Mitigation Strategy: Input Validation of Lottie JSON Structure
Description:
- Select a JSON Schema validation library compatible with your project's programming language.
- Define a JSON Schema that accurately represents the expected structure of valid Lottie JSON files, based on the official Lottie specification and the features your application uses.
- Integrate the JSON Schema validator into your application's Lottie file processing workflow, validating files before they are parsed by
lottie-web
.- For user-uploaded files: Validate on the server-side immediately after upload.
- For bundled files: Validate during the build process.
- Configure the validator to strictly enforce the schema and reject invalid files.
- Implement error handling for validation failures, logging errors and providing informative messages if needed.
Threats Mitigated:
- Malformed Lottie JSON Exploitation (High Severity): Prevents potential vulnerabilities in
lottie-web
's JSON parsing logic by ensuring only structurally valid JSON is processed. Malformed JSON could causelottie-web
to crash, behave unexpectedly, or potentially expose vulnerabilities if the parsing process is flawed. lottie-web
Rendering Errors (Medium Severity): Reduces rendering errors and unexpected behavior withinlottie-web
that can arise from attempting to render invalid or corrupted Lottie files. This leads to a more stable and predictable animation rendering process within the library.- Resource Exhaustion during
lottie-web
Parsing (Medium Severity): Mitigates resource exhaustion by preventinglottie-web
from attempting to parse excessively complex or deeply nested JSON structures that deviate from the expected Lottie format, which could strainlottie-web
's parsing engine.
Impact:
- Malformed Lottie JSON Exploitation: Significantly reduces the risk by ensuring
lottie-web
receives valid input, minimizing potential parsing-related vulnerabilities within the library. lottie-web
Rendering Errors: Moderately reduces the risk of rendering issues caused by invalid input, leading to more reliablelottie-web
animation display.- Resource Exhaustion during
lottie-web
Parsing: Minimally to Moderately reduces the risk of parsing-related resource exhaustion withinlottie-web
.
Currently Implemented:
- Currently implemented on the server-side for user-uploaded Lottie files in the
/api/lottie/upload
endpoint using a custom JSON schema and theajv
library in Node.js.
Missing Implementation:
- Client-side validation is not yet implemented. Lottie files bundled with the application during build are not currently validated. Validation should be added to the build pipeline to ensure application assets are valid before
lottie-web
processes them.
Mitigation Strategy: Restrict Allowed Lottie Features and Properties
Description:
- Analyze the Lottie specification and identify features and properties that are not essential for your application's use of
lottie-web
or that could pose risks when processed bylottie-web
. Focus on features like expressions, specific renderers, or dynamic properties. - Develop a sanitization process to remove or modify these restricted features from the Lottie JSON after validation but before passing it to
lottie-web
for rendering.- Implement a function to traverse the JSON and remove or modify specific keys/values.
- Test the sanitization process to ensure it doesn't break intended animation functionality within
lottie-web
while removing targeted features. - Document restricted features and the rationale for their restriction related to
lottie-web
usage.
Threats Mitigated:
- Expression-Based Vulnerabilities in
lottie-web
(Medium to High Severity - if expressions are used): Iflottie-web
's expression engine has vulnerabilities, or if expressions can be crafted to cause unintended behavior withinlottie-web
's rendering process, restricting expressions eliminates this attack vector. - Renderer-Specific Vulnerabilities in
lottie-web
(Low to Medium Severity): If vulnerabilities exist in specific renderers withinlottie-web
, limiting the allowed renderers reduces the attack surface within the library. - Performance Degradation within
lottie-web
due to Complex Features (Medium Severity): Certain Lottie features can be computationally expensive forlottie-web
to render. Restricting these can improvelottie-web
's rendering performance and prevent potential DoS by complex animations processed bylottie-web
.
Impact:
- Expression-Based Vulnerabilities in
lottie-web
: Significantly reduces the risk if expressions are a concern, eliminating a potential vulnerability point withinlottie-web
. - Renderer-Specific Vulnerabilities in
lottie-web
: Minimally reduces the risk, unless specific renderer vulnerabilities inlottie-web
are identified. Reduces attack surface withinlottie-web
. - Performance Degradation within
lottie-web
due to Complex Features: Moderately reduces the risk of performance issues caused by specific features straininglottie-web
's rendering capabilities.
