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Attack Tree Analysis for hapijs/hapi

Objective: Compromise Hapi.js Application by Exploiting Hapi.js Weaknesses

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Hapi.js Application [ROOT NODE - CRITICAL] ├─── 1. Exploit Hapi Core Functionality [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├─── 1.1. Route Handling Vulnerabilities │ │ ├─── 1.1.2. Path Traversal via Route Parameters (Misconfiguration) [CRITICAL NODE - HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├─── 1.2. Input Validation and Parsing Issues [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├─── 1.2.1. Payload Parsing Vulnerabilities (e.g., JSON, multipart) │ │ │ ├─── 1.2.1.1. Denial of Service via Large Payloads [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── 1.2.1.2. Payload Injection (if custom parsing logic is flawed) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── 1.2.2. Parameter Pollution (Query/Path Parameters) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── 1.2.3. Validation Bypass (If using Hapi's validation features incorrectly) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├─── 1.3. Authentication and Authorization Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├─── 1.3.1.2. Misconfiguration of Built-in Strategies [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── 1.3.2. Authorization Bypass (Using Hapi's server.auth.access) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├─── 1.4. Server Configuration and Defaults [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├─── 1.4.2. Verbose Error Messages in Production [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── 1.4.4. Misconfigured Security Settings (e.g., CORS, HSTS if managed via Hapi plugins) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └─── 1.5. Error Handling Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ └─── 1.5.1. Information Disclosure via Error Responses [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├─── 2. Exploit Hapi Plugin Ecosystem [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├─── 2.1. Vulnerabilities in Third-Party Plugins [CRITICAL NODE - HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── 2.1.1. Known Vulnerabilities in Popular Plugins [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └─── 2.1.3. Malicious Plugins (Supply Chain Attack) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └─── 2.3. Insecure Plugin Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├─── 3. Exploit Dependencies (Indirectly via Hapi) [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├─── 3.1. Vulnerabilities in Hapi's Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE - HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── 3.1.1. Known Vulnerabilities in Hapi's Direct Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └─── 3.1.2. Vulnerabilities in Transitive Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH] └─── 4. Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks Specific to Hapi └─── 4.2. Payload Parsing DoS (See 1.2.1.1) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Hapi.js Application [ROOT NODE - CRITICAL]

  • Why Critical: Represents the ultimate attacker goal. Success here means complete or significant control over the application and potentially underlying systems.
    • General Mitigation Strategies: Implement comprehensive security measures across all layers of the application, including secure coding practices, robust input validation, strong authentication and authorization, secure server configuration, regular security assessments, and incident response planning.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Hapi Core Functionality [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Why Critical: Targets the fundamental framework, potentially affecting all applications built on it if vulnerabilities are widespread or misconfigurations are common.
    • General Mitigation Strategies: Stay updated with Hapi.js security advisories, follow Hapi.js security best practices, thoroughly test route handling and input processing logic, and implement strong input validation and output encoding.

Attack Tree Path: Input Validation and Parsing Issues [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Why Critical: Input handling is a primary attack surface for web applications. Flaws here can lead to various vulnerabilities, from DoS to code execution.
    • General Mitigation Strategies: Implement strict input validation using joi or similar libraries, sanitize and encode outputs, limit payload sizes, and carefully handle different content types.

Attack Tree Path: Authentication and Authorization Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Why Critical: Weaknesses in authentication and authorization directly lead to unauthorized access, bypassing security controls designed to protect resources and data.
    • General Mitigation Strategies: Use well-vetted authentication strategies and plugins, securely configure authentication mechanisms, implement robust authorization logic using server.auth.access, and regularly audit access control rules.

Attack Tree Path: Server Configuration and Defaults [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Why Critical: Misconfigurations and insecure defaults can expose sensitive information, weaken security posture, and increase the attack surface.
    • General Mitigation Strategies: Harden server configurations, remove unnecessary features, disable verbose error messages in production, set secure HTTP headers (HSTS, CSP, etc.), and regularly audit server settings.

