Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
145 lines (93 loc) · 14.5 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

145 lines (93 loc) · 14.5 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for bigskysoftware/htmx

Objective: Attacker's Goal: Compromise the application by exploiting vulnerabilities arising from the use of HTMX, leading to unauthorized access, data manipulation, or disruption of service.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise HTMX Application [CRITICAL NODE]
├───Client-Side Attribute Manipulation [CRITICAL NODE]
│   └───Modify hx-* Attributes via Browser Tools/Scripts [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│       ├───Redirect Requests to Malicious Endpoints [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │   ├───Exfiltrate Sensitive Data to Attacker Server [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │   └───Trigger Server-Side Actions with Malicious Payloads [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       ├───Change Request Methods (GET to POST, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │   └───Bypass Input Validation based on Expected Method [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       └───Modify Request Parameters [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│           ├───Parameter Tampering to Access Unauthorized Data [HIGH RISK PATH]
│           └───Parameter Injection to Execute Unintended Server-Side Logic [HIGH RISK PATH]
├───Server-Side Vulnerabilities Exploited via HTMX Requests [CRITICAL NODE]
│   └───Insecure Endpoints Designed for HTMX [CRITICAL NODE]
│       ├───Lack of Input Validation on HTMX Endpoints [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│       │   ├───Server-Side Injection Attacks (Command Injection, Path Traversal - if applicable to endpoint logic) [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │   └───Business Logic Bypass due to Unvalidated Input [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       ├───Authentication/Authorization Bypass on HTMX Endpoints [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│       │   └───Accessing Sensitive Data or Functionality without Proper Authentication [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       └───Rate Limiting/DoS Vulnerabilities on HTMX Endpoints [HIGH RISK PATH]
│           ├───Overwhelming Server with Rapid HTMX Requests [HIGH RISK PATH]
│           └───Resource Exhaustion due to Unbounded HTMX Request Handling [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   └───Server-Side Rendering Vulnerabilities in HTMX Responses [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └───Unsanitized Data Inclusion in HTML Fragments [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│           └───Server-Side XSS leading to DOM-based XSS on the client [HIGH RISK PATH]
└───DOM-Based Vulnerabilities Introduced by HTMX Swapping [CRITICAL NODE]
    └───HTML Injection leading to DOM-Based XSS [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        └───Server Returns Unsafe HTML that is Swapped into the DOM [HIGH RISK PATH]
            └───Execute Arbitrary JavaScript via DOM-Based XSS [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Compromise HTMX Application:

  • This is the root goal of the attacker. Success means achieving unauthorized access, data manipulation, or disruption of the application using HTMX-related vulnerabilities.
  • It is a critical node because all subsequent attacks aim to achieve this root goal.

Attack Tree Path: Client-Side Attribute Manipulation:

  • This node represents the broad category of attacks that exploit the client-side nature of HTMX attributes. Attackers manipulate hx-* attributes to alter the intended behavior of HTMX requests.
  • It is critical because it is a direct and easily accessible attack surface specific to HTMX.

Attack Tree Path: Modify hx-* Attributes via Browser Tools/Scripts:

  • This is the most direct method of client-side attribute manipulation. Attackers use browser developer tools or scripts to directly change hx-* attributes in the rendered HTML.
  • It is critical and a high-risk path because it is easily achievable by attackers with basic web browser knowledge and can lead to various sub-attacks.

Attack Tree Path: Modify Request Parameters:

  • Attackers modify parameters associated with HTMX requests, either by directly changing attributes that define parameters or by intercepting and altering requests.
  • It is critical and a high-risk path because parameter manipulation is a common and effective web attack vector, and HTMX requests are susceptible to it.

Attack Tree Path: Server-Side Vulnerabilities Exploited via HTMX Requests:

  • This node encompasses all server-side vulnerabilities that can be exploited through HTMX requests. It highlights that HTMX requests are just as vulnerable as any other web request and require robust server-side security.
  • It is critical because server-side vulnerabilities often have severe consequences, including RCE and data breaches.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Endpoints Designed for HTMX:

  • This focuses on the risk that developers might create HTMX-specific endpoints with weaker security measures compared to traditional endpoints.
  • It is critical because it represents a potential area of oversight in security implementation when using HTMX.

Attack Tree Path: Lack of Input Validation on HTMX Endpoints:

  • HTMX endpoints, like all web endpoints, are vulnerable to injection attacks and business logic bypass if input validation is insufficient.
  • It is critical and a high-risk path because lack of input validation is a fundamental and common vulnerability leading to severe impacts.

Attack Tree Path: Authentication/Authorization Bypass on HTMX Endpoints:

  • Attackers attempt to bypass authentication and authorization checks on HTMX endpoints to gain unauthorized access to data or functionality.
  • It is critical and a high-risk path because bypassing authentication and authorization directly leads to unauthorized access and potential data breaches.

Attack Tree Path: Server-Side Rendering Vulnerabilities in HTMX Responses:

  • This node highlights vulnerabilities that arise during the server-side generation of HTML fragments that are sent back as HTMX responses.
  • It is critical because vulnerabilities in HTML fragment generation can lead to XSS and other DOM-based attacks.

Attack Tree Path: Unsanitized Data Inclusion in HTML Fragments:

  • If the server includes unsanitized data in HTML fragments, it can lead to DOM-based XSS when HTMX swaps in the content.
  • It is critical and a high-risk path because it directly leads to DOM-based XSS, a significant client-side vulnerability.

