Mitigation Strategy: 1. Input Validation and Sanitization (Pre-Parsing)
Description:
- Identify Entry Points: Locate all code sections where user-agent strings are passed to
ua-parser-js
. - Implement Length Check: Before calling
ua-parser-js
functions, enforce a maximum length on the user-agent string.const MAX_UA_LENGTH = 512; // Adjust as needed if (userAgentString && userAgentString.length > MAX_UA_LENGTH) { // Handle oversized string (reject, truncate, or use fallback) console.warn(`Oversized User-Agent: ${userAgentString}`); userAgentString = 'Unknown'; // Example fallback }
- (Optional) Character Whitelisting (High Effort, Limited Applicability): If your application only expects user-agents from a very restricted set of sources, create a regular expression to allow only those expected characters. This is rarely practical for general web applications.
// Example (VERY restrictive - adjust to your needs) const uaWhitelistRegex = /^[a-zA-Z0-9\s\/\.\(\)\-]+$/; if (userAgentString && !uaWhitelistRegex.test(userAgentString)) { // Handle invalid characters }
- Directly Modify Input: The key here is that the validation happens before any
ua-parser-js
methods are invoked.
Threats Mitigated:
- ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service): Severity: High. Length limits significantly reduce the attack surface. Whitelisting (if feasible) provides very strong protection.
Impact:
- ReDoS: Substantial risk reduction. Length limits are a crucial first step.
Currently Implemented:
- Specify where this pre-parsing validation is implemented (e.g., "Middleware function
validateUA
inmiddleware/ua-validation.js
").
Missing Implementation:
- List any locations where user-agent strings are passed to
ua-parser-js
without this validation.
Mitigation Strategy: 2. Timeout Mechanism (During Parsing)
Description:
- Locate Parsing Calls: Find all instances where
ua-parser-js
methods are used to parse the user-agent (e.g.,parser.setUA(userAgent).getResult()
). - Wrap with Timeout: Wrap the
ua-parser-js
call within a Promise that includes a timeout. This is the core of this mitigation.async function parseUserAgentWithTimeout(userAgentString, timeoutMs) { return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const timer = setTimeout(() => { reject(new Error('User-agent parsing timed out')); }, timeoutMs); try { const parser = new UAParser(); // Create parser *inside* the promise const result = parser.setUA(userAgentString).getResult(); clearTimeout(timer); resolve(result); } catch (error) { clearTimeout(timer); reject(error); } }); }
- Short Timeout: Use a timeout between 50ms and 200ms.
- Handle Timeouts: In the
.catch()
block:- Log: Record the user-agent and the timeout.
- Fallback: Use a safe default value or reject the request. Do not retry without modification.
parseUserAgentWithTimeout(userAgent, 100) .then(result => { /* Process result */ }) .catch(error => { console.error("UA parsing error:", error, "UA:", userAgent); if (error.message === 'User-agent parsing timed out') { // Use a fallback result } });
- Direct Interaction: This mitigation directly controls how
ua-parser-js
is executed.
Threats Mitigated:
- ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service): Severity: High. The timeout prevents CPU exhaustion.
Impact:
- ReDoS: Very high risk reduction. This is the most critical direct mitigation.
Currently Implemented:
- Specify where the timeout is implemented (e.g., "Utility function
parseUA
inutils/ua.js
").
Missing Implementation:
- List any places where
ua-parser-js
is used without a timeout.
Mitigation Strategy: 3. Alternative Parsing Strategies (Within ua-parser-js
Context)
Description:
- Fork and Modify (Last Resort): If you've identified a specific regular expression within
ua-parser-js
that's causing problems, and updates aren't addressing it, you could (as a last resort) fork the library and modify that regular expression. This is highly discouraged unless you have a deep understanding of the library and regular expressions. It also creates a maintenance burden. - Contribute Back (If Forking): If you do fork and fix a vulnerability, submit a pull request to the original
ua-parser-js
repository to benefit the community. - Direct Modification: This involves directly changing the internal workings of
ua-parser-js
(via a fork).
Threats Mitigated:
- Specific ReDoS Vulnerabilities: Severity: High (if the problematic regex is successfully modified).
Impact:
- ReDoS: Potentially complete mitigation for the specific vulnerability addressed, but introduces maintenance overhead.
Currently Implemented:
- Likely "Not Implemented" unless you've already forked the library.
Missing Implementation:
- "Forking and modification not considered unless other mitigations fail and a specific, unpatched vulnerability is identified."