Attack Surface: 1. XML External Entity (XXE) Injection
- Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in XML parsers to include external entities in XML documents. This can lead to reading local files, SSRF, and denial of service.
- Drawio Contribution: Drawio processes diagram data, often in XML format (e.g.,
.drawio
,.xml
). If server-side processing of these files is enabled and the XML parser within drawio or its integration is not properly configured, it becomes vulnerable to XXE. - Example: A malicious user uploads a
.drawio
file containing an XXE payload that reads/etc/passwd
from the server when the file is processed server-side by drawio or a related application. - Impact: Confidentiality breach (reading sensitive files), Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), Denial of Service.
- Risk Severity: High to Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Disable External Entity Resolution: Configure XML parsers used by drawio or in server-side integrations to disable external entity and DTD processing.
- Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate and sanitize diagram data to remove or neutralize potentially malicious XML structures before processing by drawio server-side components.
- Principle of Least Privilege: Run server-side components processing drawio files with minimal necessary privileges.
Attack Surface: 2. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Diagram Data
- Description: Attackers inject malicious JavaScript code into diagram data that is later rendered in a web browser, allowing them to execute scripts in the context of other users' sessions.
- Drawio Contribution: Drawio allows users to input text, labels, and potentially custom attributes within diagrams. If this user-controlled data is not properly sanitized by drawio when rendered in a web page, it can lead to XSS.
- Example: A user creates a diagram with a shape label containing
<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>
. When this diagram is displayed on a webpage using drawio's rendering capabilities, the JavaScriptalert('XSS')
executes in the user's browser. - Impact: Account takeover, session hijacking, defacement, redirection to malicious sites, information theft.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Output Encoding/Escaping: Properly encode or escape user-controlled diagram data by drawio before rendering it in HTML. Use context-aware encoding (e.g., HTML entity encoding for text content, JavaScript escaping for JavaScript contexts).
- Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strict CSP to limit the sources from which scripts can be loaded and restrict inline JavaScript execution in contexts where drawio diagrams are displayed.
- Regular Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Identify and fix potential XSS vulnerabilities in drawio's rendering logic and integration points.
Attack Surface: 3. Image Processing Vulnerabilities
- Description: Vulnerabilities in image processing libraries can be exploited by uploading or processing maliciously crafted image files, potentially leading to code execution or denial of service.
- Drawio Contribution: Drawio supports importing and exporting various image formats (PNG, JPEG, SVG, etc.). If vulnerable image processing libraries are used within drawio itself or in server-side components interacting with drawio image exports/imports, drawio becomes a vector for exploiting these vulnerabilities.
- Example: A user uploads a specially crafted PNG file to drawio. A buffer overflow vulnerability in the PNG parsing library used by drawio is triggered, leading to remote code execution on the client or server processing the image.
- Impact: Remote Code Execution, Denial of Service, Information Disclosure.
- Risk Severity: High to Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Use Secure and Updated Image Processing Libraries: Ensure that drawio and any server-side components use secure and up-to-date image processing libraries. Regularly update these libraries within drawio and related systems to patch known vulnerabilities.
- Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate image file formats and potentially sanitize image data processed by drawio to remove or neutralize malicious payloads.
- Sandboxing/Isolation: Process image files in a sandboxed or isolated environment, especially in server-side integrations with drawio, to limit the impact of potential vulnerabilities.
Attack Surface: 4. Deserialization Vulnerabilities (Server-Side)
- Description: If diagram data is processed server-side using deserialization, vulnerabilities in the deserialization process can be exploited to execute arbitrary code.
- Drawio Contribution: If drawio is integrated with server-side components that deserialize diagram data (e.g., for saving, loading, or processing diagrams), and drawio itself or these components use insecure deserialization practices, deserialization vulnerabilities become relevant.
- Example: Diagram data is serialized using Java serialization and sent to a server-side component interacting with drawio. A vulnerability in the Java deserialization process is exploited by a malicious diagram payload processed by drawio's server-side integration, leading to remote code execution on the server.
- Impact: Remote Code Execution, Data Breach, Denial of Service.
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Avoid Deserialization of Untrusted Data: If possible, avoid deserializing diagram data from untrusted sources in server-side integrations with drawio.
- Use Secure Serialization Formats: If deserialization is necessary in drawio integrations, use secure serialization formats like JSON or Protocol Buffers instead of formats known to be vulnerable (like Java serialization).
- Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate and sanitize diagram data before deserialization in server-side drawio components to remove or neutralize potentially malicious payloads.
- Regular Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Specifically test for deserialization vulnerabilities in server-side components that process drawio diagram data.