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Threat Model Analysis for ianstormtaylor/slate

Threat: Malicious Document Structure Injection

  • Threat: Malicious Document Structure Injection

    • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious JSON payload representing a Slate document. This isn't about typical XSS; it's about manipulating the structure of the document (node types, nesting, attributes) in ways that are valid according to Slate's core logic but violate the application's intended schema. The attacker might submit this directly to the server (bypassing client-side validation) or inject it into the client-side editor (e.g., via a compromised plugin).
    • Impact:
      • Data corruption on the server.
      • Unexpected application behavior, potentially leading to crashes or logic errors.
      • Bypassing of server-side validation that relies on assumptions about document structure.
      • Potential for triggering vulnerabilities in server-side processing (e.g., excessive recursion).
      • Could lead to XSS if the server renders content unsafely, but the primary attack is structural.
    • Affected Slate Component:
      • Editor object (client-side): The core editor instance.
      • Data serialization/deserialization logic (client and server).
      • Custom plugins (if any) that interact with the document structure.
      • Server-side processing logic that handles Slate data.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on server-side handling).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Server-Side Schema Validation: The server must validate the incoming Slate JSON against a predefined, strict schema. Define allowed node types, attributes, nesting, etc. Do not rely on client-side validation. Use a robust JSON schema validation library.
      • Input Sanitization (Server-Side): Sanitize the content of individual nodes (especially text nodes) to prevent malicious HTML/JS from being embedded within valid nodes. Crucial if the server renders the content.
      • Limit Node Depth and Complexity (Client and Server): Enforce limits on nesting depth and overall complexity. Mitigates resource exhaustion and reduces the attack surface.
      • Whitelisting, Not Blacklisting: Define what is allowed, not what is disallowed.
      • Regular Expression for Text Nodes: Use regex to validate text node content, allowing only safe characters.

Threat: Malicious Plugin Injection

  • Threat: Malicious Plugin Injection

    • Description: An attacker injects a malicious Slate plugin into the editor. This could be through:
      • A compromised dependency (e.g., a malicious npm package).
      • A supply chain attack.
      • A vulnerability allowing arbitrary JavaScript execution (used to load the plugin).
    • Impact:
      • Arbitrary modification of document content.
      • Data exfiltration (sending content to an attacker-controlled server).
      • Keylogging or user input monitoring.
      • Execution of arbitrary JavaScript, leading to further attacks.
    • Affected Slate Component:
      • Editor.use() (or equivalent plugin registration).
      • The entire plugin ecosystem.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Carefully Vet Dependencies: Thoroughly review all plugins and dependencies for vulnerabilities. Use tools like npm audit. Prefer well-maintained plugins.
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): Use a strict CSP to limit script sources, preventing unauthorized plugin execution. Critical defense.
      • Subresource Integrity (SRI): Use SRI to ensure plugin files haven't been tampered with. Protects against compromised CDNs or MITM attacks.
      • Regular Security Audits: Audit the codebase, including Slate integration and custom plugins.
      • Minimize Plugin Usage: Only use essential plugins.
      • Code Signing (Advanced): Consider code signing (complex in a web environment).

Threat: Data Leakage Through Custom Plugins

  • Threat: Data Leakage Through Custom Plugins

    • Description: A poorly written or malicious custom Slate plugin leaks sensitive data:
      • Draft content.
      • User metadata.
      • Data from other parts of the application.
      • Internal application state.
    • Impact: Exposure of confidential information, violating privacy or leading to further attacks.
    • Affected Slate Component:
      • Custom plugins.
      • Editor object (plugin interaction).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Thorough Code Review: Rigorously review custom plugin code, focusing on data handling, external communication, and access to sensitive info.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Plugins should only access necessary data. Avoid broad access.
      • Input Validation and Output Encoding: Validate data received by the plugin and encode data sent out.
      • Sandboxing (if possible): Explore sandboxing to isolate plugins (challenging in browsers, but iframes with postMessage might be possible).
      • Data Minimization: Store and process only the minimum necessary data.

Threat: Resource Exhaustion (Denial of Service)

  • Threat: Resource Exhaustion (Denial of Service)

    • Description: An attacker crafts a document to consume excessive resources:
      • Huge number of nodes.
      • Deeply nested structures.
      • Large amounts of text.
      • Custom plugins with expensive operations.
    • Impact:
      • Client-side: Unresponsive editor, browser tab crash, device unusable.
      • Server-side: Server crash (memory exhaustion, CPU overload), DoS for all users.
    • Affected Slate Component:
      • Editor object (client-side).
      • Serialization/deserialization logic (client and server).
      • Custom plugins (if resource-intensive).
      • Server-side processing.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Limit Document Size/Complexity (Client and Server): Strict limits on node count, nesting depth, and size. Implement both client-side and server-side.
      • Rate Limiting (Server-Side): Limit API requests handling Slate data.
      • Timeout Mechanisms (Server-Side): Timeouts for server-side processing.
      • Resource Monitoring (Server-Side): Monitor CPU/memory, alert on exhaustion.
      • Plugin Resource Limits (Client-Side - Difficult): Ideally, limit plugin resource usage (challenging in browsers).