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Attack Tree Analysis for jgraph/drawio

Objective: Compromise Application via Draw.io Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

  • [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application via Draw.io Exploitation OR
    • [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Draw.io Vulnerabilities Directly OR
      • [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Draw.io OR
    • [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Application's Integration with Draw.io OR
      • [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Insecure Handling of Diagram Data OR
        • [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Diagram Content

Attack Tree Path: 1. [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application via Draw.io Exploitation

  • Description: This is the root goal of the attacker - to successfully compromise the application by exploiting vulnerabilities related to its integration with draw.io.
  • Attack Vectors: This is the overarching goal, and is achieved through the sub-nodes listed below.
  • Potential Impact: Full compromise of the application, including data breaches, unauthorized access, and disruption of services.
  • Actionable Insights: All actionable insights from the sub-nodes contribute to mitigating this overall risk.

Attack Tree Path: 2. [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Draw.io Vulnerabilities Directly

  • Description: Attackers attempt to directly exploit vulnerabilities within the draw.io library itself, without necessarily targeting the application's specific integration logic first.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Draw.io
    • (Less likely but possible) XML External Entity (XXE) Injection in Draw.io (if server-side processing)
    • (Less likely but possible) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Draw.io (if server-side rendering)
  • Potential Impact: If successful, these vulnerabilities can lead to direct compromise through client-side attacks (XSS) or server-side attacks (XXE, SSRF if applicable).
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Regularly update draw.io library to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • Conduct security audits and penetration testing specifically focusing on draw.io itself.
    • Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) to mitigate client-side attacks like XSS.
    • For server-side processing (if used): Disable external entity resolution in XML parsers, restrict outbound requests, and implement network segmentation.

Attack Tree Path: 3. [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Draw.io

  • Description: Inject malicious JavaScript code into the draw.io interface that executes in the user's browser when they interact with the application.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Identify unsanitized input fields or functionalities in draw.io.
    • Craft a malicious diagram or input with a JavaScript payload.
    • Inject the payload into the application's draw.io instance.
    • User interacts with the compromised diagram.
    • Malicious JavaScript executes in the user's browser within the application's context.
  • Potential Impact: Session hijacking, defacement, redirection to malicious sites, data theft, execution of arbitrary actions on behalf of the user.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Thoroughly sanitize all user inputs processed by draw.io.
    • Implement a strict Content Security Policy (CSP).
    • Keep draw.io updated to patch XSS vulnerabilities.
    • Conduct security audits focusing on draw.io integration points.

Attack Tree Path: 4. [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Application's Integration with Draw.io

  • Description: Attackers focus on weaknesses in how the application integrates with draw.io, rather than directly targeting draw.io vulnerabilities. This often involves insecure handling of diagram data by the application.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Insecure Handling of Diagram Data
    • Insecure Configuration of Draw.io within Application
    • Clickjacking on Embedded Draw.io
    • PostMessage Vulnerabilities (if used for communication)
  • Potential Impact: Compromise through vulnerabilities arising from the application's specific implementation and handling of draw.io.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Securely handle diagram data, especially during storage and rendering.
    • Configure draw.io securely, enabling only necessary features.
    • Implement clickjacking defenses (frame busting, X-Frame-Options, CSP frame-ancestors).
    • Securely implement postMessage communication (origin and data validation).

Attack Tree Path: 5. [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Insecure Handling of Diagram Data

  • Description: The application processes diagram data (e.g., stores, retrieves, renders) in an insecure manner, leading to vulnerabilities.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Diagram Content
    • XML Injection/Manipulation leading to Application Logic Bypass or Data Corruption
    • Deserialization Vulnerabilities (if custom formats are used)
  • Potential Impact: Data breaches, business logic bypass, data corruption, and client-side attacks (Stored XSS).
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Implement output encoding when rendering diagram data to prevent Stored XSS.
    • Validate diagram XML against a schema and sanitize XML content.
    • Avoid deserializing untrusted diagram data in custom formats, or implement robust validation and safe deserialization practices.

Attack Tree Path: 6. [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Diagram Content

  • Description: The application stores diagram data containing malicious JavaScript without proper sanitization. When this data is retrieved and rendered using draw.io, the JavaScript executes in users' browsers.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Inject malicious JavaScript into diagram elements within draw.io.
    • Save the diagram using the application's save functionality.
    • Application stores the diagram data persistently.
    • Another user loads and views the diagram, triggering JavaScript execution.
  • Potential Impact: Session hijacking, defacement, redirection, data theft, execution of arbitrary actions on behalf of other users.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Crucially important: Implement output encoding (e.g., HTML escaping) when rendering diagram data retrieved from storage.
    • Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) as a defense-in-depth measure.
    • Regularly audit code that handles diagram loading and rendering for output encoding vulnerabilities.

This focused sub-tree and detailed breakdown highlight the most critical areas to address when securing an application that integrates with draw.io. Prioritizing mitigation efforts on these High-Risk Paths and Critical Nodes will significantly improve the application's security posture.