Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
37 lines (32 loc) · 3.35 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

37 lines (32 loc) · 3.35 KB

Threat Model Analysis for ianstormtaylor/slate

Threat: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Inline Styles

  • Threat: XSS via Inline Styles
  • Description:
    • Attacker Action: A malicious user injects XSS payloads into rich text content using crafted inline styles within the Slate editor.
    • How: By exploiting Slate's handling of inline styles in nodes or marks, attackers can insert malicious CSS properties or values that execute JavaScript when rendered by the application if proper sanitization is missing.
  • Impact:
    • Impact: Successful XSS can lead to account hijacking, redirection to malicious sites, application defacement, malware injection, and unauthorized actions on behalf of the user.
  • Affected Slate Component:
    • Affected Component: Slate editor.render and application's rendering pipeline, specifically the processing of inline style attributes in Slate nodes and marks.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Content Sanitization: Implement robust HTML sanitization using libraries like DOMPurify or sanitize-html before rendering Slate content, aggressively removing or escaping dangerous CSS properties and values in inline styles.
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): Enforce a strict CSP to limit script sources and inline script execution, providing a defense-in-depth layer.
      • Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular audits of sanitization logic and test for XSS bypasses targeting inline styles.

Threat: Insecure Deserialization of Custom Slate Nodes

  • Threat: Insecure Deserialization of Custom Slate Nodes
  • Description:
    • Attacker Action: Attackers manipulate serialized Slate editor state, focusing on custom nodes or marks, to inject malicious data or code for backend deserialization.
    • How: If the application serializes and deserializes Slate state (e.g., JSON), insecure deserialization on the backend can occur. Attackers craft malicious serialized data within custom node properties, leading to code execution or other vulnerabilities upon deserialization.
  • Impact:
    • Impact: This can result in Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the backend server, data breaches, server compromise, and Denial of Service (DoS).
  • Affected Slate Component:
    • Affected Component: Application's backend deserialization logic, custom Slate node/mark serialization and deserialization functions.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure Deserialization Practices: Avoid direct deserialization of untrusted data. Use secure deserialization libraries and techniques to prevent code execution vulnerabilities.
      • Input Validation Post-Deserialization: Thoroughly validate and sanitize all data after deserialization, especially from custom Slate nodes/marks, treating it as untrusted input.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Run backend processes handling deserialization with minimal privileges to limit exploit impact.
      • Alternative Data Formats: Consider safer serialization formats less prone to deserialization vulnerabilities.