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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for alvarotrigo/fullpage.js

Attack Surface: DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Configuration Options

  • Description: Malicious JavaScript injection into the DOM through unsanitized user-controlled data used in fullpage.js configuration options. This allows attackers to execute arbitrary scripts in the user's browser within the application's context.
  • How fullpage.js Contributes: fullpage.js configuration options like menu, anchors, navigationTooltips, and slideNavigationTooltips directly manipulate the DOM based on provided values. If these values originate from user input and are not properly sanitized, fullpage.js will render them, potentially executing injected scripts.
  • Example:
    • An application dynamically sets fullpage.js anchors based on URL parameters: anchors: [getParameterByName('sectionName')].
    • An attacker crafts a URL: example.com/?sectionName=<img src=x onerror=alert('Critical XSS!')>.
    • fullpage.js renders the anchor link, including the malicious <img> tag. When the page loads, the onerror event triggers, executing alert('Critical XSS!').
  • Impact: Critical. Full compromise of the user's session. Attackers can steal credentials, session tokens, perform actions on behalf of the user, redirect to malicious sites, deface the website, and potentially gain access to sensitive data.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Input Sanitization: Enforce rigorous sanitization and encoding of all user-provided data before using it in fullpage.js configuration options. Use HTML entity encoding to neutralize potentially malicious characters.
    • Avoid Dynamic Configuration from User Input: Minimize or eliminate dynamic generation of fullpage.js configurations directly from user input. If unavoidable, use a strict whitelist of allowed characters and validate against expected formats.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strong Content Security Policy to significantly reduce the impact of XSS by controlling the sources from which the browser can load resources and execute scripts.

Attack Surface: Vulnerabilities in fullpage.js Library Itself (Dependency Risk)

  • Description: Security flaws present within the fullpage.js library code itself. Exploiting these vulnerabilities can lead to various attacks, including XSS, or potentially more severe issues depending on the nature of the flaw.
  • How fullpage.js Contributes: As a third-party dependency, fullpage.js code becomes part of the application's codebase. Any vulnerability within fullpage.js directly exposes the application to risk.
  • Example:
    • Assume a hypothetical vulnerability in an older version of fullpage.js allows for arbitrary JavaScript execution by crafting a specific URL hash or manipulating certain API calls.
    • Applications using this vulnerable version are susceptible. An attacker could craft a malicious URL or interaction to exploit this flaw and execute arbitrary JavaScript in users' browsers.
  • Impact: High to Critical. Impact depends on the specific vulnerability. Could range from XSS to more severe issues like potential Remote Code Execution (RCE) in specific scenarios, or sensitive information disclosure.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Maintain Up-to-Date fullpage.js: Always use the latest stable version of fullpage.js. Regularly update the library to benefit from security patches and bug fixes released by the maintainers.
    • Dependency Monitoring: Implement a system for monitoring dependencies for known vulnerabilities. Subscribe to security advisories related to fullpage.js and its ecosystem.
    • Security Audits (for critical applications): For highly sensitive applications, consider periodic security audits of third-party libraries, including fullpage.js, to proactively identify potential vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Abuse of Custom Callbacks for DOM-based XSS

  • Description: DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities introduced through insecure handling of user-controlled data within custom callbacks provided by fullpage.js. If callbacks manipulate the DOM using unsanitized data, attackers can inject and execute malicious scripts.
  • How fullpage.js Contributes: fullpage.js provides callbacks like afterLoad, onLeave, etc., allowing developers to execute custom JavaScript. If these callbacks process user input and directly insert it into the DOM without sanitization, they become XSS vectors.
  • Example:
    • An afterLoad callback dynamically sets section content based on the section anchor, using innerHTML: afterLoad: function(origin, destination, direction){ sectionDiv.innerHTML = getUserContent(destination.anchor); }.
    • If getUserContent retrieves content from a user-controlled source (e.g., database lookup based on URL parameter) and doesn't sanitize it, an attacker can inject malicious HTML/JavaScript through this source. When the section loads, the unsanitized content, including the malicious script, is inserted into the DOM and executed.
  • Impact: High to Critical. Similar to general DOM-based XSS, attackers can compromise user sessions, steal credentials, redirect users, and perform malicious actions within the application's context.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Callback Implementation: Thoroughly review and secure all custom callback functions used with fullpage.js. Pay close attention to how user input or external data is handled within these callbacks.
    • Input Sanitization in Callbacks: Sanitize and encode any user-controlled data within the callback functions before using it to manipulate the DOM.
    • Avoid innerHTML for User Content: When dynamically inserting content in callbacks, avoid using innerHTML if the content originates from user input or external sources. Prefer safer DOM manipulation methods like textContent for text or DOM APIs (createElement, createTextNode, appendChild) combined with sanitization when necessary for structured content.