- Threat: Parallel Execution Overload
- Description: An attacker sends a large number of requests or provides a large input that triggers the application to use
async.parallel
orasync.each
(or their*Limit
counterparts with an excessively high limit) without proper bounds. The attacker aims to spawn a massive number of concurrent operations, exhausting server resources. For example, if the application processes image uploads in parallel, the attacker could upload thousands of images simultaneously. - Impact: Denial of Service (DoS). The application becomes unresponsive, crashes, or is unable to serve legitimate users. Database connections, file handles, memory, and CPU can all be exhausted.
- Affected Async Component:
async.parallel
,async.parallelLimit
,async.each
,async.eachLimit
,async.map
,async.mapLimit
, and any other functions that execute tasks concurrently. - Risk Severity: High (potentially Critical if easily exploitable and no other DoS protections are in place).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Strict Input Validation: Validate the size and number of inputs before passing them to
async
functions. Reject excessively large or numerous inputs. - Use
*Limit
Variants: Always preferasync.parallelLimit
,async.eachLimit
,async.mapLimit
, etc., over their unbounded counterparts. - Dynamic Concurrency Limits: Instead of hardcoding limits, consider adjusting them dynamically based on current server load and resource availability.
- Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting at the application or API gateway level to restrict the number of requests a user can make within a given time period.
- Queueing System: Use a robust queueing system (e.g., Bull, Bee-Queue, or a message broker like RabbitMQ) to manage asynchronous tasks. This provides better control over concurrency and resource utilization than
async
alone. - Circuit Breakers: Implement circuit breakers to prevent cascading failures if a dependent service (e.g., a database) becomes overloaded.
- Strict Input Validation: Validate the size and number of inputs before passing them to
- Threat: Queue Overflow Attack
- Description: An attacker sends a flood of requests that add tasks to an
async.queue
. The attacker sends requests faster than the queue workers can process them, causing the queue to grow without bound. - Impact: Denial of Service (DoS). The application runs out of memory and crashes.
- Affected Async Component:
async.queue
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Queue Length Monitoring: Continuously monitor the queue length and set alerts for unusual growth.
- Backpressure: Implement backpressure mechanisms. When the queue reaches a certain size, the application should slow down or stop accepting new tasks until the queue size decreases. This requires coordination between the task producer and the
async.queue
. - Persistent Queue: Use a persistent queue (e.g., Redis-backed) to prevent data loss in case of a crash and to allow for more sophisticated queue management.
- Maximum Queue Size (Custom Implementation):
async.queue
doesn't have a built-in maximum size. You'll need to wrap it with custom logic to reject new tasks when a limit is reached. This might involve checkingqueue.length()
before pushing. - Rate Limiting: Limit the rate at which tasks can be added to the queue.
- Threat: Synchronous Blocking Operation
- Description: An attacker crafts input that triggers a long-running synchronous operation within an
async
callback (e.g., a computationally expensive calculation, a blocking I/O operation without proper asynchronous handling). The attacker aims to block the Node.js event loop. - Impact: Denial of Service (DoS). The application becomes unresponsive to all requests while the blocking operation is running.
- Affected Async Component: Any
async
function that uses callbacks containing synchronous blocking code (e.g.,async.queue
worker,async.each
iterator, etc.). The issue isn'tasync
itself, but how it's used. - Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Asynchronous I/O: Use asynchronous versions of I/O operations (e.g.,
fs.readFile
instead offs.readFileSync
, asynchronous database drivers). - Worker Threads: Offload CPU-bound tasks to worker threads (using the
worker_threads
module in Node.js) to prevent blocking the main event loop. - Process Pool: For very heavy computations, consider using a process pool to distribute the work across multiple processes.
- Code Profiling: Use profiling tools to identify and eliminate synchronous blocking operations within
async
callbacks. - Input Validation (Indirect Mitigation): Validate input to prevent triggering computationally expensive operations maliciously.
- Asynchronous I/O: Use asynchronous versions of I/O operations (e.g.,
- Threat: Concurrent Resource Modification
- Description: An attacker exploits timing vulnerabilities by sending multiple requests that trigger concurrent asynchronous operations (e.g., using
async.parallel
) that access and modify the same shared resource (e.g., a global variable, a database record) without proper synchronization. - Impact: Data corruption, inconsistent application state, unpredictable behavior, potentially leading to security vulnerabilities (e.g., privilege escalation if user roles are corrupted).
- Affected Async Component:
async.parallel
,async.each
, and any other functions that execute tasks concurrently, if those tasks access shared mutable state. - Risk Severity: High (potentially Critical depending on the nature of the shared resource).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Minimize Shared State: Design the application to minimize shared mutable state. Favor immutable data structures.
- Synchronization Primitives: Use appropriate synchronization mechanisms (e.g., mutexes, semaphores, atomic operations) to protect access to shared resources. Libraries like
async-mutex
can help. - Database Transactions: If using a database, use transactions to ensure atomicity and consistency of operations that modify shared data.
- Careful Code Review: Thoroughly review code that uses
async.parallel
orasync.each
to identify and eliminate potential race conditions.