Currently Implemented:
- Partially implemented. Expressions are not explicitly disabled in
lottie-web
configuration, but we are not actively using Lottie animations that rely on expressions.
Missing Implementation:
- Explicitly disable expressions in
lottie-web
configuration if possible. Implement a JSON sanitization function to actively remove expression-related properties from Lottie JSON before rendering bylottie-web
. Further analysis is needed to identify other potentially risky features forlottie-web
to process.
Mitigation Strategy: Enforce File Size Limits for Lottie Files
Description:
- Determine a maximum file size for Lottie JSON files based on application needs and expected animation complexity, considering
lottie-web
's performance and resource usage. - Implement file size checks:
- Client-side (for user uploads): Provide feedback if files exceed the limit before upload.
- Server-side (for user uploads): Enforce limits before processing files with
lottie-web
. - During build (for bundled files): Optionally check size to ensure reasonable limits for
lottie-web
rendering.
- Configure web server/CDN to enforce file size limits for serving Lottie files, if applicable, to prevent serving excessively large files to
lottie-web
. - Communicate file size limits to users uploading Lottie files.
Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) through Large Lottie Files impacting
lottie-web
(High Severity): Prevents attackers from uploading or providing excessively large Lottie files that could consume excessive resources whenlottie-web
attempts to parse and render them, potentially leading to denial of service by overloadinglottie-web
or the client. - Client-Side Performance Issues with
lottie-web
(Medium Severity): Reduces the risk of client-side performance problems caused bylottie-web
attempting to render very large and complex animations, which can lead to browser crashes or unresponsive behavior due tolottie-web
's resource consumption.
Impact:
- Denial of Service (DoS) through Large Lottie Files impacting
lottie-web
: Significantly reduces the risk by preventinglottie-web
from processing excessively large files that could strain its resources. - Client-Side Performance Issues with
lottie-web
: Moderately reduces the risk of performance problems caused bylottie-web
rendering overly large animations.
Currently Implemented:
- Server-side file size limit of 2MB is implemented for Lottie file uploads in the
/api/lottie/upload
endpoint. Client-side file size validation with a warning message is also implemented before upload submission.
Missing Implementation:
- File size limits are not enforced for Lottie files bundled with the application during the build process. Consider adding a build-time check to warn or fail the build if bundled Lottie files exceed a defined size threshold, ensuring reasonable file sizes for
lottie-web
to handle.
Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Update lottie-web
Description:
- Establish a process for monitoring new releases and security updates for
lottie-web
. - Promptly update
lottie-web
to the latest stable version, especially security patches, to benefit from bug fixes and security improvements within the library itself. - Thoroughly test your application after each
lottie-web
update to ensure compatibility and no regressions inlottie-web
's rendering or functionality. - Document the
lottie-web
version used and track update history.
Threats Mitigated:
- Known Vulnerabilities in
lottie-web
(High Severity): Mitigates the risk of exploitation of known security vulnerabilities withinlottie-web
itself. Updates are released to fix bugs and security issues inlottie-web
, and using outdated versions leaves your application vulnerable to these known flaws in the library.
Impact:
- Known Vulnerabilities in
lottie-web
: Significantly reduces the risk by ensuring you are running the most secure version oflottie-web
, benefiting from fixes and security patches directly within the library.
Currently Implemented:
- We are currently using
lottie-web
version 5.9.6. We have a manual process for checking for updates.
Missing Implementation:
- Implement an automated dependency update monitoring system to automatically detect and notify about new
lottie-web
releases and security vulnerabilities. Integrate this into our CI/CD pipeline to streamline thelottie-web
update process.
Mitigation Strategy: Dependency Scanning
Description:
- Integrate a dependency scanning tool into your development pipeline that supports scanning JavaScript dependencies.
- Configure the tool to regularly scan your project's dependency files to identify known vulnerabilities in
lottie-web
and its dependencies. - Set up automated alerts for vulnerability detection.
- Establish a process for reviewing and remediating identified vulnerabilities in
lottie-web
or its dependencies, prioritizing based on severity and impact.
