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Threat Model Analysis for emberjs/ember.js

Threat: HTMLBars/Glimmer Engine Vulnerability

  • Threat: HTMLBars/Glimmer Engine Vulnerability

    • Description: An attacker exploits a previously unknown vulnerability in the core HTMLBars templating engine or the Glimmer rendering engine. They could craft a malicious template or input that, when processed by the engine, allows them to execute arbitrary JavaScript code within the user's browser. This could be achieved through a complex series of nested expressions or by exploiting a flaw in how the engine handles specific HTML attributes or characters.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of the client-side application. The attacker could steal user data, modify the application's behavior, redirect the user to malicious sites, or perform any action the user could perform.
    • Affected Component: HTMLBars templating engine, @glimmer/component, @glimmer/runtime, @glimmer/compiler.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Update: Keep Ember.js and all @glimmer/* packages updated to the latest stable versions. Prioritize security releases.
      • Monitor: Actively monitor Ember.js security advisories and the broader JavaScript security community for reports of vulnerabilities.
      • CSP: Implement a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) to limit the execution of inline scripts and other potentially dangerous resources. This provides a defense-in-depth layer even if a vulnerability exists.
      • Bug Bounty: If feasible, participate in or monitor bug bounty programs related to Ember.js.

Threat: Improper Use of htmlSafe

  • Threat: Improper Use of htmlSafe

    • Description: A developer uses the htmlSafe helper to mark user-supplied data as safe for rendering without proper sanitization. An attacker provides malicious HTML or JavaScript code as input (e.g., through a form field or URL parameter). Because the developer used htmlSafe, Ember's built-in XSS protection is bypassed, and the attacker's code is executed in the user's browser.
    • Impact: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability. The attacker can steal cookies, session tokens, or other sensitive data, deface the website, redirect the user to a phishing site, or perform actions on behalf of the user.
    • Affected Component: Ember.String.htmlSafe helper function.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Avoid htmlSafe: Strongly discourage the use of htmlSafe with any user-supplied or untrusted data.
      • Sanitize: If htmlSafe must be used, always sanitize the input using a robust, well-vetted HTML sanitization library like DOMPurify before marking it as safe. Never rely on custom sanitization.
      • Linting: Use ember-template-lint with rules to flag and prevent the use of htmlSafe without explicit approval and verification of sanitization.
      • Code Review: Mandatory code reviews should specifically check for any use of htmlSafe and ensure proper sanitization.

Threat: Unsafe Handlebars Helpers

  • Threat: Unsafe Handlebars Helpers

    • Description: A custom Handlebars helper (or a helper from a third-party addon) takes user input and renders it to the DOM without proper escaping or sanitization. An attacker provides malicious input that is processed by the helper, leading to an XSS vulnerability. The helper might incorrectly assume the input is safe or might have a flaw in its escaping logic.
    • Impact: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability, similar to the improper use of htmlSafe.
    • Affected Component: Custom Handlebars helpers (defined using Ember.Helper.helper), third-party addon helpers.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Escape Output: Ensure all custom Handlebars helpers properly escape their output using Handlebars.escapeExpression (or equivalent) when dealing with potentially unsafe data.
      • Review Helpers: Thoroughly review the code of all custom and third-party helpers for potential XSS vulnerabilities.
      • Prefer Built-ins: Favor built-in Ember features and helpers over custom ones whenever possible.
      • Linting: Use linters that can analyze Handlebars helper code for potential security issues.

Threat: Dynamic Component Rendering with Unsafe Input

  • Threat: Dynamic Component Rendering with Unsafe Input

    • Description: The application uses the {{component}} helper with a component name that is dynamically generated based on user input. An attacker provides a malicious component name (e.g., a component that contains harmful code or attempts to access restricted data). Without proper validation, Ember renders the attacker-specified component.
    • Impact: Potential for arbitrary code execution, unauthorized access to data, or other malicious actions, depending on the capabilities of the rendered component.
    • Affected Component: {{component}} helper.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Whitelist: Strictly validate user input used to determine the component name against a whitelist of allowed component names.
      • Controlled Mapping: Avoid using user input directly. Instead, map user input to a predefined set of safe component names using application logic.
      • Conditional Rendering: Prefer using conditional rendering (e.g., {{#if}}) to choose between a fixed set of components, rather than dynamically generating the component name.

Threat: Prototype Pollution in Ember Data

  • Threat: Prototype Pollution in Ember Data

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in how Ember Data handles model data, allowing them to inject properties into the base object prototype (Object.prototype). This affects all instances of Ember Data models, potentially leading to denial of service (by overriding critical methods) or, in some cases, arbitrary code execution (if the injected properties are later used in an unsafe way).
    • Impact: Denial of service, potential for arbitrary code execution, data corruption.
    • Affected Component: ember-data package, specifically model definition and data handling (e.g., serializers, adapters).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Update Ember Data: Keep Ember Data updated to the latest version to benefit from security patches.
      • Review Adapters/Serializers: Be cautious when using third-party Ember Data adapters or serializers; thoroughly review their code for potential prototype pollution vulnerabilities.
      • Controlled Data Mapping: Avoid directly merging user-supplied data into Ember Data models without proper sanitization and validation. Use a controlled mapping process to populate model attributes.
      • Object.freeze: In critical parts of the application, consider using Object.freeze on model prototypes after they are defined to prevent further modifications.