Mitigation Strategy: Strict Input Sanitization and Validation (for anime.js
parameters)
Description:
- Identify
anime.js
Input Points: Pinpoint every instance where user-supplied data is passed directly intoanime.js
function calls, specifically targeting animation parameters. - Implement DOMPurify for
anime.js
: Before any user input reachesanime.js
, sanitize it using DOMPurify. Configure DOMPurify with an extremely restrictive whitelist, allowing only the absolute minimum HTML elements and attributes needed for your animations. Disallow<script>
,<iframe>
, event handlers (likeonclick
), and ideally, inline styles. - Type Validation for
anime.js
Parameters: Before sanitization, rigorously validate the data type of eachanime.js
parameter. Ifduration
is expected, ensure it's a number and within a defined range. If a color is expected, validate it against a color format regex. - Whitelist Values for
anime.js
: Foranime.js
parameters with a limited set of valid options (likeeasing
), create a whitelist of allowed values (e.g.,'linear'
,'easeInQuad'
, etc.) and reject any input that doesn't match. - Sanitize Immediately Before
anime.js
Call: The crucial step: sanitize user input immediately before it's passed to theanime.js
function. Do not sanitize earlier and store the result; sanitize right at the point of use.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via
anime.js
: (Severity: High) - Prevents malicious JavaScript from being injected throughanime.js
parameters that modify the DOM. - DOM Clobbering (indirectly via
anime.js
): (Severity: Medium) - Reduces the risk of attackers manipulating the DOM structure throughanime.js
.
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via
-
Impact:
- XSS: Reduces XSS risk related to
anime.js
to near zero if implemented correctly. - DOM Clobbering: Provides significant protection against DOM clobbering attacks that leverage
anime.js
.
- XSS: Reduces XSS risk related to
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially implemented in
ProductDetails
component. DOMPurify is used, but the configuration allows<style>
tags. Type validation is missing.
- Partially implemented in
-
Missing Implementation:
UserComments
component: No sanitization ofanime.js
parameters.HomePageCarousel
component: Uses an insufficient regex for sanitization.- Type validation is missing in most components using
anime.js
. - Whitelist validation for
anime.js
easing functions is not implemented.
Mitigation Strategy: Use Safer anime.js
Animation Targets
Description:
- Prioritize CSS Properties with
anime.js
: Within youranime.js
configurations, always prefer animating CSS properties (e.g.,transform
,opacity
,width
,height
) over directly manipulating DOM content or attributes. - Avoid
innerHTML
withanime.js
: Never use user-supplied data to directly set theinnerHTML
property of an element within ananime.js
animation. - Use
textContent
andanime.js
'supdate
Callback: If you must animate text content derived from user input, leverageanime.js
'supdate
callback function. Inside this callback:- Sanitize the user input (using DOMPurify).
- Set the element's
textContent
property (which automatically escapes HTML) with the sanitized input. Do not useinnerHTML
.
- Attribute Animations (Extremely Cautious): If animating attributes is unavoidable, be extremely cautious. Sanitize attribute values rigorously. Prefer
data-*
attributes overstyle
or event handler attributes.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via
anime.js
: (Severity: High) - Reduces the attack surface for XSS by limiting how user input interacts with the DOM throughanime.js
.
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via
-
Impact:
- XSS: Significantly reduces XSS risk when combined with input sanitization, specifically within the context of
anime.js
animations.
- XSS: Significantly reduces XSS risk when combined with input sanitization, specifically within the context of
-
Currently Implemented:
- Mostly implemented in
ProductImageGallery
component (primarily uses CSS transforms withanime.js
).
- Mostly implemented in
-
Missing Implementation:
AnimatedBanner
component: Directly setsinnerHTML
based on user input within ananime.js
animation.NotificationSystem
component: Animates thestyle
attribute directly withanime.js
, using user-configurable colors (without proper validation).
Mitigation Strategy: Limit anime.js
Animation Complexity
Description:
- Maximum Elements (for
anime.js
calls): Set a reasonable limit on the number of DOM elements that can be animated simultaneously in a singleanime.js
call triggered by user input. anime.js
Duration and Delay Limits: Impose maximum values for theduration
anddelay
properties withinanime.js
configurations. Prevent extremely long or infinite animations initiated by user input.anime.js
Easing Restrictions: Limit the complexity of easing functions used inanime.js
. Avoid allowing users to define custom easing functions. Use a whitelist of predefinedanime.js
easing functions.anime.js
Iteration Limits: Restrict the number ofiterations
ananime.js
animation can run, especially if triggered by user input. Prevent infinite loops.- Value Range Validation for
anime.js
: For numericalanime.js
parameters (e.g.,translateX
,scale
), validate that user-provided values fall within a safe and reasonable range.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) via
anime.js
: (Severity: Medium) - Prevents attackers from overwhelming the browser with computationally expensiveanime.js
animations.
- Denial of Service (DoS) via
-
Impact:
- DoS: Significantly reduces the risk of client-side DoS attacks specifically targeting
anime.js
.
- DoS: Significantly reduces the risk of client-side DoS attacks specifically targeting
-
Currently Implemented:
- A basic
duration
limit is implemented globally foranime.js
, but it's too high (10 seconds).
- A basic
-
Missing Implementation:
- No limits on the number of elements animated by a single
anime.js
call. - No restrictions on
anime.js
easing functions. - No limits on
anime.js
animation iterations. - No value range validation for most numerical
anime.js
parameters.
- No limits on the number of elements animated by a single