Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
134 lines (113 loc) · 134 KB

sec-design-deep-analysis.md

File metadata and controls

134 lines (113 loc) · 134 KB

Okay, let's perform a deep security analysis of Cypress based on the provided design review.

1. Objective, Scope, and Methodology

  • Objective: To conduct a thorough security analysis of the Cypress testing framework and its associated Cypress Cloud service, identifying potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses in its key components. This analysis aims to uncover architectural, design, and implementation-level security risks that could be exploited by malicious actors. The focus is on preventing code execution, data breaches, and compromise of the testing environment.

  • Scope:

    • Cypress Test Runner: The core open-source testing framework, including the desktop application, test runner process, browser interaction mechanisms, and reporting functionality.
    • Cypress Cloud: The optional cloud service, including its API, data storage (database and object storage), and user authentication/authorization mechanisms.
    • CI/CD Integration (GitHub Actions): The security of the build and deployment pipeline, focusing on dependency management and secret handling.
    • Exclusions: The security of the applications being tested is explicitly out of scope, as Cypress is a testing tool, not a security assessment tool for the target application. We are concerned with the security of Cypress itself.

  • Methodology:

    1. Architecture Review: Analyze the provided C4 diagrams (Context, Container, Deployment, Build) and element descriptions to understand the system's architecture, data flow, and trust boundaries.
    2. Component Analysis: Break down each key component and identify potential security implications based on its function and interactions.
    3. Threat Modeling: Consider relevant threat actors (script kiddies, opportunistic attackers, and potentially more sophisticated actors targeting Cypress Cloud) and potential attack vectors. We'll use the business risks identified in the design review as a starting point.
    4. Vulnerability Identification: Identify potential vulnerabilities based on common web application security risks (OWASP Top 10), specific risks associated with testing frameworks, and the identified threat model.
    5. Mitigation Recommendations: Provide actionable and specific mitigation strategies for each identified vulnerability, tailored to the Cypress architecture and development practices.

2. Security Implications of Key Components

Let's analyze each component from a security perspective, building upon the design review:

2.1 Cypress Test Runner

  • Desktop Application (Electron):

    • Threats:
      • Code Injection: If an attacker can modify the application's code (e.g., through a compromised dependency or a supply chain attack), they could execute arbitrary code on the user's machine.
      • Insecure Defaults: Misconfigured Electron settings could expose the application to vulnerabilities.
      • Unsigned/Tampered Builds: Users might download a malicious version of Cypress from an unofficial source.
    • Mitigations:
      • Code Signing: Digitally sign all Cypress releases to ensure authenticity and integrity. Verify the signature before installation.
      • Secure Electron Configuration: Follow Electron security best practices (e.g., disable Node.js integration in renderers where not absolutely necessary, use contextBridge for safe inter-process communication, enable sandbox: true).
      • Dependency Management: Use a lockfile (package-lock.json or yarn.lock) and regularly audit dependencies for known vulnerabilities (e.g., using npm audit or a dedicated vulnerability scanning tool). Consider using tools like socket.dev to analyze dependency risks.
      • SBOM: Maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) to track all dependencies and their versions.
      • Harden Electron: Use a hardened version of Electron, if available, or apply security patches promptly.

  • Test Runner Process:

    • Threats:
      • Test Code Execution (Arbitrary Code Execution): The biggest risk. Cypress executes JavaScript code within the context of the browser. If a test contains malicious code (either intentionally or through a compromised test), it could potentially escape the browser sandbox and execute code on the host machine.
      • Cross-Origin Leaks: Tests might inadvertently leak sensitive information from one origin to another.
      • Network Manipulation: Tests could be manipulated to make malicious network requests.
    • Mitigations:
      • Strict Input Validation: While Cypress itself doesn't directly take user input in the traditional sense, it does execute user-provided test code. This is the "input" to be validated. Mitigation here focuses on limiting the capabilities of the test code.
      • Browser Context Isolation: Ensure that each test runs in a completely isolated browser context. Leverage browser features like <iframe> sandboxing and process isolation to the fullest extent possible. Clear cookies, local storage, and other persistent data between tests.
      • Network Monitoring/Filtering: Consider implementing a mechanism to monitor and potentially filter network requests made by tests. This could help prevent malicious requests or data exfiltration. This is a complex area, as Cypress needs to interact with the network to test web applications. A configurable allowlist/denylist of domains might be a starting point.
      • Command Whitelisting: Cypress provides a set of commands (e.g., cy.visit, cy.get, cy.request). Internally, ensure that these commands are the only way to interact with the browser and the system. Prevent direct access to underlying Node.js APIs or browser APIs from within the test code, except where explicitly allowed and carefully controlled.
      • Resource Limits: Consider imposing resource limits (CPU, memory, network) on the test runner process to prevent denial-of-service attacks.

  • Browser (Controlled by Cypress):

    • Threats:
      • Browser Exploits: Vulnerabilities in the underlying browser engine (Chromium, Gecko) could be exploited.
      • Extension Abuse: If Cypress allows browser extensions, a malicious extension could compromise the testing environment.
    • Mitigations:
      • Regular Browser Updates: Keep the bundled browser (Electron or other) up-to-date with the latest security patches. This is critical.
      • Disable Unnecessary Features: Disable browser features that are not required for testing (e.g., WebGL, WebRTC) if they pose a security risk.
      • Extension Control: Strongly restrict or completely disable the use of browser extensions within the Cypress testing environment. If extensions are absolutely necessary, implement a strict allowlist and vet each extension thoroughly.
      • Leverage Browser Security Features: Utilize built-in browser security features like Content Security Policy (CSP), Subresource Integrity (SRI), and HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) where applicable, even within the testing environment.

