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Attack Tree Analysis for handlebars-lang/handlebars.js

Objective: Compromise Application using Handlebars.js Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Visualization

└── Compromise Application using Handlebars.js Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] ├── 1. Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 1.1. Direct Template Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── 1.1.1. Inject Malicious Handlebars Code via User Input [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── 1.1.1.2. Craft Malicious Handlebars Payload [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └── 1.1.1.4. Achieve Code Execution/Data Exfiltration [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── 1.2. Indirect Template Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 1.2.1. Inject Malicious Data into Backend Storage [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 1.2.1.2. Inject Malicious Handlebars Code into Data Source [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── 1.2.1.3. Trigger Template Rendering with Malicious Data [CRITICAL NODE] ├── 3. Vulnerabilities in Handlebars.js Library Itself [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └── 3.1. Exploit Known Handlebars.js Vulnerabilities (CVEs) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── 3.1.3. Exploit Vulnerable Handlebars.js Version [CRITICAL NODE] └── 4. Misconfiguration and Insecure Usage of Handlebars.js [HIGH-RISK PATH] └── 4.1. Use of Unsafe or Vulnerable Handlebars Helpers [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] ├── 4.1.2. Analyze Helper Code for Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] └── 4.1.3. Exploit Vulnerable Helpers [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)

Attack Vector: Attackers aim to inject malicious Handlebars code into templates that are processed server-side. Successful SSTI allows arbitrary code execution on the server.

  • Breakdown:
    • 1.1. Direct Template Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • 1.1.1. Inject Malicious Handlebars Code via User Input [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Exploiting input fields (forms, URL parameters, headers) that directly embed user-provided data into Handlebars templates without proper sanitization or escaping.
        • How it works: The application takes user input and directly places it within a Handlebars template string. If the input contains Handlebars expressions, these expressions are evaluated by the Handlebars engine on the server.
        • Example: If a template is constructed like Handlebars.compile("<h1>Hello {{name}}</h1>") and name is directly taken from user input, an attacker could input {{process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('whoami')}} to execute system commands.
      • 1.1.1.2. Craft Malicious Handlebars Payload [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Developing Handlebars payloads that leverage Handlebars helpers, built-in functions, or context access to achieve malicious goals.
        • How it works: Attackers need to understand Handlebars syntax and available functionalities to craft payloads. Payloads can range from simple data exfiltration to complex code execution depending on the Handlebars environment and available helpers.
        • Example Payloads:
          • {{lookup process 'mainModule'}} (Information disclosure - accessing process object if available in context)
          • {{#with (lookup process 'mainModule')}}{{#with (lookup require 'child_process')}}{{execSync 'id'}}{{/with}}{{/with}} (Code execution - if process and require are accessible in context, though less likely in modern Handlebars environments without explicit context provision)
      • 1.1.1.4. Achieve Code Execution/Data Exfiltration [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Successful execution of the crafted malicious payload, leading to server-side code execution, data exfiltration, or other forms of compromise.
        • How it works: Once the payload is injected and processed by the Handlebars engine, the malicious code within the payload is executed on the server with the privileges of the application. This can allow attackers to read files, execute system commands, connect to databases, or perform other actions.
    • 1.2. Indirect Template Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • 1.2.1. Inject Malicious Data into Backend Storage [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Compromising backend data sources (databases, configuration files, etc.) that are used to populate data for Handlebars templates. This often involves exploiting other vulnerabilities like SQL Injection or NoSQL Injection.
        • How it works: Attackers first exploit a vulnerability in data input mechanisms to inject malicious Handlebars code into a data source. When the application later retrieves this data and uses it in a Handlebars template, the injected code is executed.
        • Example: Injecting <h1>Hello {{attacker_payload}}</h1> into a database field that is later used in a Handlebars template.
      • 1.2.1.2. Inject Malicious Handlebars Code into Data Source [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Specifically targeting data sources with injection vulnerabilities to store malicious Handlebars code.
        • How it works: Attackers leverage vulnerabilities like SQL Injection, NoSQL Injection, or Configuration Injection to write malicious Handlebars code into the application's data storage.
        • Example: Using SQL Injection to update a database record to contain malicious Handlebars code in a text field.
      • 1.2.1.3. Trigger Template Rendering with Malicious Data [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Waiting for or actively triggering the application to render a Handlebars template that uses the compromised data source.
        • How it works: Once malicious data is in the data source, the attacker needs to ensure that the application processes a template that uses this data. This might happen automatically as part of normal application flow, or the attacker might need to trigger specific actions to render the template.

