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Attack Tree Analysis for chartjs/chart.js

Objective: Manipulate/Exfiltrate Data or Disrupt Application via Chart.js

Attack Tree Visualization

Attacker's Goal: Manipulate/Exfiltrate Data or Disrupt Application via Chart.js

OR

1.  Manipulate Data Displayed in Charts  [HIGH RISK]
    AND
    a.  Gain Control of Chart Data Source  [CRITICAL]
        OR
        i.   Exploit Vulnerabilities in Application Code Handling Data Input (NOT Chart.js specific, but relevant to data source) [HIGH RISK]
    b.  Exploit Chart.js Configuration/Rendering Vulnerabilities
        OR
        i.   Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Chart Configuration Options  [HIGH RISK]
            AND
            2.  Inject Malicious Script into that Option via Application Input  [CRITICAL]
            3.  Application Fails to Sanitize Input Before Passing to Chart.js  [CRITICAL]
        iii. Data Exfiltration via crafted labels/tooltips [HIGH RISK]
            AND
            2.  Craft a payload that reads sensitive data from the DOM or application memory. [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Manipulate Data Displayed in Charts [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: This is the primary high-risk path, focusing on the attacker's ability to alter the data shown in the charts, leading to misinformation, deception, or further attacks.

Attack Tree Path: 1.a. Gain Control of Chart Data Source [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is the foundational step for many data manipulation attacks. If the attacker controls the data source, they control the chart's content.
  • Sub-Vector:

Attack Tree Path: 1.a.i. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Application Code Handling Data Input [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This involves finding weaknesses in how the application processes user-provided data before it's used to generate chart data. This is not a Chart.js-specific vulnerability, but it's a critical pathway to controlling the chart's input.
  • Examples:
    • SQL Injection: If the chart data comes from a database, and the application doesn't properly sanitize user input used in SQL queries, an attacker could inject malicious SQL code to retrieve, modify, or delete data.
    • Command Injection: If the application uses user input to construct commands executed on the server (e.g., to fetch data from an external source), an attacker could inject malicious commands.
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Data Source Input: If user input is used to populate the data source itself (e.g., a user-editable database field), and that input isn't sanitized, an attacker could inject JavaScript that would then be executed when the chart is rendered. This is a different XSS attack than the one targeting Chart.js configuration directly.
  • Mitigation: Rigorous input validation and sanitization on the server-side, parameterized queries (for SQL), and escaping/encoding data appropriately.

Attack Tree Path: 1.b. Exploit Chart.js Configuration/Rendering Vulnerabilities

  • Sub-Vector:

Attack Tree Path: 1.b.i. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Chart Configuration Options [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This involves injecting malicious JavaScript code into the configuration options of Chart.js (e.g., labels, tooltips, titles). If the application doesn't sanitize user input before passing it to these options, the attacker's script can be executed in the context of the victim's browser.
  • Steps:

Attack Tree Path: 1.b.i.2. Inject Malicious Script into that Option via Application Input [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The attacker finds a way to provide input to the application that will be used, unsanitized, in a Chart.js configuration option. This could be through a form field, URL parameter, or any other input mechanism.
  • Example: If a chart's title is set using a user-provided value, and the application doesn't sanitize that value, the attacker could enter something like: <script>alert('XSS')</script> as the title.

Attack Tree Path: 1.b.i.3. Application Fails to Sanitize Input Before Passing to Chart.js [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is the crucial vulnerability. The application takes the user's input and directly uses it in the Chart.js configuration without removing or escaping potentially dangerous characters. This is a failure of the application's security, not a bug in Chart.js itself (although Chart.js should ideally be robust against such misuse).
  • Mitigation: Use a robust input sanitization library before passing any user-supplied data to Chart.js. Never trust user input.

Attack Tree Path: Mitigation (Overall for XSS)

  • Input Sanitization (Primary): Use a well-vetted library to remove or escape potentially dangerous characters from user input.
  • Content Security Policy (CSP): A strong CSP can prevent the execution of injected scripts, even if the application fails to sanitize input.
  • Output Encoding: Encode data when displaying it within the chart (e.g., HTML-encode labels and tooltips). This is a secondary defense, as input sanitization is preferred.

Attack Tree Path: 1.b.iii. Data Exfiltration via crafted labels/tooltips [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This attack leverages the ability to inject JavaScript code (similar to XSS) but with the specific goal of stealing data. The injected script accesses sensitive information from the page (e.g., cookies, session tokens, data displayed elsewhere on the page) and sends it to an attacker-controlled server. * Steps:

Attack Tree Path: 1.b.iii.2. Craft a payload that reads sensitive data from the DOM or application memory. [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The attacker creates a JavaScript payload that, when executed in the victim's browser, can access and extract sensitive data.
  • Examples:
    • document.cookie: Accesses the user's cookies.
    • Accessing specific HTML elements by ID or class to read their content.
    • Accessing JavaScript variables in the application's scope (if possible due to the XSS vulnerability).
  • Mitigation: Same as for XSS (input sanitization, CSP, output encoding). Also, ensure sensitive data is not unnecessarily exposed in the DOM or client-side code. Use HttpOnly cookies to prevent JavaScript access to cookies.