  • Reporter:

    • Threats:
      • Data Leakage: Test results might contain sensitive information (e.g., credentials, API keys) that could be exposed if the reporter is not handled securely.
      • Injection Attacks: If the reporter uses user-provided data (e.g., test names, error messages) without proper sanitization, it could be vulnerable to injection attacks.
    • Mitigations:
      • Secure Data Handling: Avoid logging or storing sensitive data in test results. If sensitive data must be included, redact or encrypt it.
      • Input Sanitization: Sanitize all user-provided data before using it in reports. Use output encoding to prevent XSS vulnerabilities.
      • Secure Transmission: If reporting to Cypress Cloud, use HTTPS with strong TLS configuration.

2.2 Cypress Cloud

  • Cypress Cloud API:

    • Threats:
      • Authentication Bypass: Attackers could bypass authentication mechanisms to access the API.
      • Authorization Flaws: Users might be able to access data or perform actions they are not authorized to.
      • Injection Attacks: SQL injection, NoSQL injection, command injection, etc.
      • Denial of Service (DoS): Attackers could flood the API with requests, making it unavailable.
      • Data Breaches: Attackers could exploit vulnerabilities to gain access to sensitive data stored in the cloud.
    • Mitigations:
      • Strong Authentication: Implement robust authentication mechanisms, including multi-factor authentication (MFA) and strong password policies. Use industry-standard authentication protocols (e.g., OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect).
      • Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): Implement RBAC to restrict user access to only the resources and actions they need. Follow the principle of least privilege.
      • Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate and sanitize all input received by the API, on every endpoint. Use a whitelist approach where possible. Use parameterized queries or ORM to prevent SQL injection.
      • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting to prevent DoS attacks.
      • TLS Encryption: Use HTTPS with a strong TLS configuration for all communication with the API.
      • Regular Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Conduct regular security audits and penetration tests to identify and address vulnerabilities.
      • Web Application Firewall (WAF): Deploy a WAF to protect against common web attacks.

  • Cloud Storage (e.g., S3, GCS):

    • Threats:
      • Unauthorized Access: Attackers could gain access to test artifacts (screenshots, videos) due to misconfigured access controls.
      • Data Leakage: Sensitive data stored in artifacts could be exposed.
    • Mitigations:
      • Strict Access Control Lists (ACLs): Use the principle of least privilege to restrict access to storage buckets. Ensure that only authorized users and services can access the data.
      • Encryption at Rest: Enable server-side encryption to protect data stored in the cloud.
      • Object Versioning: Enable object versioning to protect against accidental deletion or modification of data.
      • Regular Audits: Regularly audit access logs and configurations to identify any unauthorized access attempts.

  • Cloud Database (e.g., PostgreSQL, MongoDB):

    • Threats:
      • SQL Injection/NoSQL Injection: Attackers could inject malicious code into database queries.
      • Unauthorized Access: Attackers could gain access to the database due to weak credentials or misconfigured access controls.
      • Data Breaches: Attackers could exploit vulnerabilities to steal sensitive data.
    • Mitigations:
      • Parameterized Queries/ORM: Use parameterized queries or an Object-Relational Mapper (ORM) to prevent SQL injection. Avoid constructing queries by concatenating strings.
      • Strong Authentication and Authorization: Use strong passwords and enforce the principle of least privilege for database users.
      • Encryption at Rest: Encrypt the database to protect data at rest.
      • Regular Backups: Implement regular backups and ensure that backups are stored securely.
      • Database Security Best Practices: Follow database-specific security best practices (e.g., disabling unnecessary features, applying security patches).
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate the database from the public internet using network segmentation.

2.3 CI/CD Integration (GitHub Actions)

  • Threats:

    • Compromised Dependencies: A malicious dependency could be introduced into the build process.
    • Secret Leakage: API keys, credentials, or other secrets stored in the CI environment could be exposed.
    • Malicious Workflow Modifications: An attacker could modify the workflow configuration to execute malicious code.
    • Runner Compromise: The CI runner itself could be compromised.
    • Supply Chain Attacks on GitHub Actions: A vulnerability in a third-party GitHub Action could be exploited.
    • Insecure use of cypress run --record --key: If the record key is exposed, an attacker could potentially upload fake test results.
    • Insecure use of environment variables: If environment variables containing secrets are not properly managed, they could be exposed.

  • Mitigations:

    • Dependency Management: Use a lockfile and regularly audit dependencies for vulnerabilities. Pin dependencies to specific versions. Use tools to analyze dependency risks.
    • Secret Management: Use GitHub Actions secrets to store sensitive information. Never hardcode secrets in the workflow configuration or source code. Rotate secrets regularly.
    • Workflow Security: Review and audit workflow configurations regularly. Use branch protection rules to prevent unauthorized modifications to workflows.
    • Runner Security: Use self-hosted runners only if necessary and ensure they are properly secured. Keep the runner software up-to-date.
    • Third-Party Action Auditing: Carefully vet any third-party GitHub Actions used in the workflow. Use specific commit SHAs instead of tags to avoid unexpected updates.
    • Secure Record Key Handling: Treat the Cypress record key as a highly sensitive secret. Store it securely using GitHub Actions secrets. Monitor for any suspicious activity related to the record key.
    • Environment Variable Best Practices: Use environment variables for configuration, but avoid storing secrets directly in environment variables if possible. Use a dedicated secret management solution.

3. Actionable Mitigation Strategies (Summary & Prioritization)

The following table summarizes the key vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies, prioritized by severity:

| Vulnerability Category | Specific Vulnerability | Mitigation Strategy