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Threat Model Analysis for airbnb/lottie-web

  • Description: An attacker injects crafted JSON animation data by compromising animation file sources or exploiting application vulnerabilities in animation data handling. The attacker aims to provide JSON that exploits parsing or rendering logic within lottie-web or browser APIs to cause harm.
  • Impact:
    • Denial of Service (DoS) due to excessive resource consumption (CPU, memory), leading to application unavailability.
    • Client-side resource exhaustion causing browser crashes or severe performance degradation, impacting user experience.
    • Unexpected animation rendering and application malfunction, potentially disrupting critical functionalities.
  • Affected Lottie-web Component: Core animation parsing and rendering engine (primarily lottie.loadAnimation and related rendering functions).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement robust server-side input validation and sanitization of animation JSON data to ensure it conforms to the expected schema and is free of malicious payloads.
    • Enforce a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) to control the origins from which animation data can be loaded, limiting potential attack vectors.
    • Utilize Subresource Integrity (SRI) when loading animations from CDNs to guarantee the integrity and authenticity of the files.
    • Maintain lottie-web at the latest version to benefit from security patches and bug fixes that address potential vulnerabilities.
    • Conduct thorough code reviews of the application's animation data handling logic to identify and rectify any weaknesses.
  • Description: An attacker crafts malicious JSON animation data designed to exploit potential, albeit less likely, vulnerabilities in lottie-web or underlying browser rendering engines (Canvas, SVG, HTML). Successful exploitation could lead to the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code within the user's browser context. While the likelihood might be lower, the potential impact of XSS remains significant.
  • Impact:
    • Full Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) impact, including session hijacking, cookie theft, website defacement, redirection to malicious sites, and unauthorized actions performed on behalf of the user.
  • Affected Lottie-web Component: Core animation rendering engine, specifically its interaction with browser rendering APIs (Canvas, SVG, HTML).
  • Risk Severity: Medium (High Impact) - While the likelihood of exploitation might be considered medium due to the indirect nature and reliance on specific vulnerabilities, the potential impact of XSS is undeniably high.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement a stringent Content Security Policy (CSP), paying particular attention to the script-src directive to strictly control script execution origins.
    • Ensure both lottie-web and user browsers are consistently updated to patch any potential vulnerabilities that could be leveraged for XSS attacks.
    • Perform regular security audits and penetration testing, specifically focusing on the application's integration with lottie-web and its handling of diverse animation data inputs.
    • Adhere to the principle of least privilege when configuring animation data sources, ideally restricting loading to trusted and necessary origins only.