Threats Mitigated:
- Known Vulnerabilities in
lottie-web
and its Dependencies (High Severity): Proactively identifies known security vulnerabilities withinlottie-web
and libraries it relies on. This allows for timely remediation of vulnerabilities in thelottie-web
dependency chain before they can be exploited. - Supply Chain Attacks targeting
lottie-web
dependencies (Medium Severity): Dependency scanning can help detect compromised dependencies oflottie-web
if they are added to vulnerability databases, offering some protection against supply chain issues affectinglottie-web
indirectly.
Impact:
- Known Vulnerabilities in
lottie-web
and its Dependencies: Significantly reduces the risk by providing early detection of vulnerabilities in thelottie-web
ecosystem, enabling proactive patching and reducing the vulnerability window. - Supply Chain Attacks targeting
lottie-web
dependencies: Minimally to Moderately reduces the risk. Detection depends on vulnerability databases being updated promptly after a supply chain compromise affectinglottie-web
's dependencies.
Currently Implemented:
- We are using
npm audit
as part of our development workflow to check for vulnerabilities before deployments, includinglottie-web
and its dependencies.
Missing Implementation:
- Integrate
npm audit
(or a more comprehensive tool) into our CI/CD pipeline to automatically run on every build and fail builds if high-severity vulnerabilities are detected inlottie-web
or its dependencies. Set up automated notifications for vulnerability alerts related tolottie-web
.
Mitigation Strategy: Subresource Integrity (SRI)
Description:
- If loading
lottie-web
from a CDN, generate SRI hashes for the specificlottie-web
files used. - When including the
<script>
tag to loadlottie-web
from the CDN, add theintegrity
attribute with the SRI hash andcrossorigin="anonymous"
. - The browser will verify the fetched
lottie-web
file's hash against the SRI hash. If they don't match, the script will not execute, preventing the use of potentially compromisedlottie-web
files from the CDN.
Threats Mitigated:
- CDN Compromise/Supply Chain Attacks targeting
lottie-web
(Medium to High Severity): Mitigates the risk of a CDN being compromised and malicious code being injected into thelottie-web
files served from the CDN. SRI ensures that the browser only executes the expected, untampered version of thelottie-web
library.
Impact:
- CDN Compromise/Supply Chain Attacks targeting
lottie-web
: Significantly reduces the risk of using compromised CDN resources forlottie-web
. Provides a strong guarantee of file integrity when loadinglottie-web
from CDNs.
Currently Implemented:
- We are loading
lottie-web
from a CDN (jsDelivr). SRI is not currently implemented for the<script>
tag loadinglottie-web
.
Missing Implementation:
- Implement SRI for the
<script>
tag loadinglottie-web
from the CDN. Generate SRI hashes for the specificlottie-web
version we are using and add theintegrity
andcrossorigin
attributes to the<script>
tag in our HTML templates to ensure the integrity of thelottie-web
library.
Mitigation Strategy: Animation Complexity Limits
Description:
- Analyze the typical complexity of Lottie animations used in your application in relation to
lottie-web
's rendering performance. Define metrics for complexity relevant tolottie-web
, such as layers, shapes, keyframes, or effects. - Establish guidelines or limits for animation complexity based on your application's performance requirements and target devices, considering
lottie-web
's capabilities. - If users upload/create Lottie animations, implement mechanisms to enforce complexity limits relevant to
lottie-web
:- Analysis tools: Develop/use tools to analyze Lottie JSON and assess complexity for
lottie-web
rendering. - Rejection/simplification: Reject animations exceeding limits or simplify them for better
lottie-web
performance.
- Analysis tools: Develop/use tools to analyze Lottie JSON and assess complexity for
- Educate designers about complexity limits and best practices for creating performant Lottie animations for
lottie-web
.
Threats Mitigated:
- Client-Side Performance Degradation due to
lottie-web
Rendering Complexity (Medium Severity): Prevents or reduces client-side performance issues (lag, jank, crashes) caused bylottie-web
rendering overly complex Lottie animations, especially on lower-powered devices wherelottie-web
's performance might be more constrained. - Resource Exhaustion (Client-Side DoS) due to
lottie-web
Rendering Load (Medium Severity): Mitigates client-side denial-of-service where excessively complex animations could consume so many resources duringlottie-web
rendering that the browser becomes unresponsive or crashes specifically due tolottie-web
's resource demands.