Attack Tree Path: Direct Template Injection

  • 1.1. Direct Template Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: * 1.1.1. Inject Malicious Handlebars Code via User Input [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Exploiting input fields (forms, URL parameters, headers) that directly embed user-provided data into Handlebars templates without proper sanitization or escaping. * How it works: The application takes user input and directly places it within a Handlebars template string. If the input contains Handlebars expressions, these expressions are evaluated by the Handlebars engine on the server. * Example: If a template is constructed like Handlebars.compile("<h1>Hello {{name}}</h1>") and name is directly taken from user input, an attacker could input {{process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('whoami')}} to execute system commands. * 1.1.1.2. Craft Malicious Handlebars Payload [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Developing Handlebars payloads that leverage Handlebars helpers, built-in functions, or context access to achieve malicious goals. * How it works: Attackers need to understand Handlebars syntax and available functionalities to craft payloads. Payloads can range from simple data exfiltration to complex code execution depending on the Handlebars environment and available helpers. * Example Payloads: * {{lookup process 'mainModule'}} (Information disclosure - accessing process object if available in context) * {{#with (lookup process 'mainModule')}}{{#with (lookup require 'child_process')}}{{execSync 'id'}}{{/with}}{{/with}} (Code execution - if process and require are accessible in context, though less likely in modern Handlebars environments without explicit context provision) * 1.1.1.4. Achieve Code Execution/Data Exfiltration [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Successful execution of the crafted malicious payload, leading to server-side code execution, data exfiltration, or other forms of compromise. * How it works: Once the payload is injected and processed by the Handlebars engine, the malicious code within the payload is executed on the server with the privileges of the application. This can allow attackers to read files, execute system commands, connect to databases, or perform other actions.

Attack Tree Path: Inject Malicious Handlebars Code via User Input

  • 1.1.1. Inject Malicious Handlebars Code via User Input [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Exploiting input fields (forms, URL parameters, headers) that directly embed user-provided data into Handlebars templates without proper sanitization or escaping. * How it works: The application takes user input and directly places it within a Handlebars template string. If the input contains Handlebars expressions, these expressions are evaluated by the Handlebars engine on the server. * Example: If a template is constructed like Handlebars.compile("<h1>Hello {{name}}</h1>") and name is directly taken from user input, an attacker could input {{process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('whoami')}} to execute system commands.

Attack Tree Path: Craft Malicious Handlebars Payload

  • 1.1.1.2. Craft Malicious Handlebars Payload [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Developing Handlebars payloads that leverage Handlebars helpers, built-in functions, or context access to achieve malicious goals. * How it works: Attackers need to understand Handlebars syntax and available functionalities to craft payloads. Payloads can range from simple data exfiltration to complex code execution depending on the Handlebars environment and available helpers. * Example Payloads: * {{lookup process 'mainModule'}} (Information disclosure - accessing process object if available in context) * {{#with (lookup process 'mainModule')}}{{#with (lookup require 'child_process')}}{{execSync 'id'}}{{/with}}{{/with}} (Code execution - if process and require are accessible in context, though less likely in modern Handlebars environments without explicit context provision)

Attack Tree Path: Achieve Code Execution/Data Exfiltration

  • 1.1.1.4. Achieve Code Execution/Data Exfiltration [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Successful execution of the crafted malicious payload, leading to server-side code execution, data exfiltration, or other forms of compromise. * How it works: Once the payload is injected and processed by the Handlebars engine, the malicious code within the payload is executed on the server with the privileges of the application. This can allow attackers to read files, execute system commands, connect to databases, or perform other actions.

