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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for dominictarr/rc

Threat: Threat 1: Environment Variable Injection

  • Description: An attacker with the ability to modify environment variables accessible to the application process sets environment variables that rc will interpret as configuration settings. The attacker crafts these variables to override legitimate settings with malicious values, leveraging rc's built-in environment variable parsing.
    • Impact:
      • Integrity: Modification of application behavior, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution (e.g., by changing database connection strings, library paths, or feature flags) due to rc loading the attacker-controlled values.
      • Availability: Denial of service by setting invalid or resource-exhausting configuration values that rc passes to the application.
    • Affected Component: rc's environment variable parsing logic (specifically the env parsing within the main rc function and its merging behavior).
    • Risk Severity: High (Potentially Critical if it leads to RCE)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Least Privilege: Run the application with minimal privileges, restricting access to environment variables.
      • Input Validation: Treat environment variables loaded by rc as untrusted. Implement strict validation and sanitization within the application after rc loads them.
      • Secrets Management: Avoid storing sensitive data directly in environment variables. Use a dedicated secrets manager.
      • Configuration Prefixing: Use a unique prefix (e.g., MYAPP_) for application-specific environment variables to minimize collisions and aid management.
      • Disable Environment Variable Loading (if feasible): If not strictly required, disable this configuration source via rc's options (e.g., empty env option).

Threat: Threat 2: Command-Line Argument Injection

  • Description: An attacker who can influence the command-line arguments passed to the application injects arguments that rc will interpret as configuration overrides, exploiting rc's built-in argument parsing.
    • Impact:
      • Integrity: Modification of application behavior, potentially leading to RCE, similar to environment variable injection, as rc processes the malicious arguments.
      • Availability: Denial of service through rc loading and passing invalid configuration to the application.
    • Affected Component: rc's command-line argument parsing logic (the argv parsing within the main rc function).
    • Risk Severity: High (Potentially Critical if it leads to RCE)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Avoid Sensitive Data in Arguments: Do not use command-line arguments for sensitive configuration.
      • Strict Input Validation: Validate and sanitize all command-line arguments within the application, treating them as untrusted input after rc has processed them.
      • Controlled Execution Environment: Ensure the application is launched securely, preventing attackers from modifying the command line.
      • Disable Argument Parsing (if feasible): If not essential, disable this source via rc's options (e.g., empty argv option).

Threat: Threat 3: Configuration File Tampering

  • Description: An attacker gains write access to configuration files that rc loads (e.g., .appnamerc, /etc/appname/config). The attacker modifies the file contents, and rc subsequently loads these malicious settings. This threat directly involves rc's file loading mechanism.
    • Impact:
      • Integrity: Modification of application behavior, potentially leading to RCE or data corruption, because rc loads and applies the tampered configuration.
      • Availability: Denial of service by introducing invalid configuration that rc attempts to process.
    • Affected Component: rc's file loading mechanism (the logic that searches for and reads configuration files).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • File System Permissions: Enforce strict file system permissions. Only the application's service account (with least privilege) should have read access; restrict write access.
      • File Integrity Monitoring: Implement monitoring to detect unauthorized modifications to files that rc reads.
      • Secure Configuration Storage: Store configuration files securely, separate from the application code and web root.
      • Configuration File Signing (Advanced): Digitally sign configuration files and verify the signature before rc loads them.