attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for dominictarr/rc

Objective: To compromise application that use given project by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the project itself, focusing on high-risk attack vectors related to rc configuration manipulation and social engineering.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application Using rc Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [HIGH RISK PATH] [HIGH RISK PATH] [HIGH RISK PATH] ├───(OR)─ Manipulate Application Configuration via rc [HIGH RISK PATH] [HIGH RISK PATH] [HIGH RISK PATH] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───(OR)─ Configuration Source Poisoning [HIGH RISK PATH] [HIGH RISK PATH] [HIGH RISK PATH] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───(AND)─ Environment Variable Manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Attacker Gains Access to Environment │ │ │ └─── [CRITICAL NODE] Set Malicious Environment Variables (RC_CONFIG, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───(AND)─ Configuration File Poisoning [HIGH RISK PATH] [HIGH RISK PATH] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Attacker Gains Write Access to Config File Locations │ │ │ │ ├── [CRITICAL NODE] System-Wide Configuration Directories (/etc/appname/config, /etc/rc.d/appname, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── [CRITICAL NODE] Place Malicious Configuration File [HIGH RISK PATH] └───(OR)─ Social Engineering to Induce Malicious Configuration Usage [HIGH RISK PATH] [HIGH RISK PATH] ├───(AND)─ Trick User into Running Application with Malicious Environment Variables [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Social Engineering Tactics (Phishing, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └─── User Runs Application with Attacker-Controlled Environment Variables [HIGH RISK PATH] └───(AND)─ Trick User into Placing Malicious Configuration Files [HIGH RISK PATH] ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Social Engineering Tactics [HIGH RISK PATH] └─── User Places Malicious Configuration File in rc's Search Paths [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Manipulate Application Configuration via rc -> Configuration Source Poisoning -> Environment Variable Manipulation

• Critical Node: Attacker Gains Access to Environment

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the system or application environment (e.g., OS vulnerabilities, web application vulnerabilities leading to shell access) or using social engineering to gain unauthorized access to the environment where the application runs.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Harden the application environment by patching OS and application vulnerabilities promptly.
    • Implement strong access controls and authentication mechanisms to limit unauthorized access.
    • Use Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) to detect and prevent malicious activity.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Low to High (depending on access level)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

• Critical Node: Set Malicious Environment Variables (RC_CONFIG, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Once environment access is gained, the attacker sets environment variables that rc prioritizes for configuration loading (e.g., RC_CONFIG, APPNAME_CONFIG). These variables can point to malicious configurations or directly contain malicious settings.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Implement monitoring and logging of environment variable changes, especially for variables used by rc.
    • Run applications with minimal necessary privileges to reduce the impact of environment manipulation.
    • Consider using immutable infrastructure or containerization to limit environment modifications.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: High (if environment access is gained)
    • Impact: High (full control over application configuration)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: Manipulate Application Configuration via rc -> Configuration Source Poisoning -> Configuration File Poisoning -> System-Wide Configuration Directories

• Critical Node: Attacker Gains Write Access to Config File Locations

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities to gain write access to file system locations where rc searches for configuration files. This could involve OS vulnerabilities, privilege escalation, or misconfigured file permissions.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Enforce strict file system permissions to prevent unauthorized write access to configuration directories.
    • Regularly audit file system permissions and configurations.
    • Implement vulnerability management and patch systems promptly.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Low to High (depending on access level and config file importance)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

• Critical Node: System-Wide Configuration Directories (/etc/appname/config, /etc/rc.d/appname, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Targeting system-wide configuration directories is particularly high-risk because modifications here can affect all users and instances of the application on the system. Gaining write access to these directories (typically requiring root/administrator privileges) allows for widespread and impactful configuration poisoning.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Restrict write access to system-wide configuration directories to only authorized administrators.
    • Implement strong authentication and authorization for administrative access.
    • Utilize file integrity monitoring specifically for system-wide configuration directories to detect unauthorized changes.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Low (requires root/admin access)
    • Impact: High (system-wide application configuration compromise)
    • Effort: High
    • Skill Level: High
    • Detection Difficulty: Low (system logs, file integrity monitoring)

• Critical Node: Place Malicious Configuration File [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Once write access to a configuration file location is achieved, the attacker places a malicious configuration file. This file will be loaded by rc and can contain settings to alter application behavior, potentially leading to data breaches, denial of service, or other malicious outcomes.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Implement file integrity monitoring to detect unauthorized creation or modification of configuration files.
    • Use access control lists (ACLs) to restrict file creation and modification in configuration directories.
    • Consider using read-only file systems for configuration directories where possible.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: High (if write access is gained)
    • Impact: High (full control over application configuration)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: Social Engineering to Induce Malicious Configuration Usage -> Trick User into Running Application with Malicious Environment Variables

• Critical Node: Social Engineering Tactics (Phishing, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Using social engineering techniques like phishing emails, deceptive websites, or misleading instructions to trick users into running the application with attacker-controlled environment variables.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Implement comprehensive user security awareness training to educate users about social engineering threats and how to identify them.
    • Promote a culture of security awareness within the organization.
    • Use email filtering and anti-phishing technologies to reduce the likelihood of successful phishing attacks.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium to High (depending on malicious configuration)
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Low to Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: High

• User Runs Application with Attacker-Controlled Environment Variables [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: If social engineering is successful, the user unknowingly runs the application with environment variables set by the attacker. These variables will be picked up by rc and can inject malicious configurations.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Reinforce user education about the dangers of running applications with untrusted environment variables.
    • Provide clear and secure instructions to users on how to configure the application correctly.
    • Consider application-level warnings or confirmations when sensitive configurations are loaded from environment variables (though this might be complex to implement with rc directly).
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Medium (if social engineering is successful)
    • Impact: High (full control over application configuration)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: High

Attack Tree Path: Social Engineering to Induce Malicious Configuration Usage -> Trick User into Placing Malicious Configuration Files

• Critical Node: Social Engineering Tactics [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Similar to the environment variable path, attackers use social engineering to trick users into downloading or creating malicious configuration files and placing them in locations where rc will search for them (e.g., user's home directory, application's local directory).
  • Actionable Insights:
    • User security awareness training is crucial to prevent users from placing untrusted files in configuration locations.
    • Provide clear instructions on where and how to correctly place configuration files.
    • Consider digital signatures or checksums for configuration files to verify their integrity.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium to High (depending on malicious configuration)
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Low to Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: High

• User Places Malicious Configuration File in rc's Search Paths [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: If social engineering is successful, the user places the malicious configuration file in a location where rc will find and load it. This file can then inject malicious settings into the application.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • File integrity monitoring can detect the creation or modification of configuration files after they are placed, providing a reactive detection mechanism.
    • Educate users about the importance of only using trusted sources for configuration files.
    • Consider application-level validation of configuration file content to detect malicious settings (though this is application-specific, not directly related to rc).
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Medium (if social engineering is successful)
    • Impact: High (full control over application configuration)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: High (File integrity monitoring can help after placement)