Attack Tree Path: DOM-Based Vulnerabilities Introduced by HTMX Swapping:

  • This node represents the category of vulnerabilities that are specifically introduced or amplified by HTMX's DOM swapping mechanism.
  • It is critical because it highlights the unique DOM-related risks associated with HTMX.

Attack Tree Path: HTML Injection leading to DOM-Based XSS:

  • This is a specific type of DOM-based vulnerability where the server returns unsafe HTML, which when swapped into the DOM by HTMX, results in DOM-based XSS.
  • It is critical and a high-risk path because DOM-based XSS is a significant client-side vulnerability with potentially high impact.

Attack Tree Path: Modify hx-* Attributes via Browser Tools/Scripts -> Redirect Requests to Malicious Endpoints -> Exfiltrate Sensitive Data to Attacker Server:

  • Attackers modify hx-get or hx-post attributes to point to an attacker-controlled server. When the HTMX trigger is activated, the request is sent to the attacker's server, potentially exfiltrating sensitive data included in the request or the page context.

Attack Tree Path: Modify hx-* Attributes via Browser Tools/Scripts -> Redirect Requests to Malicious Endpoints -> Trigger Server-Side Actions with Malicious Payloads:

  • Attackers redirect HTMX requests to legitimate application endpoints but modify request parameters or the request body to include malicious payloads. This can trigger unintended server-side actions or exploit vulnerabilities in server-side logic.

Attack Tree Path: Modify hx-* Attributes via Browser Tools/Scripts -> Change Request Methods (GET to POST, etc.) -> Bypass Input Validation based on Expected Method:

  • Attackers change the HTTP method of an HTMX request (e.g., from GET to POST) by modifying hx-get to hx-post or using browser tools. If the server-side input validation or routing logic relies on the expected HTTP method, this change can bypass validation and lead to unintended code execution or access.

Attack Tree Path: Modify hx-* Attributes via Browser Tools/Scripts -> Modify Request Parameters -> Parameter Tampering to Access Unauthorized Data:

  • Attackers modify request parameters associated with HTMX requests to access data they are not authorized to view. This is classic parameter tampering, made easier to manipulate client-side with HTMX attributes.

Attack Tree Path: Modify hx-* Attributes via Browser Tools/Scripts -> Modify Request Parameters -> Parameter Injection to Execute Unintended Server-Side Logic:

  • Attackers inject malicious parameters or modify existing parameters to exploit vulnerabilities in server-side logic, potentially leading to unintended actions, data modification, or privilege escalation.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Endpoints Designed for HTMX -> Lack of Input Validation on HTMX Endpoints -> Server-Side Injection Attacks (Command Injection, Path Traversal - if applicable to endpoint logic):

  • If HTMX endpoints lack proper input validation, attackers can inject malicious commands or paths into input fields or parameters. This can lead to server-side injection vulnerabilities like command injection or path traversal, potentially allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code or access sensitive files on the server.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Endpoints Designed for HTMX -> Lack of Input Validation on HTMX Endpoints -> Business Logic Bypass due to Unvalidated Input:

  • Insufficient input validation on HTMX endpoints can allow attackers to bypass business logic constraints. By sending unexpected or crafted input, attackers can manipulate application flow, access restricted features, or perform actions they are not supposed to.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Endpoints Designed for HTMX -> Authentication/Authorization Bypass on HTMX Endpoints -> Accessing Sensitive Data or Functionality without Proper Authentication:

  • If authentication or authorization checks are missing or improperly implemented on HTMX endpoints, attackers can directly access sensitive data or functionality without proper credentials or permissions.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Endpoints Designed for HTMX -> Rate Limiting/DoS Vulnerabilities on HTMX Endpoints -> Overwhelming Server with Rapid HTMX Requests:

  • HTMX makes it easy to trigger frequent requests. If HTMX endpoints are not rate-limited, attackers can easily flood the server with rapid HTMX requests, leading to a Denial of Service (DoS) by overwhelming server resources.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Endpoints Designed for HTMX -> Rate Limiting/DoS Vulnerabilities on HTMX Endpoints -> Resource Exhaustion due to Unbounded HTMX Request Handling:

  • Even without explicitly flooding, if server-side code handling HTMX requests is inefficient or resource-intensive, attackers can trigger resource exhaustion by sending a moderate number of carefully crafted HTMX requests that consume excessive server resources.

Attack Tree Path: Server-Side Rendering Vulnerabilities in HTMX Responses -> Unsanitized Data Inclusion in HTML Fragments -> Server-Side XSS leading to DOM-based XSS on the client:

  • If the server includes unsanitized user-controlled data in the HTML fragments it sends back as HTMX responses, it can lead to server-side XSS. When HTMX swaps this fragment into the DOM, the XSS payload is executed in the user's browser, resulting in DOM-based XSS.

Attack Tree Path: DOM-Based Vulnerabilities Introduced by HTMX Swapping -> HTML Injection leading to DOM-Based XSS -> Server Returns Unsafe HTML that is Swapped into the DOM -> Execute Arbitrary JavaScript via DOM-Based XSS:

  • This path describes the general scenario of DOM-based XSS via HTMX. If the server returns unsafe HTML in HTMX responses, and this HTML is swapped into the DOM, it can lead to DOM-based XSS. The attacker injects malicious HTML that contains JavaScript, which is then executed when the HTML is inserted into the page by HTMX.