Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code OR Manipulate Document Content Beyond Intended Logic (via Slate.js) {CRITICAL}
Attacker Goal:
Execute Arbitrary Code OR
Manipulate Document Content Beyond Intended Logic
(via Slate.js) {CRITICAL}
/ \
/ \
/ \
------------------ ------------------
| | | |
| Deserialization | | Plugin/Custom |
| Vulnerabilities| | Vulnerabilities|
| [HIGH RISK] | | [HIGH RISK] |
------------------ ------------------
/ | \ / |
/ | \ / |
/ | \ / |
--------------------- --------------------- ---------------- ----------------
|Unsafe Default | |Malicious Input | |3rd-Party | |Unsafe Plugin |
|Deserializer | |to Deserializer | |Dependency | |Implementation|
|{CRITICAL} | |{CRITICAL} | |(Deserializ.)| |{CRITICAL} |
|[HIGH RISK] | |[HIGH RISK] | |{CRITICAL} | |[HIGH RISK] |
--------------------- --------------------- ---------------- ----------------
Attack Tree Path: Deserialization Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK]
- Deserialization Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK]: This branch represents a significant attack surface due to the way Slate.js handles document data in JSON format.
Attack Tree Path: Unsafe Default Deserializer [HIGH RISK] {CRITICAL}
* **Unsafe Default Deserializer [HIGH RISK] {CRITICAL}:**
* **Description:** This occurs if Slate.js (or a commonly used plugin) uses a default deserializer that doesn't properly sanitize or validate incoming JSON data. This allows an attacker to potentially inject malicious code or data structures.
* **Likelihood:** Medium
* **Impact:** High (Arbitrary Code Execution)
* **Effort:** Low
* **Skill Level:** Intermediate
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium
Attack Tree Path: Malicious Input to Deserializer [HIGH RISK] {CRITICAL}
* **Malicious Input to Deserializer [HIGH RISK] {CRITICAL}:**
* **Description:** Even with a custom deserializer, if the validation logic is flawed or incomplete, an attacker can craft a malicious JSON payload that bypasses the checks and triggers unintended behavior, potentially leading to code execution.
* **Likelihood:** Medium
* **Impact:** High (Arbitrary Code Execution)
* **Effort:** Medium
* **Skill Level:** Advanced
* **Detection Difficulty:** Hard
Attack Tree Path: 3rd-Party Dependency (Deserialization) {CRITICAL}
* **3rd-Party Dependency (Deserialization) {CRITICAL}:**
* **Description:** If the deserialization process relies on a vulnerable third-party library, an attacker could exploit that library to achieve code execution or other malicious outcomes.
* **Likelihood:** Low
* **Impact:** High (Arbitrary Code Execution)
* **Effort:** Low
* **Skill Level:** Intermediate
* **Detection Difficulty:** Hard
Attack Tree Path: Plugin/Custom Code Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK]
- Plugin/Custom Code Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK]: This branch represents the most likely attack vector, as plugins and custom code are often less rigorously reviewed than the core library.
Attack Tree Path: Unsafe Plugin Implementation [HIGH RISK] {CRITICAL}
* **Unsafe Plugin Implementation [HIGH RISK] {CRITICAL}:**
* **Description:** A plugin (either third-party or developed in-house) might contain vulnerabilities, such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if it renders HTML without proper sanitization, or even arbitrary code execution if it uses unsafe functions like `eval`.
* **Likelihood:** High
* **Impact:** High (XSS, Arbitrary Code Execution)
* **Effort:** Low
* **Skill Level:** Intermediate
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium