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Attack Tree Analysis for faisalman/ua-parser-js

Objective: Compromise Application via ua-parser-js Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via ua-parser-js Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]
├───(AND)─► Exploit Vulnerabilities in ua-parser-js Library [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───(OR)─► Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───► Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └───► Send Malicious User-Agent String to Application
│   │   │       └───► Inject UA String via HTTP Header, API Call, etc.
│   │   └───► Resource Exhaustion via Large Input [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │       └───► Send High Volume of Requests with Complex UA Strings
│   ├───(OR)─► Logic/Parsing Errors Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   └───► Bypass Security Checks Based on User-Agent [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │       └───► Gain Unauthorized Access or Bypass Restrictions
│   └───(OR)─► Supply Chain Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       └───► Compromise ua-parser-js Package Directly [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
└───(AND)─► Application Relies on Potentially Vulnerable ua-parser-js Output [CRITICAL NODE]
    └───► Application Uses ua-parser-js Output for Critical Functionality [CRITICAL NODE]
        └───► User-Agent Data Used for Security Decisions, Content Rendering, Analytics, etc. [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application via ua-parser-js Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]

This is the root goal of the attacker. Success means gaining unauthorized access, causing disruption, or exfiltrating data from the application by leveraging vulnerabilities in the ua-parser-js library or the application's usage of it.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Vulnerabilities in ua-parser-js Library [CRITICAL NODE]

This is the primary attack vector, focusing on directly exploiting weaknesses within the ua-parser-js library itself. This includes vulnerabilities in its code, regular expressions, or parsing logic.

Attack Tree Path: Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Aim to make the application unavailable to legitimate users.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Exploit inefficient regular expressions within ua-parser-js by crafting specific User-Agent strings that cause excessive backtracking and CPU consumption, leading to server overload and DoS.
      • Steps:
        • Identify vulnerable regular expressions in ua-parser-js source code.
        • Craft malicious User-Agent strings designed to trigger ReDoS.
        • Send these malicious User-Agent strings to the application via HTTP headers or other input methods.
    • Resource Exhaustion via Large Input [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Overwhelm the application's resources (CPU, memory, bandwidth) by sending excessively large or numerous requests containing complex User-Agent strings.
      • Steps:
        • Send extremely long User-Agent strings to exceed parser buffer limits or processing capabilities.
        • Send a high volume of requests, each with complex User-Agent strings, to overload server resources.

Attack Tree Path: Logic/Parsing Errors Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Exploit flaws or edge cases in ua-parser-js's parsing logic to cause misrepresentation of user identity or incorrect parsing results, leading to security bypass or application errors.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • Bypass Security Checks Based on User-Agent [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: If the application uses ua-parser-js output for security decisions, attackers can craft User-Agent strings to spoof legitimate users or bots, bypassing these security checks.
      • Steps:
        • Identify application logic that relies on ua-parser-js output for security (e.g., access control, bot detection).
        • Craft User-Agent strings to spoof legitimate users or trusted bots.
        • Gain unauthorized access to restricted areas or bypass security restrictions.

Attack Tree Path: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Compromise the integrity of the ua-parser-js library itself through the software supply chain, leading to widespread impact on applications using it.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • Compromise ua-parser-js Package Directly [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Directly compromise the ua-parser-js package on package registries or its distribution channels to inject malicious code.
      • Steps:
        • Account takeover of the package maintainer on registries like npm.
        • Malicious code injection into the ua-parser-js repository or build/release process.

Attack Tree Path: Application Relies on Potentially Vulnerable ua-parser-js Output [CRITICAL NODE]

This is not an attack vector itself, but a critical enabling condition. The attacks become impactful when the application relies on the output of ua-parser-js for important functionalities.

  • Condition:
    • Application Uses ua-parser-js Output for Critical Functionality [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Examples: User-Agent data is used for security decisions, content rendering, analytics, personalization, or other critical application logic.
      • Impact: Makes the application vulnerable to exploitation if ua-parser-js is compromised or its output is manipulated.