Impact:
- Client-Side Performance Degradation due to
lottie-web
Rendering Complexity: Moderately reduces the risk by limiting animation complexity, leading to smootherlottie-web
rendering and better user experience. - Resource Exhaustion (Client-Side DoS) due to
lottie-web
Rendering Load: Moderately reduces the risk of client-side DoS by preventinglottie-web
from rendering animations likely to overwhelm client resources.
Currently Implemented:
- No explicit animation complexity limits are currently implemented for
lottie-web
rendering.
Missing Implementation:
- Implement analysis tools to assess Lottie animation complexity relevant to
lottie-web
's performance. Define specific complexity metrics and thresholds. Consider server-side checks to reject/simplify overly complex user-uploaded animations forlottie-web
. Document animation complexity guidelines for designers to optimize forlottie-web
.
Mitigation Strategy: Resource Quotas for Animation Rendering
Description:
- Implement resource quotas for animation rendering, especially when multiple animations might be rendered concurrently by
lottie-web
or when users can trigger frequent animation rendering. - Limit:
- Concurrent animations: Restrict the number of Lottie animations
lottie-web
can render simultaneously. - Total rendering time: Limit total time spent rendering animations by
lottie-web
within a period. - CPU/Memory usage: (More complex) Monitor CPU/memory usage during
lottie-web
rendering and throttle/stop if thresholds are exceeded.
- Concurrent animations: Restrict the number of Lottie animations
- Prioritize animation rendering if needed, ensuring critical animations are rendered by
lottie-web
while less important ones are delayed/skipped under resource constraints.
Threats Mitigated:
- Client-Side Performance Degradation due to Concurrent
lottie-web
Rendering (Medium Severity): Reduces client-side performance issues caused by excessive concurrent animation rendering bylottie-web
. - Resource Exhaustion (Client-Side DoS) due to Overloading
lottie-web
(Medium Severity): Mitigates client-side denial-of-service caused by overloading the browser with too many animations forlottie-web
to render at once, leading to resource exhaustion specifically related tolottie-web
's processing.
Impact:
- Client-Side Performance Degradation due to Concurrent
lottie-web
Rendering: Moderately reduces the risk by preventing resource contention from excessivelottie-web
animation rendering. - Resource Exhaustion (Client-Side DoS) due to Overloading
lottie-web
: Moderately reduces the risk of client-side DoS by limiting the overall resource demand from animations rendered bylottie-web
.
Currently Implemented:
- No explicit resource quotas for
lottie-web
animation rendering are currently implemented.
Missing Implementation:
- Implement limits on the number of concurrent Lottie animations that
lottie-web
can render. Explore options for limiting total rendering time or monitoring resource usage duringlottie-web
animation rendering.
Mitigation Strategy: Lazy Loading and On-Demand Rendering
Description:
- Implement lazy loading for Lottie animations, especially for multiple animations or those not immediately visible, to optimize
lottie-web
usage. - Use Intersection Observer API to detect when Lottie animation containers become visible.
- Only initialize and start rendering Lottie animations with
lottie-web
when containers are in the viewport or needed based on user interaction. - For non-continuous animations, render them with
lottie-web
only on demand (e.g., hover, click).
Threats Mitigated:
- Initial Page Load Performance Degradation due to
lottie-web
Initialization (Medium Severity): Reduces initial page load time by deferring loading and rendering of Lottie animations bylottie-web
that are not immediately needed. - Unnecessary Resource Consumption (Client-Side) by
lottie-web
(Low to Medium Severity): Prevents unnecessary CPU and memory usage by avoiding rendering animations withlottie-web
that are not visible or actively used.
Impact:
- Initial Page Load Performance Degradation due to
lottie-web
Initialization: Moderately reduces the risk by improving initial page load speed and perceived performance by deferringlottie-web
usage. - Unnecessary Resource Consumption (Client-Side) by
lottie-web
: Minimally to Moderately reduces resource consumption, especially on pages with many animations, leading to better battery life and smoother performance by optimizinglottie-web
's activity.
Currently Implemented:
- Lazy loading is not currently implemented for Lottie animations rendered by
lottie-web
. All animations are initialized and start rendering on page load.
Missing Implementation:
- Implement lazy loading for Lottie animations using Intersection Observer API. Modify animation initialization logic to start
lottie-web
rendering only when the animation container is in the viewport, optimizinglottie-web
's resource usage.