Attack Tree Path: Indirect Template Injection

  • 1.2. Indirect Template Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: * 1.2.1. Inject Malicious Data into Backend Storage [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Compromising backend data sources (databases, configuration files, etc.) that are used to populate data for Handlebars templates. This often involves exploiting other vulnerabilities like SQL Injection or NoSQL Injection. * How it works: Attackers first exploit a vulnerability in data input mechanisms to inject malicious Handlebars code into a data source. When the application later retrieves this data and uses it in a Handlebars template, the injected code is executed. * Example: Injecting <h1>Hello {{attacker_payload}}</h1> into a database field that is later used in a Handlebars template. * 1.2.1.2. Inject Malicious Handlebars Code into Data Source [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Specifically targeting data sources with injection vulnerabilities to store malicious Handlebars code. * How it works: Attackers leverage vulnerabilities like SQL Injection, NoSQL Injection, or Configuration Injection to write malicious Handlebars code into the application's data storage. * Example: Using SQL Injection to update a database record to contain malicious Handlebars code in a text field. * 1.2.1.3. Trigger Template Rendering with Malicious Data [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Waiting for or actively triggering the application to render a Handlebars template that uses the compromised data source. * How it works: Once malicious data is in the data source, the attacker needs to ensure that the application processes a template that uses this data. This might happen automatically as part of normal application flow, or the attacker might need to trigger specific actions to render the template.

Attack Tree Path: Inject Malicious Data into Backend Storage

  • 1.2.1. Inject Malicious Data into Backend Storage [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Compromising backend data sources (databases, configuration files, etc.) that are used to populate data for Handlebars templates. This often involves exploiting other vulnerabilities like SQL Injection or NoSQL Injection. * How it works: Attackers first exploit a vulnerability in data input mechanisms to inject malicious Handlebars code into a data source. When the application later retrieves this data and uses it in a Handlebars template, the injected code is executed. * Example: Injecting <h1>Hello {{attacker_payload}}</h1> into a database field that is later used in a Handlebars template.

Attack Tree Path: Inject Malicious Handlebars Code into Data Source

  • 1.2.1.2. Inject Malicious Handlebars Code into Data Source [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Specifically targeting data sources with injection vulnerabilities to store malicious Handlebars code. * How it works: Attackers leverage vulnerabilities like SQL Injection, NoSQL Injection, or Configuration Injection to write malicious Handlebars code into the application's data storage. * Example: Using SQL Injection to update a database record to contain malicious Handlebars code in a text field.

Attack Tree Path: Trigger Template Rendering with Malicious Data

  • 1.2.1.3. Trigger Template Rendering with Malicious Data [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Waiting for or actively triggering the application to render a Handlebars template that uses the compromised data source. * How it works: Once malicious data is in the data source, the attacker needs to ensure that the application processes a template that uses this data. This might happen automatically as part of normal application flow, or the attacker might need to trigger specific actions to render the template.

Attack Tree Path: Vulnerabilities in Handlebars.js Library Itself

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities (CVEs) in specific versions of the Handlebars.js library.
  • Breakdown:
    • 3.1.3. Exploit Vulnerable Handlebars.js Version [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Identifying the version of Handlebars.js used by the application and checking for known CVEs affecting that version. If vulnerabilities exist and are exploitable in the application's context, attackers can leverage published exploits.
      • How it works: Attackers first determine the Handlebars.js version (e.g., from package.json, dependency lock files, or by probing). They then search vulnerability databases for CVEs associated with that version. If exploitable CVEs are found, they attempt to use publicly available exploit code or develop their own exploit to target the application.
      • Example: If a CVE exists that allows code execution through a specific Handlebars helper in a vulnerable version, an attacker would craft a template that uses that helper with a malicious payload, targeting an application using that vulnerable Handlebars.js version.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Known Handlebars.js Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

  • Breakdown:
    • 3.1.3. Exploit Vulnerable Handlebars.js Version [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Identifying the version of Handlebars.js used by the application and checking for known CVEs affecting that version. If vulnerabilities exist and are exploitable in the application's context, attackers can leverage published exploits.
      • How it works: Attackers first determine the Handlebars.js version (e.g., from package.json, dependency lock files, or by probing). They then search vulnerability databases for CVEs associated with that version. If exploitable CVEs are found, they attempt to use publicly available exploit code or develop their own exploit to target the application.
      • Example: If a CVE exists that allows code execution through a specific Handlebars helper in a vulnerable version, an attacker would craft a template that uses that helper with a malicious payload, targeting an application using that vulnerable Handlebars.js version.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Vulnerable Handlebars.js Version

