Threat Model Analysis for hakimel/reveal.js

Threat: Malicious Plugin Execution

Threat: Malicious Plugin Execution
- Description: An attacker convinces a presentation author to install a malicious reveal.js plugin, or exploits a vulnerability in a legitimate plugin to inject malicious code. The attacker's code could then steal data, manipulate the presentation, or attack the viewer's browser. This is a direct threat because reveal.js's plugin system is the attack vector.
- Impact:
  - Data breach (presentation content, speaker notes).
  - Presentation defacement or manipulation.
  - Client-side attacks (XSS, drive-by downloads).
  - Loss of user trust.
- Affected Component: Plugin system (Reveal.registerPlugin, plugin loading mechanism).
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
  - Plugin Vetting: Only install plugins from trusted sources (official reveal.js plugins, reputable developers). Carefully review plugin code before installation.
  - Regular Updates: Keep all plugins updated to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities.
  - Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strict CSP to limit the capabilities of plugins (e.g., restrict network access, prevent inline script execution). This is crucial for mitigating malicious plugin actions.
  - Sandboxing: If possible, run plugins in a sandboxed environment (e.g., using iframes with the sandbox attribute) to limit their access to the main presentation context.
  - Least Privilege: Configure plugins with the minimum necessary permissions.

Threat: `postMessage` API Exploitation

Threat: postMessage API Exploitation
- Description: If reveal.js or a plugin uses the postMessage API insecurely, an attacker could send crafted messages to the presentation, potentially triggering unintended actions or exploiting vulnerabilities in the message handling logic. This is a direct threat if reveal.js's own use of postMessage, or a plugin's use facilitated by reveal.js, is flawed.
- Impact:
  - Presentation manipulation.
  - Data leakage.
  - Execution of arbitrary code (if the message handler is vulnerable).
- Affected Component: Any component (core reveal.js or plugins) that uses the postMessage API (e.g., window.postMessage, message event listeners).
- Risk Severity: High (if postMessage is used, and used insecurely)
- Mitigation Strategies:
  - Origin Validation: Always validate the origin property of incoming postMessage events. Only process messages from trusted origins. This is the primary defense.
  - Data Validation: Sanitize and validate the data property of incoming messages. Do not blindly trust the content of the message.
  - Specific Target Origin: When sending messages, use a specific target origin (rather than *) to prevent the message from being intercepted by other applications.
  - Code Review: Carefully review any code (especially within reveal.js or its plugins) that uses postMessage to ensure it is implemented securely.

Threat: Multiplexing Control Hijack

Threat: Multiplexing Control Hijack
- Description: If the reveal.js multiplexing feature is used, an attacker gains access to the master presentation or the multiplexing secret, allowing them to control the presentation displayed to other viewers. This is a direct threat because it targets a specific reveal.js feature.
- Impact:
  - Presentation hijacking.
  - Display of unauthorized content.
  - Disruption of the presentation.
- Affected Component: Multiplexing feature (socket.io communication, master/client roles).
- Risk Severity: High (if multiplexing is used)
- Mitigation Strategies:
  - Strong Secret: Use a strong, randomly generated secret for the multiplexing feature. This is the most important mitigation.
  - Access Control: Restrict access to the master presentation. Only authorized users should be able to control it.
  - Network Security: Ensure the network used for multiplexing is secure (e.g., a private network, VPN).
  - HTTPS: Serve both the master and client presentations over HTTPS.