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Attack Tree Analysis for chartjs/chart.js

Objective: Compromise Application via Chart.js

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Root Goal: Compromise Application via Chart.js [CRITICAL NODE]
      1. Client-Side Exploitation (Direct Chart.js Interaction) [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 1.1. Malicious Data Injection [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 1.1.1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Data [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
          • 1.1.1.1. Inject Malicious JavaScript in Data Labels [HIGH RISK PATH]
          • 1.1.1.2. Inject Malicious JavaScript in Data Tooltips [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 1.2. Exploiting Chart.js Library Vulnerabilities (Direct Bugs in Chart.js) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 1.2.1. Known Vulnerabilities (CVEs, Public Disclosures) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
          • 1.2.1.1. Exploiting Outdated Chart.js Version [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 1.4. Misconfiguration/Insecure Implementation of Chart.js
        • 1.4.2. Insecure Data Handling Before Chart.js Rendering [HIGH RISK PATH]
      1. Server-Side Influence (Indirect Chart.js Exploitation via Data Source) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 2.1. Compromising Data Source (Server-Side Vulnerabilities) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 2.1.1. Data API Vulnerabilities (e.g., SQL Injection, API Injection) [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Root Goal: Compromise Application via Chart.js [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: This is the attacker's ultimate objective. Success means gaining unauthorized access, control, or causing harm to the application that uses Chart.js.

Attack Tree Path: 2. 1. Client-Side Exploitation (Direct Chart.js Interaction) [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: Attackers directly target the client-side application and its interaction with Chart.js. This involves exploiting vulnerabilities that manifest within the user's browser when Chart.js renders content.
  • Attack Vectors within this Node:
    • Malicious Data Injection
    • Exploiting Chart.js Library Vulnerabilities
    • Misconfiguration/Insecure Implementation (specifically Insecure Data Handling Before Chart.js Rendering)

Attack Tree Path: 3. 1.1. Malicious Data Injection [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: This is a primary high-risk path. Attackers attempt to inject malicious data into the application that is then processed and rendered by Chart.js. If Chart.js or the application doesn't properly sanitize or handle this data, it can lead to client-side vulnerabilities.
  • Attack Vectors within this Node:
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Data

Attack Tree Path: 4. 1.1.1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Data [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: This is a critical and high-risk attack vector. By injecting malicious scripts within the data provided to Chart.js, attackers can execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the user's browser. This can lead to session hijacking, cookie theft, defacement, redirection to malicious sites, and other client-side attacks.
  • Specific Attack Vectors within this Node:
    • 1.1.1.1. Inject Malicious JavaScript in Data Labels [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious JavaScript code (e.g., <script>alert('XSS')</script>) into data that is used to generate chart labels. If labels are rendered without proper HTML encoding or sanitization, the injected script will execute when Chart.js renders the chart.
      • Example: An attacker might manipulate a form field or API request to include data like "<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>" as a chart label.
    • 1.1.1.2. Inject Malicious JavaScript in Data Tooltips [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Similar to labels, injecting malicious JavaScript into data used to generate chart tooltips. When a user hovers over a chart element and the tooltip is displayed, the injected script will execute if tooltips are not properly sanitized.
      • Example: An attacker might inject data like "<div onmouseover=alert('XSS')>Hover me</div>" into tooltip data.

Attack Tree Path: 5. 1.2. Exploiting Chart.js Library Vulnerabilities (Direct Bugs in Chart.js) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: This is another critical and high-risk path. Attackers target vulnerabilities directly within the Chart.js library itself. Exploiting these vulnerabilities can bypass application-level security measures and directly compromise the client-side environment.
  • Attack Vectors within this Node:
    • Known Vulnerabilities (CVEs, Public Disclosures)

Attack Tree Path: 6. 1.2.1. Known Vulnerabilities (CVEs, Public Disclosures) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: This is a significant high-risk path. Using outdated versions of Chart.js that contain publicly known vulnerabilities (documented as CVEs or security advisories) makes the application an easy target. Exploits for known vulnerabilities are often readily available, lowering the barrier for attackers.
  • Specific Attack Vectors within this Node:
    • 1.2.1.1. Exploiting Outdated Chart.js Version [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: The application uses an old version of Chart.js that has known security flaws. Attackers can leverage publicly available exploit code or techniques to target these vulnerabilities.
      • Example: If a CVE is published for a specific Chart.js version allowing XSS or Remote Code Execution, applications using that version are directly vulnerable until they update.

Attack Tree Path: 7. 1.4. Misconfiguration/Insecure Implementation of Chart.js

  • Description: While broader misconfigurations exist, the high-risk aspect here is related to how the application handles data before it reaches Chart.js.
  • Specific High-Risk Attack Vector within this Node:
    • 1.4.2. Insecure Data Handling Before Chart.js Rendering [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: The application itself processes data insecurely before passing it to Chart.js for rendering. This could involve fetching data from untrusted sources without validation, performing unsafe transformations, or using insecure APIs. Even if Chart.js is secure, vulnerabilities introduced in the application's data handling pipeline can be exploited.
      • Example: An application might fetch data from a public API that is vulnerable to data injection, and then directly use this data in Chart.js without sanitization, leading to XSS vulnerabilities when Chart.js renders the chart.

Attack Tree Path: 8. 2. Server-Side Influence (Indirect Chart.js Exploitation via Data Source) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: This is a critical and high-risk path because it highlights that vulnerabilities are not limited to the client-side. Compromising the server-side data source that feeds data to Chart.js can indirectly lead to client-side exploitation.
  • Attack Vectors within this Node:
    • Compromising Data Source (Server-Side Vulnerabilities)

Attack Tree Path: 9. 2.1. Compromising Data Source (Server-Side Vulnerabilities) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: This is a high-risk path because successful server-side compromise can have broad and severe consequences, including indirectly affecting the client-side application using Chart.js.
  • Specific Attack Vectors within this Node:
    • 2.1.1. Data API Vulnerabilities (e.g., SQL Injection, API Injection) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the server-side API that provides data for the charts. Common vulnerabilities include SQL injection, API injection, and other server-side injection flaws. Successful exploitation allows attackers to manipulate the data returned by the API. This malicious data is then passed to the client-side application and rendered by Chart.js, potentially leading to client-side XSS or data manipulation in the charts.
      • Example: An attacker might use SQL injection to modify database queries, causing the API to return malicious JavaScript code as chart data, which is then rendered by Chart.js and executed in the user's browser.