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Attack Tree Analysis for bigskysoftware/htmx

Objective: Execute Unauthorized Actions or Access Sensitive Data

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      <<Attacker's Goal: Execute Unauthorized Actions or Access Sensitive Data>>
                                                      /                                                   \
                                                     /                                                     \
               {1. Manipulate htmx Attributes to Trigger Unintended Actions}      <<3. Exploit Server-Side Vulnerabilities Exposed by htmx>>
              /           |           \                                                                  /           |           \
             /            |            \                                                                 /            |            \
{1.1 HX-Trigger} {1.2 HX-Target} {1.3 HX-Swap}                                        <<3.1 XSS via HX-Swap>> <<3.2 CSRF via HX-Trigger>> {3.3 Sensitive Data Exposure}

Attack Tree Path: 1. Manipulate htmx Attributes to Trigger Unintended Actions

  • Description: This path represents the attacker's ability to modify htmx attributes on the client-side to cause the application to behave in unexpected and potentially harmful ways. This is a high-risk path due to the ease of manipulation and the potential for significant impact.
  • Mitigation (General for this Path):
    • Server-Side Validation: Always validate all request parameters and user permissions on the server, regardless of client-side htmx attributes.
    • Attribute Immutability (Ideal): Design the application so that critical htmx attributes are not modifiable by the client after initial rendering.
    • Input Sanitization: Sanitize any user input that might influence htmx attributes.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 HX-Trigger Manipulation

  • Description: Modifying the hx-trigger attribute to trigger requests on unexpected events (e.g., changing click to mouseover or injecting custom events).
    • Attack Scenario: Changing a "delete" action's trigger from click to mouseover, causing accidental deletions.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium to High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Beginner to Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation (Specific):
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): Restrict allowed event types.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2 HX-Target Manipulation

  • Description: Changing the hx-target attribute to direct the response to an unintended element, potentially overwriting sensitive data or injecting malicious content.
    • Attack Scenario: Redirecting a comment update request to target the #admin-panel element, potentially injecting malicious content.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High to Very High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Beginner to Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
    • Mitigation (Specific):
      • Server-Side Target Validation: The server must determine the correct target element based on the request, not the client-provided hx-target.
      • Strict Output Encoding: Encode all server responses to prevent XSS.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3 HX-Swap Manipulation

  • Description: Altering the hx-swap attribute to change how the returned HTML is inserted, potentially enabling XSS attacks that would otherwise be prevented.
    • Attack Scenario: Changing hx-swap from outerHTML to innerHTML to allow script execution within a returned HTML snippet.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium to High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
    • Mitigation (Specific):
      • Server-Side Swap Control: The server should dictate the swap strategy.
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): Restrict inline script execution.
      • Sanitize and Encode: Always sanitize and encode server responses.
      • Avoid innerHTML: Prefer safer swap strategies when possible.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Server-Side Vulnerabilities Exposed by htmx

  • Description: This node represents the most severe class of attacks, where htmx is used as a vector to exploit underlying server-side vulnerabilities. This is critical because successful exploitation can lead to complete application compromise.
  • Mitigation (General for this Node):
    • Robust Authentication and Authorization: Ensure only authorized users can access sensitive data and perform actions.
    • Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate and sanitize all user input on the server-side.
    • Output Encoding: Encode all data returned from the server to prevent XSS.
    • CSRF Protection: Implement standard CSRF protection mechanisms.
    • Regular Security Audits and Penetration Testing.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1 XSS via HX-Swap

  • Description: Injecting malicious JavaScript through unsanitized user input returned in an htmx response and inserted into the DOM via hx-swap.
    • Attack Scenario: A user submits a comment containing a <script> tag. If the server doesn't sanitize this input, and it's returned in an htmx response, the script could execute in other users' browsers.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High to Very High
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
    • Mitigation (Specific):
      • Strict Output Encoding: Encode all data for the appropriate context (HTML, JavaScript, etc.).
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): Restrict script execution.
      • Input Sanitization: Sanitize input before storing and before returning.

Attack Tree Path: 3.2 CSRF via HX-Trigger

  • Description: Tricking a user into triggering an htmx request (often through a malicious website) that performs an unauthorized action on their behalf. The predictability of hx-trigger can facilitate this.
    • Attack Scenario: An attacker crafts a malicious link that, when clicked by a logged-in user, triggers an htmx request to delete their account.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium to High
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation (Specific):
      • CSRF Tokens: Include unique, unpredictable tokens in each request and validate them on the server.
      • SameSite Cookies: Use SameSite cookies to restrict cross-origin cookie sending.

Attack Tree Path: 3.3 Sensitive Data Exposure

  • Description: Crafting htmx requests to retrieve sensitive data that the user should not have access to, due to insufficient authorization checks on the server.
    • Attack Scenario: An attacker discovers an htmx endpoint that returns user data. By modifying request parameters, they might be able to retrieve data for other users.
    • Likelihood: Low to Medium
    • Impact: High to Very High
    • Effort: Medium to High
    • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
    • Mitigation (Specific):
      • Robust Authorization: Enforce strict authorization checks on every request that accesses sensitive data.
      • Least Privilege: Grant users only the minimum necessary permissions.