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Attack Tree Analysis for cypress-io/cypress

Objective: Compromise the Application via Cypress Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Focused Cypress Threat Model: High-Risk Paths and Critical Nodes

Attacker's Goal: Compromise the Application via Cypress Exploitation

High-Risk Sub-Tree:

Compromise Application via Cypress (Critical Node - Root Goal)
├───(OR)─ Exploit Cypress Configuration Vulnerabilities (High-Risk Path)
│   ├───(AND)─ Expose Sensitive Information via Cypress Configuration (High-Risk Path)
│   │   ├───(OR)─ Hardcoded Secrets in Cypress Configuration Files (cypress.config.js, etc.) (Critical Node)
│   │   ├───(OR)─ Insecure Environment Variable Handling (Critical Node)
│   ├───(AND)─ Misconfigure Cypress Plugins or Custom Commands (High-Risk Path)
│   │   ├───(OR)─ Vulnerable or Malicious Cypress Plugins (Critical Node)
├───(OR)─ Compromise Cypress Test Environment or CI/CD Pipeline (High-Risk Path)
│   ├───(AND)─ Supply Chain Attacks via Cypress Dependencies (High-Risk Path)
│   │   ├───(OR)─ Vulnerable Cypress Dependencies (Critical Node)
│   │   ├───(OR)─ Malicious Cypress Dependencies (Critical Node)
│   ├───(AND)─ Insecure CI/CD Pipeline Configuration for Cypress Tests (High-Risk Path)
│   │   ├───(OR)─ Exposed CI/CD Secrets Used by Cypress Tests (Critical Node)
│   │   ├───(OR)─ Compromised CI/CD Pipeline Steps Executing Cypress Tests (Critical Node)
├───(OR)─ Abuse Cypress Features for Malicious Actions
│   ├───(AND)─ Exploit Cypress Debugging and Reporting Features
│   │   ├───(OR)─ Information Leakage via Cypress Screenshots and Videos (Critical Node)

Attack Vector Category: Misconfiguration and Information Disclosure.

  • Description: Attackers target weaknesses in how Cypress is configured, focusing on exposing sensitive information or creating permissive settings that can be exploited.

    • 1.1. Expose Sensitive Information via Cypress Configuration (High-Risk Path)

      • Attack Vectors:
        • Hardcoded Secrets in Cypress Configuration Files (cypress.config.js, etc.) (Critical Node)
          • Description: Developers unintentionally embed secrets like API keys, database credentials, or other sensitive tokens directly within Cypress configuration files (e.g., cypress.config.js, cypress.env.json).
          • Exploitation: Attackers gain access to these configuration files (e.g., through public repositories, leaked backups, or compromised systems) and extract the hardcoded secrets.
          • Impact: Direct access to backend systems, data breaches, unauthorized actions using compromised credentials.
          • Mitigation:
            • Never hardcode secrets in configuration files.
            • Utilize secure secret management solutions (e.g., environment variables, vault systems).
            • Implement pre-commit hooks or automated scanners to detect and prevent secret commits.
        • Insecure Environment Variable Handling (Critical Node)
          • Description: Cypress configuration relies on environment variables for sensitive settings, but these variables are not properly secured. This could include exposure in CI/CD logs, insecure storage, or lack of proper access controls.
          • Exploitation: Attackers gain access to the environment where Cypress tests are executed (e.g., CI/CD environment, test servers) and retrieve exposed environment variables containing secrets.
          • Impact: Similar to hardcoded secrets - access to backend systems, data breaches, unauthorized actions.
          • Mitigation:
            • Use CI/CD platform's built-in secret management features.
            • Ensure environment variables are not logged in CI/CD outputs or application logs.
            • Restrict access to environments where sensitive environment variables are used.
    • 1.2. Misconfigure Cypress Plugins or Custom Commands (High-Risk Path)

      • Attack Vectors:
        • Vulnerable or Malicious Cypress Plugins (Critical Node)
          • Description: Using third-party Cypress plugins that contain known vulnerabilities or are intentionally malicious.
          • Exploitation: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in plugins to gain code execution within the Cypress test environment, potentially leading to test environment compromise, data exfiltration, or even impacting the application under test. Malicious plugins could be designed to directly compromise the system.
          • Impact: Code execution, test environment compromise, data exfiltration, potential application compromise.
          • Mitigation:
            • Thoroughly vet and audit all third-party plugins before use.
            • Check plugin reputation, maintainers, and security history.
            • Keep plugins updated to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities.
            • Consider developing in-house plugins for critical functionalities to reduce reliance on external code.
            • Implement Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tools to scan plugins for vulnerabilities.

Attack Vector Category: Infrastructure Compromise and Supply Chain Attacks.

