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Threat Model Analysis for impress/impress.js

Threat: Malicious impress.js Library Substitution

  • Threat: Malicious impress.js Library Substitution

    • Description: An attacker replaces the legitimate impress.js file (either on the server or via a Man-in-the-Middle attack if HTTP is used) with a modified version containing malicious code. The attacker could inject code that steals data, redirects users, or performs other harmful actions within the context of the presentation. This is not about injecting content into slides, but altering the library itself.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of the presentation's functionality. The attacker could control the presentation flow, steal data entered into any interactive elements within the presentation (if any exist), or redirect users to malicious websites.
    • Affected Component: The entire impress.js library file.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Use Subresource Integrity (SRI) when loading impress.js from a CDN. This ensures the browser verifies the integrity of the downloaded file. Example: <script src="https://cdn.example.com/impress.js" integrity="sha384-..." crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
      • If self-hosting, implement file integrity monitoring (FIM) on the server to detect unauthorized modifications to the impress.js file.
      • Always use HTTPS to load impress.js, preventing Man-in-the-Middle attacks.
      • Regularly update to the latest version of impress.js to benefit from security patches.

Threat: Malicious Configuration Injection

  • Threat: Malicious Configuration Injection

    • Description: An attacker manipulates the configuration data passed to impress().init() or other impress.js functions. This could involve injecting malicious JavaScript code or altering parameters to disrupt the presentation's behavior. This assumes the configuration is loaded dynamically or influenced by user input.
    • Impact: The attacker could alter the presentation's flow, disable navigation controls, trigger unexpected animations, or potentially execute arbitrary JavaScript code (if the configuration is not properly sanitized).
    • Affected Component: impress().init() and any other functions that accept configuration data (e.g., impress().goto(), if its arguments are derived from untrusted sources).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Thoroughly validate and sanitize all configuration data before passing it to impress.js functions. Treat it as untrusted input.
      • Use a strict allowlist approach for configuration values, rejecting any unexpected or potentially dangerous values.
      • If configuration data is derived from user input, ensure proper input validation and output encoding to prevent XSS vulnerabilities.
      • Consider using a JSON schema to define the expected structure and types of the configuration data, and validate against it.