS) in an application by exploiting vulnerabilities in the Lottie-web library through malicious animation data.

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Compromise Application Using Lottie-web (CR)
    • Exploit Vulnerabilities in Lottie-web Library (CR)
      • Maliciously Crafted JSON Animation Data (Bodymovin) (CR)
        • Exploit Parser Vulnerabilities (CR)
          • Cause Denial of Service (DoS) via Parser Crash (HR)

            Send excessively large or deeply nested JSON (HR) Send JSON with unexpected data types or formats (HR)

        • Exploit Rendering Engine Logic Flaws (CR)
          • Cause Client-Side Denial of Service (DoS) via Resource Exhaustion (HR)

            Create animations with excessive complexity (e.g., very large number of shapes, layers, keyframes, complex expressions). (HR) Trigger computationally expensive features within Lottie-web (e.g., specific effects, masks, mattes). (HR)

          • Achieve Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Animation Properties (If improperly handled) (HR)

            Inject malicious JavaScript code within animation properties that are rendered into the DOM without proper sanitization. (HR)

      • Dependency Vulnerabilities (CR)
        • Exploit Vulnerabilities in Lottie-web's Dependencies (HR)

          Lottie-web relies on other JavaScript libraries. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies could be exploited. (HR)

    • Social Engineering Attacks Leveraging Lottie-web
      • Phishing Attacks with Malicious Animations (HR)

        Embed malicious animations in phishing emails or websites that exploit Lottie-web vulnerabilities or simply appear legitimate to trick users. (HR)

  • This is the overarching goal and represents the starting point for all high-risk attack paths.
  • Success here means the attacker has achieved their objective of compromising the application through Lottie-web.
  • This node highlights that vulnerabilities within the Lottie-web library itself are a primary attack vector.
  • Attackers will focus on finding and exploiting weaknesses in Lottie-web's code to compromise applications using it.
  • This node emphasizes that the JSON animation data (Bodymovin format) is the primary input and a critical point of vulnerability.
  • Attackers will craft malicious JSON data to exploit weaknesses in how Lottie-web processes and renders animations.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Send excessively large or deeply nested JSON (High-Risk Path):
      • Attackers send animation JSON that is extremely large in size or has deeply nested structures.
      • This can overwhelm the JSON parser, causing it to crash or consume excessive resources, leading to Denial of Service (DoS).
    • Send JSON with unexpected data types or formats (High-Risk Path):
      • Attackers send animation JSON that deviates from the expected Bodymovin schema, using incorrect data types or unexpected formats.
      • This can trigger errors in the parser, potentially leading to crashes, unexpected behavior, or in rare cases, exploitable vulnerabilities.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Cause Client-Side Denial of Service (DoS) via Resource Exhaustion (High-Risk Path):
      • Create animations with excessive complexity (High-Risk Path):
        • Attackers create animations with a very large number of shapes, layers, keyframes, or complex expressions.
        • Rendering these complex animations can consume excessive CPU and memory resources on the client-side, leading to browser unresponsiveness or crashes (DoS).
      • Trigger computationally expensive features within Lottie-web (High-Risk Path):
        • Attackers utilize specific Lottie-web features known to be computationally intensive, such as certain effects, masks, or mattes, within their animations.
        • This can similarly lead to client-side resource exhaustion and DoS.
    • Achieve Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Animation Properties (If improperly handled) (High-Risk Path):
      • Inject malicious JavaScript code within animation properties that are rendered into the DOM without proper sanitization (High-Risk Path):
        • Attackers embed malicious JavaScript code within animation properties, such as text layers, dynamic expressions, or potentially custom data attributes if used insecurely.
        • If the application or Lottie-web does not properly sanitize these properties before rendering them into the Document Object Model (DOM), the malicious JavaScript code can be executed in the user's browser, leading to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Exploit Vulnerabilities in Lottie-web's Dependencies (High-Risk Path):
      • Lottie-web relies on other JavaScript libraries (dependencies).
      • If any of these dependencies have known security vulnerabilities, attackers can exploit them through Lottie-web.
      • This could lead to various impacts depending on the specific vulnerability, ranging from Denial of Service to Remote Code Execution or information disclosure.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Embed malicious animations in phishing emails or websites that exploit Lottie-web vulnerabilities or simply appear legitimate to trick users (High-Risk Path):
      • Attackers embed malicious Lottie animations within phishing emails or on fake websites designed to mimic legitimate applications.
      • These animations can be used to:
        • Exploit known vulnerabilities in Lottie-web if the user's browser is vulnerable.
        • Appear legitimate and trustworthy, tricking users into interacting with the phishing content (e.g., clicking links, entering credentials).
        • Potentially deliver a payload or redirect users to malicious sites after interaction with the animation.