  • 3.1.3. Exploit Vulnerable Handlebars.js Version [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Identifying the version of Handlebars.js used by the application and checking for known CVEs affecting that version. If vulnerabilities exist and are exploitable in the application's context, attackers can leverage published exploits. * How it works: Attackers first determine the Handlebars.js version (e.g., from package.json, dependency lock files, or by probing). They then search vulnerability databases for CVEs associated with that version. If exploitable CVEs are found, they attempt to use publicly available exploit code or develop their own exploit to target the application. * Example: If a CVE exists that allows code execution through a specific Handlebars helper in a vulnerable version, an attacker would craft a template that uses that helper with a malicious payload, targeting an application using that vulnerable Handlebars.js version.

Attack Tree Path: Misconfiguration and Insecure Usage of Handlebars.js

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in custom Handlebars helpers that are created by developers and used within the application.
  • Breakdown:
    • 4.1.2. Analyze Helper Code for Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Reviewing the source code of custom Handlebars helpers to identify insecure coding practices, logic flaws, or vulnerabilities.
      • How it works: Attackers analyze the code of custom helpers for potential security issues. This includes looking for:
        • Execution of system commands without proper sanitization.
        • File system access without authorization checks.
        • Database queries vulnerable to injection.
        • Insecure handling of context data.
        • Logic flaws that can be abused.
    • 4.1.3. Exploit Vulnerable Helpers [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Crafting Handlebars templates that call vulnerable custom helpers with malicious arguments or in a way that triggers the identified vulnerability.
      • How it works: Once a vulnerability in a custom helper is identified, attackers create Handlebars templates that specifically target that vulnerability. This might involve providing crafted input to the helper through template context or manipulating the template structure to trigger the vulnerable code path in the helper.
      • Example: If a custom helper readFile reads a file path from the template context without proper validation, an attacker could inject a template like {{readFile ../../../etc/passwd}} to read sensitive files if the helper is vulnerable to path traversal.

Attack Tree Path: Use of Unsafe or Vulnerable Handlebars Helpers

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in custom Handlebars helpers that are created by developers and used within the application.
  • Breakdown:
    • 4.1.2. Analyze Helper Code for Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Reviewing the source code of custom Handlebars helpers to identify insecure coding practices, logic flaws, or vulnerabilities.
      • How it works: Attackers analyze the code of custom helpers for potential security issues. This includes looking for:
        • Execution of system commands without proper sanitization.
        • File system access without authorization checks.
        • Database queries vulnerable to injection.
        • Insecure handling of context data.
        • Logic flaws that can be abused.
    • 4.1.3. Exploit Vulnerable Helpers [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Crafting Handlebars templates that call vulnerable custom helpers with malicious arguments or in a way that triggers the identified vulnerability.
      • How it works: Once a vulnerability in a custom helper is identified, attackers create Handlebars templates that specifically target that vulnerability. This might involve providing crafted input to the helper through template context or manipulating the template structure to trigger the vulnerable code path in the helper.
      • Example: If a custom helper readFile reads a file path from the template context without proper validation, an attacker could inject a template like {{readFile ../../../etc/passwd}} to read sensitive files if the helper is vulnerable to path traversal.

Attack Tree Path: Analyze Helper Code for Vulnerabilities

  • 4.1.2. Analyze Helper Code for Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Reviewing the source code of custom Handlebars helpers to identify insecure coding practices, logic flaws, or vulnerabilities. * How it works: Attackers analyze the code of custom helpers for potential security issues. This includes looking for: * Execution of system commands without proper sanitization. * File system access without authorization checks. * Database queries vulnerable to injection. * Insecure handling of context data. * Logic flaws that can be abused.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Vulnerable Helpers

  • 4.1.3. Exploit Vulnerable Helpers [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Crafting Handlebars templates that call vulnerable custom helpers with malicious arguments or in a way that triggers the identified vulnerability. * How it works: Once a vulnerability in a custom helper is identified, attackers create Handlebars templates that specifically target that vulnerability. This might involve providing crafted input to the helper through template context or manipulating the template structure to trigger the vulnerable code path in the helper. * Example: If a custom helper readFile reads a file path from the template context without proper validation, an attacker could inject a template like {{readFile ../../../etc/passwd}} to read sensitive files if the helper is vulnerable to path traversal.