threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for kong/insomnia

Threat: Sensitive Data Exposure in Workspace/Collection

• Description: An attacker gains access to a developer's Insomnia workspace or collection files (either through a compromised workstation with inadequate security, accidental sharing, or a compromised sync service). The attacker could then extract sensitive information like API keys, authentication tokens, passwords, or PII that were inadvertently stored in request bodies, headers, environment variables, or query parameters. They might do this by simply opening the files in a text editor or importing them into their own Insomnia instance. The core vulnerability is the insecure storage of sensitive data within Insomnia's data files.
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized access to APIs and services.
    • Data breaches and exposure of sensitive information.
    • Reputational damage.
    • Financial loss.
    • Legal and regulatory consequences.
  • Insomnia Component Affected:
    • Workspace files (.insomnia/)
    • Collection files (.insomnia/RequestGroup, .insomnia/Request)
    • Environment files (.insomnia/Environment)
    • Insomnia's internal data storage (if accessed directly on a compromised machine).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Never hardcode sensitive data directly into requests.
    • Use environment variables appropriately, and be mindful of the "Base Environment" and its potential for accidental leakage.
    • Use the "No Environment" option when working with requests that don't require sensitive credentials.
    • Regularly audit workspaces and collections for accidentally stored secrets.
    • Sanitize collections before sharing them.
    • Use a secrets management solution (e.g., HashiCorp Vault) and integrate it with Insomnia if possible.
    • Implement strong workstation security (full disk encryption, strong passwords, MFA, EDR) – while this is a general security practice, it's crucial for mitigating this Insomnia-specific threat because it protects the files Insomnia uses.
    • Use short-lived credentials.

Threat: Malicious Plugin Execution

• Description: An attacker creates and distributes a malicious Insomnia plugin, or compromises a legitimate plugin. The plugin could then execute arbitrary code on the developer's machine, potentially stealing data (including Insomnia's own data and other files), installing malware, or using the machine for further attacks. The attacker might distribute the plugin through unofficial channels or by compromising the official plugin repository (a lower probability event, but high impact). This threat is directly related to Insomnia's plugin architecture.
  • Impact:
    • Complete system compromise.
    • Data theft (including Insomnia data and other sensitive information on the workstation).
    • Installation of malware (ransomware, keyloggers, etc.).
    • Use of the compromised machine for further attacks (botnet participation, etc.).
  • Insomnia Component Affected:
    • Insomnia Plugin API
    • Plugin loading mechanism (app.getPath('userData')/plugins)
    • Potentially any part of Insomnia accessible to plugins (request/response modification, environment access, etc.)
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Only install plugins from the official Insomnia plugin repository.
    • Carefully review the source code of plugins before installing them (if possible).
    • Review the permissions requested by a plugin before installation.
    • Regularly update plugins to the latest versions.
    • Remove unused plugins.
    • Implement a plugin approval process within the development team.
    • Consider sandboxing Insomnia (though this may be complex).

Threat: Data Leakage via Cloud Sync

• Description: If Insomnia's built-in cloud sync service is used, an attacker could compromise the service or a user's Insomnia account. This would give them access to all synced data, including workspaces, collections, and environment variables, potentially containing sensitive information. The attacker might exploit vulnerabilities in the cloud service, use stolen credentials, or phish the user. This is a direct threat because it involves a core feature of Insomnia.
  • Impact:
    • Similar to "Sensitive Data Exposure in Workspace/Collection," but potentially on a larger scale if multiple developers use the same account or if the cloud service itself is compromised.
    • Unauthorized access to APIs and services.
    • Data breaches.
    • Reputational damage.
  • Insomnia Component Affected:
    • Insomnia Cloud Sync service
    • Insomnia Account authentication
    • Data encryption/decryption mechanisms (if vulnerabilities exist)
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use a strong, unique password for the Insomnia account.
    • Enable two-factor authentication (2FA) for the Insomnia account.
    • Carefully consider the sensitivity of the data being synced. Avoid syncing production credentials.
    • Regularly review synced data and remove unnecessary or sensitive information.
    • Consider not using cloud sync, or using a self-hosted sync solution if data sensitivity is very high. (Self-hosting shifts the threat, but doesn't eliminate it).
    • Understand and accept Insomnia's data privacy and security policies.

Threat: Data Leakage via Self-Hosted Sync

• Description: If a self-hosted sync solution is used with Insomnia, an attacker could compromise the server hosting the service. This would give them access to all synced Insomnia data. The attacker might exploit vulnerabilities in the server software, use weak credentials, or exploit misconfigurations. While the server itself isn't part of Insomnia, the use of a sync solution is directly tied to how Insomnia is used and managed.
  • Impact: Similar to data leakage via cloud sync.
  • Insomnia Component Affected:
    • Self-hosted sync server software (external, but used by Insomnia).
    • Network communication between Insomnia and the sync server.
    • Insomnia's sync functionality.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Ensure the self-hosted server is properly secured:
      • Strong authentication and authorization.
      • Regular security updates and patching.
      • Network segmentation.
      • Encryption of data in transit and at rest.
    • Monitor and log server activity.
    • Consider the security implications of self-hosting versus the risks of cloud sync.