Objective: Compromise Application Security and Availability by Exploiting qs
Library Weaknesses.
- Compromise Application Security and Availability
- Exploit Parsing Logic Vulnerabilities in
qs
- Prototype Pollution [CRITICAL NODE, POTENTIALLY HIGH-RISK]
- Manipulate Object Prototype via
__proto__
,constructor.prototype
, or similar properties (if vulnerable version used) [POTENTIALLY HIGH-RISK]
- Manipulate Object Prototype via
- Prototype Pollution [CRITICAL NODE, POTENTIALLY HIGH-RISK]
- Exploit Application's Misuse of
qs
Parsed Data [CRITICAL NODE]- Injection Vulnerabilities due to Unsafe Handling of Parsed Data [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK]
- Application fails to sanitize or validate data parsed by
qs
before using it in sensitive operations. [HIGH-RISK]- SQL Injection [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]
- Command Injection [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]
- Path Traversal [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]
- Logic Bugs and Application-Specific Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]
- Application fails to sanitize or validate data parsed by
- Injection Vulnerabilities due to Unsafe Handling of Parsed Data [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK]
- Exploit Parsing Logic Vulnerabilities in
Attack Tree Path: Prototype Pollution [CRITICAL NODE, POTENTIALLY HIGH-RISK]
- Attack Vector: Manipulate Object Prototype via
__proto__
,constructor.prototype
, or similar properties (if vulnerable version used) [POTENTIALLY HIGH-RISK]- Mechanism: Craft query string parameters that attempt to modify the prototype of
Object
or other built-in objects through__proto__
orconstructor.prototype
properties. - Impact: Pollution of JavaScript object prototypes, potentially leading to:
- Unexpected application behavior.
- Security vulnerabilities if application logic relies on default object properties or behaviors.
- In some scenarios, potentially lead to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) or other attacks if polluted properties are later accessed in a vulnerable context.
- Mitigation:
- Use a patched and up-to-date version of
qs
library. Modern versions ofqs
have mitigations against prototype pollution. - Sanitize or validate data parsed by
qs
before using it in sensitive operations. - Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) to mitigate potential XSS if prototype pollution leads to script injection.
- Use a patched and up-to-date version of
- Example Query String:
?__proto__[isAdmin]=true
or?constructor.prototype.polluted=true
(These are examples, actual exploitability depends onqs
version and application context) - Risk Estimations:
- Likelihood: Low (for recent
qs
versions) to Medium (for older, unpatched versions) - Impact: Medium to High
- Effort: Low to Medium
- Skill Level: Medium
- Detection Difficulty: High
- Likelihood: Low (for recent
- Mechanism: Craft query string parameters that attempt to modify the prototype of
Attack Tree Path: Injection Vulnerabilities due to Unsafe Handling of Parsed Data [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK]
-
Attack Vector: Application fails to sanitize or validate data parsed by
qs
before using it in sensitive operations. [HIGH-RISK]-
2.1. SQL Injection [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]
- Mechanism: Attacker crafts query string parameters that, when parsed by
qs
and used in SQL queries without proper sanitization, lead to SQL injection. - Impact: Data breach, data manipulation, unauthorized access to database.
- Mitigation:
- Parameterized queries or prepared statements: Use these to prevent SQL injection.
- Input validation and sanitization: Validate and sanitize all data received from
qs
before using it in SQL queries.
- Example Query String:
?search='; DROP TABLE users; --
(classic SQL injection example) - Risk Estimations:
- Likelihood: High
- Impact: High
- Effort: Low to Medium
- Skill Level: Medium
- Detection Difficulty: Medium
- Mechanism: Attacker crafts query string parameters that, when parsed by
-
2.2. Command Injection [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]
- Mechanism: Attacker crafts query string parameters that, when parsed by
qs
and used in system commands without proper sanitization, lead to command injection. - Impact: Remote code execution on the server.
- Mitigation:
- Avoid executing system commands based on user input whenever possible.
- If system commands are necessary, use safe APIs and libraries that avoid shell execution.
- Input validation and sanitization: Strictly validate and sanitize any data from
qs
used in system commands.
- Example Query String:
?file=; rm -rf /
(dangerous command injection example) - Risk Estimations:
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: High
- Effort: Medium
- Skill Level: Medium
- Detection Difficulty: Medium to High
- Mechanism: Attacker crafts query string parameters that, when parsed by
-
2.3. Path Traversal [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]
- Mechanism: Attacker crafts query string parameters that, when parsed by
qs
and used to construct file paths without proper validation, lead to path traversal. - Impact: Unauthorized access to files on the server, potential information disclosure.
- Mitigation:
- Validate and sanitize file paths: Ensure that paths constructed from
qs
data are properly validated to prevent traversal outside of allowed directories. - Use secure file handling APIs that restrict access to specific directories.
- Validate and sanitize file paths: Ensure that paths constructed from
- Example Query String:
?file=../../../../etc/passwd
(path traversal example) - Risk Estimations:
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: Medium to High
- Effort: Low
- Skill Level: Low
- Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium
- Mechanism: Attacker crafts query string parameters that, when parsed by
-
2.4. Logic Bugs and Application-Specific Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]
- Mechanism: Attacker exploits application logic flaws that arise from how the application processes and uses the data parsed by
qs
. This is highly application-specific. - Impact: Varies depending on the application logic, could range from data manipulation to privilege escalation or other security breaches.
- Mitigation:
- Thoroughly review application logic that uses
qs
parsed data. - Implement robust input validation and business logic checks.
- Perform security testing specific to the application's functionality.
- Thoroughly review application logic that uses
- Example: Application uses a parsed parameter to determine user role without proper authorization checks.
- Risk Estimations:
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: Medium to High
- Effort: Medium to High
- Skill Level: Medium to High
- Detection Difficulty: High
- Mechanism: Attacker exploits application logic flaws that arise from how the application processes and uses the data parsed by
-