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Attack Tree Analysis for emberjs/ember.js

Objective: Exfiltrate sensitive user data or achieve unauthorized modification of application state by exploiting Ember.js-specific vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                  Exfiltrate Data / Modify State  (CRITICAL NODE)
                                              |
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    |                                               |                                               |
  1. Exploit Ember Data [HIGH RISK] 2. Manipulate Ember Routing [HIGH RISK] 3. Compromise Ember Components [HIGH RISK] | | | ------| ---------| ---------| | | | 1.1 2.1 3.1 XSS* Route* XSS* via Hijacking in Ember (Force Component Data unauth. (e.g., route) Handlebars)

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Ember Data [HIGH RISK]

  • *1.1 XSS via Ember Data (CRITICAL NODE, )
    • Description: Attackers inject malicious scripts into data handled by Ember Data. This typically occurs when data received from the backend is not properly sanitized before being loaded into Ember Data models and subsequently rendered in templates. Ember's built-in sanitization is helpful but insufficient without robust backend sanitization.
    • Likelihood: Medium (High if backend sanitization is weak/absent)
    • Impact: High (Data exfiltration, session hijacking, defacement, potential for further attacks)
    • Effort: Low to Medium (Finding an injection point may be easy; crafting a successful, persistent payload might require more effort)
    • Skill Level: Intermediate (Requires understanding of XSS vulnerabilities and how Ember Data handles data)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (CSP violations might be logged; unusual network activity could indicate an attack; subtle XSS can be hard to detect without careful monitoring)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Backend Sanitization: Crucially, sanitize all data on the backend before sending it to the Ember application. This is the primary defense.
      • Input Validation: Validate data types and formats on both the backend and within Ember Data models.
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strict CSP to limit the sources from which scripts can be executed.
      • Review Adapter Customizations: Carefully review any custom Ember Data adapters for potential sanitization bypasses.
      • Minimize htmlSafe: Avoid using htmlSafe and triple curlies ({{{ }}}) in templates unless absolutely necessary and with thoroughly vetted data. Prefer double curlies ({{ }}).

Attack Tree Path: 2. Manipulate Ember Routing [HIGH RISK]

  • *2.1 Route Hijacking (Force Unauthorized Route) (CRITICAL NODE, )
    • Description: Attackers manipulate the URL or use JavaScript to force the application into a route the user shouldn't have access to. This bypasses authentication or authorization checks if those checks are not properly implemented within the route's lifecycle hooks (beforeModel, model, afterModel) and on the server.
    • Likelihood: Medium (High if authorization is weak or only implemented on the UI)
    • Impact: High (Unauthorized access to data and functionality; potential for data exfiltration or modification)
    • Effort: Low (Often as simple as changing the URL in the browser)
    • Skill Level: Beginner to Intermediate (Requires basic understanding of web applications and URLs)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Failed authorization attempts might be logged; requires monitoring user activity and server-side validation of all requests)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Route-Level Authorization: Implement robust authorization checks within each route's lifecycle hooks, especially beforeModel.
      • Server-Side Validation: Always validate on the server that the user is authorized to access the data and perform actions associated with a particular route. Client-side checks are insufficient.
      • Secure transitionTo Usage: When programmatically transitioning routes, ensure the target route and parameters are validated and come from a trusted source.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Compromise Ember Components [HIGH RISK]

  • *3.1 XSS in Component (e.g., Handlebars) (CRITICAL NODE, )
    • Description: Attackers inject malicious scripts into data rendered by Ember components. This occurs when a component renders user-provided or otherwise untrusted data without proper sanitization.
    • Likelihood: Medium (High if components don't sanitize user input)
    • Impact: High (Data exfiltration, session hijacking, defacement, potential for further attacks)
    • Effort: Low to Medium (Finding an injection point might be easy; crafting a successful payload could require more effort)
    • Skill Level: Intermediate (Requires understanding of XSS and how Ember components render data)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (CSP violations might be logged; unusual network activity could be a sign; subtle XSS can be hard to detect)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Sanitize User Input: Always sanitize user-provided data before rendering it in component templates. Use Ember's built-in sanitization (double curlies {{ }}) for most cases.
      • Avoid htmlSafe: Minimize the use of htmlSafe and triple curlies ({{{ }}}). If necessary, ensure the data is absolutely safe and comes from a trusted source.
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): A strong CSP is a crucial defense against XSS.
      • Component Audits: Regularly audit components for potential XSS vulnerabilities.