  • Description: Attackers target the infrastructure where Cypress tests are executed, specifically the test environment and CI/CD pipeline. Compromising these systems can have broad and severe consequences.

    • 2.1. Supply Chain Attacks via Cypress Dependencies (High-Risk Path)

      • Attack Vectors:
        • Vulnerable Cypress Dependencies (Critical Node)
          • Description: Cypress and its plugins rely on numerous dependencies. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies can be exploited to compromise the test environment or CI/CD pipeline.
          • Exploitation: Attackers exploit known vulnerabilities in Cypress dependencies to gain code execution or access within the test environment or CI/CD pipeline.
          • Impact: Test environment compromise, CI/CD pipeline compromise, potential application compromise, data breaches.
          • Mitigation:
            • Regularly scan Cypress project dependencies for vulnerabilities using dependency scanning tools (e.g., npm audit, yarn audit, Snyk, OWASP Dependency-Check).
            • Keep Cypress and its plugins updated to the latest versions, which often include dependency updates.
            • Implement automated dependency vulnerability monitoring and alerting.
        • Malicious Cypress Dependencies (Critical Node)
          • Description: Attackers intentionally introduce compromised or malicious dependencies into the Cypress project's dependency tree. This could be through typosquatting, account compromise on package registries, or direct injection.
          • Exploitation: Malicious dependencies execute code during installation or runtime within the test environment or CI/CD pipeline, allowing attackers to gain control, exfiltrate data, or inject malicious code into the application build process.
          • Impact: Severe CI/CD pipeline compromise, application compromise, supply chain contamination, data breaches, reputational damage.
          • Mitigation:
            • Use dependency lock files (package-lock.json, yarn.lock) to ensure consistent dependency versions.
            • Verify dependency integrity using checksums or signatures when possible.
            • Regularly audit project dependencies and their sources.
            • Employ dependency scanning tools that can detect suspicious or known malicious packages.
            • Consider using private package registries for greater control over dependencies.
    • 2.2. Insecure CI/CD Pipeline Configuration for Cypress Tests (High-Risk Path)

      • Attack Vectors:
        • Exposed CI/CD Secrets Used by Cypress Tests (Critical Node)
          • Description: CI/CD pipelines often use secrets (API keys, credentials) to interact with services during Cypress tests (e.g., deploying test environments, accessing APIs). If these secrets are exposed within the CI/CD pipeline configuration, logs, or environment, they become vulnerable.
          • Exploitation: Attackers gain access to CI/CD pipeline configurations, logs, or environment variables and extract exposed secrets.
          • Impact: CI/CD pipeline compromise, access to cloud resources, application compromise, data breaches, unauthorized actions using compromised credentials.
          • Mitigation:
            • Utilize CI/CD platform's dedicated secret management features (e.g., secret variables, vaults).
            • Avoid logging secrets in CI/CD pipeline outputs or build logs.
            • Restrict access to CI/CD pipeline configurations and logs to authorized personnel only.
            • Regularly audit CI/CD pipeline configurations for potential secret exposure.
        • Compromised CI/CD Pipeline Steps Executing Cypress Tests (Critical Node)
          • Description: Attackers compromise the CI/CD pipeline steps responsible for executing Cypress tests. This could involve injecting malicious code into pipeline scripts, modifying test execution flow, or altering the build process.
          • Exploitation: Attackers modify CI/CD pipeline steps to inject malicious code, manipulate test results, or compromise the application build artifacts.
          • Impact: Application compromise, backdoors in deployed applications, CI/CD pipeline control, supply chain contamination.
          • Mitigation:
            • Secure the CI/CD pipeline infrastructure itself (access controls, hardening).
            • Implement strict access controls and audit logging for modifications to CI/CD pipeline configurations and steps.
            • Use secure build environments and containerization for CI/CD jobs.
            • Employ code review and security scanning for CI/CD pipeline scripts and configurations.
  • 3.1. Exploit Cypress Debugging and Reporting Features * Attack Vectors: * Information Leakage via Cypress Screenshots and Videos (Critical Node) * Description: Cypress automatically captures screenshots and videos during test runs for debugging and reporting. If sensitive information is displayed on the application UI during testing, these outputs can inadvertently capture and expose this data if not properly secured. * Exploitation: Attackers gain access to Cypress screenshots and videos (e.g., through insecure storage, public access to test reports) and extract sensitive information displayed in the UI during tests (PII, secrets, internal data). * Impact: Information disclosure, data breaches, privacy violations. * Mitigation: * Securely store and manage Cypress screenshots and videos. Restrict access to authorized personnel. * Avoid displaying sensitive information in the UI during automated tests. * Implement redaction or masking techniques to remove or obscure sensitive data in visual test outputs. * Regularly review and audit the content of screenshots and videos to identify and mitigate potential information leakage.