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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for airbnb/lottie-web

Attack Surface: 1. Denial of Service (DoS) via Resource Exhaustion

  • Description: An attacker crafts a Lottie JSON file designed to consume excessive system resources (CPU, memory) when parsed and rendered by lottie-web, leading to application slowdown or crashes.
    • How Lottie-Web Contributes: lottie-web is the direct target; it parses the malicious JSON and performs the resource-intensive rendering.
    • Example: A JSON file with millions of layers, extremely high frame rates, deeply nested objects, or embedded base64-encoded images that are gigabytes in size.
    • Impact:
      • Application unresponsiveness.
      • Browser tab freezing or crashing.
      • Potential server-side resource exhaustion (if pre-processing Lottie files).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Input Validation: Implement strict size limits on the Lottie JSON file. Validate structure (max nesting depth, layers). Reject files exceeding thresholds.
      • Resource Limits: Set limits within lottie-web configuration (if available) or application-level code to restrict animation complexity (max frame rate, elements).
      • Timeout Mechanisms: Implement timeouts for rendering. Terminate animations that take too long.
      • Server-Side Validation: If possible, validate on the server before sending to the client.
      • Rate Limiting: Limit the number of Lottie files processed per user/time period.

Attack Surface: 2. Code Injection (Extremely Unlikely, but Theoretically Possible)

  • Description: An attacker exploits a hypothetical vulnerability in lottie-web's parsing or event handling to inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript. This is highly improbable with proper coding but is a theoretical worst-case scenario.
    • How Lottie-Web Contributes: A vulnerability within lottie-web's code would be the direct cause, allowing the attacker to leverage the library for code execution.
    • Example: A crafted JSON file exploiting a hypothetical flaw in how lottie-web handles animation events or interacts with potentially dangerous JavaScript functions (extremely unlikely in a well-maintained library).
    • Impact:
      • Complete application compromise.
      • Data theft.
      • Redirection to malicious sites.
      • Malware installation.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (but very low probability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep Lottie-Web Updated: The primary mitigation is using the latest lottie-web version, which should include patches for any discovered vulnerabilities.
      • Avoid Custom Modifications: Do not modify lottie-web's source code unless absolutely necessary and with extreme caution.
      • Strict CSP: Implement a very strict Content Security Policy (CSP) disallowing inline scripts and restricting script sources. This makes injected code execution much harder.
      • Input Sanitization (Indirect): While direct injection is unlikely, sanitizing input JSON to remove potentially dangerous characters can add a layer of defense.
      • Security Audits: Regular security audits, including lottie-web usage, can help identify potential vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: 3. Malicious Resource Substitution (If External Resources are Used AND lottie-web has a vulnerability related to loading them)

  • Description: An attacker compromises the source of external resources (e.g., a CDN), replacing legitimate resources with malicious ones, and lottie-web has a vulnerability that allows this substitution to lead to a security issue (e.g., bypassing security checks).
    • How Lottie-Web Contributes: lottie-web loads and renders these resources. A vulnerability in how it loads them would be necessary for this to be a direct lottie-web issue. Without a specific lottie-web vulnerability, this is more of a general web security concern.
    • Example: An attacker compromises a CDN, replaces a legitimate image with a malicious one, and a hypothetical lottie-web bug bypasses integrity checks, allowing the malicious image to be loaded and potentially exploited.
    • Impact:
      • Potential code execution (if the malicious resource is exploitable).
      • Display of unwanted content.
      • Data theft.
    • Risk Severity: High (Contingent on a lottie-web vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Embed Resources: Embed resources within the Lottie JSON as base64 data, eliminating external dependencies.
      • Use a Trusted CDN: Use a reputable and well-secured CDN.
      • Proxy Resources: Proxy external resources through your server, allowing you to scan them for malware.
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): Restrict resource loading domains via CSP.
      • Keep Lottie-Web Updated: Ensure you are using the latest version of lottie-web to benefit from any security patches related to resource loading.
      • Subresource Integrity (SRI): If possible use SRI.