Attack Tree Path: Error Handling Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Why Critical: Poor error handling can leak sensitive information and be exploited for DoS attacks.
    • General Mitigation Strategies: Sanitize error responses to prevent information disclosure, log detailed errors securely, and implement error rate limiting to mitigate DoS attempts.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Hapi Plugin Ecosystem [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Why Critical: Plugins extend functionality but also introduce new vulnerabilities and dependencies. Plugin vulnerabilities can directly compromise the application.
    • General Mitigation Strategies: Thoroughly audit and review plugins before use, keep plugins updated, minimize plugin usage, and implement secure plugin configuration practices.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Dependencies (Indirectly via Hapi) [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Why Critical: Vulnerabilities in dependencies, both direct and transitive, can be exploited to compromise the application indirectly through Hapi.
    • General Mitigation Strategies: Regularly scan dependencies for vulnerabilities, keep dependencies updated, use dependency pinning, and implement dependency integrity checks.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2. Path Traversal via Route Parameters (Misconfiguration) [CRITICAL NODE - HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting misconfigured routes where user-controlled parameters are used to construct file paths, allowing access to files outside the intended directory.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (Access to arbitrary files, potential data breach, code execution if upload functionality exists).
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • Mitigation Strategies: Avoid direct file path construction from user input, use secure file handling libraries, implement strict input validation and sanitization for route parameters, and enforce proper access controls on file system resources.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.1. Denial of Service via Large Payloads [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Sending excessively large payloads to the application, overwhelming server resources during parsing and processing, leading to service disruption.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium (Service disruption, temporary unavailability).
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • Mitigation Strategies: Limit maximum payload sizes in Hapi configuration, implement request rate limiting, and use efficient payload parsing techniques.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.2. Payload Injection (if custom parsing logic is flawed) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious data within payloads that are processed by custom parsing logic, leading to code execution, data manipulation, or other vulnerabilities.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: High (Code execution, data manipulation, application compromise).
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation Strategies: Avoid custom payload parsing if possible, if necessary, thoroughly review and test custom parsing logic for vulnerabilities, implement strict input validation and sanitization within custom parsing functions.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.2. Parameter Pollution (Query/Path Parameters) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Manipulating application logic by injecting or overriding query or path parameters, potentially bypassing validation, altering intended behavior, or exploiting logic flaws.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium (Logic bypass, potential for data manipulation or access control issues).
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation Strategies: Carefully design parameter handling logic, avoid relying solely on parameter order, implement robust input validation for all parameters, and use parameterized queries for database interactions.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.3. Validation Bypass (If using Hapi's validation features incorrectly) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Submitting invalid data that should have been rejected by validation rules due to misconfiguration or incomplete validation implementation, leading to application errors or security vulnerabilities.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium (Application errors, data integrity issues, potential for further exploitation).
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation Strategies: Implement comprehensive and correctly configured validation using joi, thoroughly test validation rules with various input types and boundary conditions, and regularly review validation logic.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1.2. Misconfiguration of Built-in Strategies [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting misconfigurations in built-in authentication strategies (e.g., weak JWT secrets, insecure basic auth), leading to weakened or bypassed authentication.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (Weak authentication, easier to brute-force or bypass, potential account takeover).
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation Strategies: Securely configure authentication strategies with strong secrets, secure algorithms, and appropriate settings, regularly review authentication configurations, and enforce strong password policies.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.2. Authorization Bypass (Using Hapi's server.auth.access) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting logic errors or flaws in access control functions used with server.auth.access, leading to unauthorized access to resources and functionalities.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (Unauthorized access to sensitive resources, privilege escalation).
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation Strategies: Carefully design and test access control functions, follow the principle of least privilege, implement thorough authorization checks, and regularly audit access control logic.

Attack Tree Path: 1.4.2. Verbose Error Messages in Production [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Information disclosure through verbose error messages in production, revealing internal application details, stack traces, or sensitive data that can aid attackers in reconnaissance and vulnerability identification.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium (Information leak, aids reconnaissance and potential vulnerability identification).
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • Mitigation Strategies: Disable verbose error messages in production, provide minimal generic error responses to users, log detailed errors securely for debugging purposes, and implement centralized error logging and monitoring.

Attack Tree Path: 1.4.4. Misconfigured Security Settings (e.g., CORS, HSTS if managed via Hapi plugins) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Weakening security posture due to misconfigured security settings, such as improperly configured CORS policies or missing security headers (HSTS, CSP, etc.), increasing vulnerability to other attacks like XSS or MITM.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium (Weakened security, increased vulnerability to other attacks).
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • Mitigation Strategies: Properly configure security settings and headers, use Hapi plugins or middleware to enforce security policies, regularly review security configurations, and use security header analysis tools.

Attack Tree Path: 1.5.1. Information Disclosure via Error Responses [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Leaking sensitive information through error responses, such as file paths, database details, or internal logic, aiding attackers in reconnaissance and further exploitation.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium (Information leak, aids reconnaissance and potential vulnerability identification).
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • Mitigation Strategies: Sanitize error responses to remove sensitive information, provide generic error messages to users, log detailed errors securely, and implement centralized error logging and monitoring.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1. Known Vulnerabilities in Popular Plugins [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities in commonly used Hapi plugins, leveraging readily available exploits or vulnerability information.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (Plugin functionality compromise, application compromise).
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low to Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation Strategies: Regularly update plugins to the latest versions, monitor plugin security advisories, use vulnerability scanning tools to identify vulnerable plugins, and consider alternative plugins or custom implementations if necessary.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.3. Malicious Plugins (Supply Chain Attack) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Installing and using plugins that are intentionally malicious, introduced through compromised package registries or supply chain attacks, leading to direct application compromise.
    • Likelihood: Very Low
    • Impact: High (Full application compromise, data breach, backdoors).
    • Effort: High
    • Skill Level: High
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard
    • Mitigation Strategies: Thoroughly audit and review plugins before use, verify plugin integrity and sources, use dependency integrity checks, monitor package registries for suspicious activity, and implement code review processes for plugin integration.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3. Insecure Plugin Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Weakening security posture or introducing vulnerabilities due to insecure configurations of plugins, such as default settings or misconfigured access controls.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium (Weakened security, potential for exploitation of plugin-specific vulnerabilities).
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation Strategies: Securely configure plugin settings, follow plugin security best practices, regularly review plugin configurations, and implement configuration management and auditing.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.1. Known Vulnerabilities in Hapi's Direct Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities in libraries directly used by Hapi, if not patched or mitigated by Hapi itself or the application.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (Dependency vulnerability impact, potentially application compromise).
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low to Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation Strategies: Regularly update Hapi and its dependencies, monitor dependency security advisories, use vulnerability scanning tools to identify vulnerable dependencies, and implement dependency pinning and management practices.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.2. Vulnerabilities in Transitive Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in libraries used by Hapi's dependencies (transitive dependencies), which can be harder to track and patch, leading to indirect application compromise.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (Dependency vulnerability impact, potentially application compromise).
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation Strategies: Use dependency scanning tools that analyze transitive dependencies, monitor dependency security advisories for transitive dependencies, and implement Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) analysis to track dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 4.2. Payload Parsing DoS (See 1.2.1.1) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: (Reiteration from 1.2.1.1) Sending excessively large or complex payloads to exhaust server resources during parsing, leading to denial of service.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium (Service disruption, temporary unavailability).
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • Mitigation Strategies: (Same as 1.2.1.1) Limit maximum payload sizes, implement request rate limiting, and use efficient payload parsing techniques.