Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
51 lines (42 loc) · 6.51 KB

File metadata and controls

51 lines (42 loc) · 6.51 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for jgraph/drawio

  • Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in XML parsers to include external entities in XML documents. This can lead to reading local files, SSRF, and denial of service.
  • Drawio Contribution: Drawio processes diagram data, often in XML format (e.g., .drawio, .xml). If server-side processing of these files is enabled and the XML parser within drawio or its integration is not properly configured, it becomes vulnerable to XXE.
  • Example: A malicious user uploads a .drawio file containing an XXE payload that reads /etc/passwd from the server when the file is processed server-side by drawio or a related application.
  • Impact: Confidentiality breach (reading sensitive files), Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), Denial of Service.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Disable External Entity Resolution: Configure XML parsers used by drawio or in server-side integrations to disable external entity and DTD processing.
    • Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate and sanitize diagram data to remove or neutralize potentially malicious XML structures before processing by drawio server-side components.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Run server-side components processing drawio files with minimal necessary privileges.
  • Description: Attackers inject malicious JavaScript code into diagram data that is later rendered in a web browser, allowing them to execute scripts in the context of other users' sessions.
  • Drawio Contribution: Drawio allows users to input text, labels, and potentially custom attributes within diagrams. If this user-controlled data is not properly sanitized by drawio when rendered in a web page, it can lead to XSS.
  • Example: A user creates a diagram with a shape label containing <img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>. When this diagram is displayed on a webpage using drawio's rendering capabilities, the JavaScript alert('XSS') executes in the user's browser.
  • Impact: Account takeover, session hijacking, defacement, redirection to malicious sites, information theft.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Output Encoding/Escaping: Properly encode or escape user-controlled diagram data by drawio before rendering it in HTML. Use context-aware encoding (e.g., HTML entity encoding for text content, JavaScript escaping for JavaScript contexts).
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strict CSP to limit the sources from which scripts can be loaded and restrict inline JavaScript execution in contexts where drawio diagrams are displayed.
    • Regular Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Identify and fix potential XSS vulnerabilities in drawio's rendering logic and integration points.
  • Description: Vulnerabilities in image processing libraries can be exploited by uploading or processing maliciously crafted image files, potentially leading to code execution or denial of service.
  • Drawio Contribution: Drawio supports importing and exporting various image formats (PNG, JPEG, SVG, etc.). If vulnerable image processing libraries are used within drawio itself or in server-side components interacting with drawio image exports/imports, drawio becomes a vector for exploiting these vulnerabilities.
  • Example: A user uploads a specially crafted PNG file to drawio. A buffer overflow vulnerability in the PNG parsing library used by drawio is triggered, leading to remote code execution on the client or server processing the image.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution, Denial of Service, Information Disclosure.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Secure and Updated Image Processing Libraries: Ensure that drawio and any server-side components use secure and up-to-date image processing libraries. Regularly update these libraries within drawio and related systems to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate image file formats and potentially sanitize image data processed by drawio to remove or neutralize malicious payloads.
    • Sandboxing/Isolation: Process image files in a sandboxed or isolated environment, especially in server-side integrations with drawio, to limit the impact of potential vulnerabilities.
  • Description: If diagram data is processed server-side using deserialization, vulnerabilities in the deserialization process can be exploited to execute arbitrary code.
  • Drawio Contribution: If drawio is integrated with server-side components that deserialize diagram data (e.g., for saving, loading, or processing diagrams), and drawio itself or these components use insecure deserialization practices, deserialization vulnerabilities become relevant.
  • Example: Diagram data is serialized using Java serialization and sent to a server-side component interacting with drawio. A vulnerability in the Java deserialization process is exploited by a malicious diagram payload processed by drawio's server-side integration, leading to remote code execution on the server.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution, Data Breach, Denial of Service.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid Deserialization of Untrusted Data: If possible, avoid deserializing diagram data from untrusted sources in server-side integrations with drawio.
    • Use Secure Serialization Formats: If deserialization is necessary in drawio integrations, use secure serialization formats like JSON or Protocol Buffers instead of formats known to be vulnerable (like Java serialization).
    • Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate and sanitize diagram data before deserialization in server-side drawio components to remove or neutralize potentially malicious payloads.
    • Regular Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Specifically test for deserialization vulnerabilities in server-side components that process drawio diagram data.