Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
83 lines (65 loc) · 7.18 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

83 lines (65 loc) · 7.18 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for markedjs/marked

Objective: Compromise application using Marked.js by exploiting vulnerabilities within Marked.js itself.

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application Using Marked.js [CRITICAL] ├───[AND] Exploit Marked.js Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL] ├───[OR] Input Processing Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL] │ ├───[OR] Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [CRITICAL] │ │ ├───[OR] Direct HTML Injection [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ │ ├───[LEAF] Inject Malicious HTML Tags (e.g., <script>, <iframe>, ) [CRITICAL] │ │ ├───[OR] Markdown Syntax Exploits Leading to XSS [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ │ ├───[LEAF] Exploit Link Parsing for JavaScript Execution [CRITICAL] │ │ │ ├───[LEAF] Exploit Image Parsing for JavaScript Execution [CRITICAL] │ │ ├───[OR] Bypass Sanitization Mechanisms [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ │ ├───[LEAF] Exploit Weak Default Sanitizer [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ ├───[OR] Denial of Service (DoS) │ │ ├───[LEAF] Resource Exhaustion via Complex Markdown [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Marked.js Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]

  • This is the overarching critical node. It represents the attacker's primary strategy: to find and exploit weaknesses within the Marked.js library itself to compromise the application. Success here opens the door to all subsequent attacks.

Attack Tree Path: Input Processing Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]

  • This critical node highlights the core vulnerability area. Marked.js takes user-provided Markdown input and processes it into HTML. Flaws in this processing are the most likely source of exploitable vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [CRITICAL]

  • This critical node represents the most significant security risk stemming from Marked.js. If an attacker can inject malicious scripts that execute in a user's browser, they can achieve a wide range of malicious goals, including:
    • Session hijacking and account takeover.
    • Data theft and exfiltration.
    • Website defacement.
    • Redirection to malicious websites.
    • Installation of malware.

Attack Tree Path: Direct HTML Injection [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

  • Attack Vector: Attackers attempt to embed raw HTML tags directly within the Markdown input. If Marked.js does not properly sanitize or escape these tags, especially security-sensitive tags like <script>, <iframe>, and <object>, they will be rendered as HTML in the application's output.
  • Critical Node: Inject Malicious HTML Tags (e.g., <script>, <iframe>, ) [CRITICAL]: This specific attack step is critical because these tags are directly designed to execute scripts or embed external content, making them prime vectors for XSS.
  • Why High-Risk:
    • Likelihood: Medium - Common if default sanitization is weak or misconfigured. Many developers might assume default sanitizers are sufficient.
    • Impact: High - Full XSS vulnerability.
    • Effort: Low - Easy to inject raw HTML into Markdown.
    • Skill Level: Low - Requires basic HTML and Markdown knowledge.

    • Attack Tree Path: Markdown Syntax Exploits Leading to XSS [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

    • Attack Vector: Attackers leverage Markdown syntax itself to inject malicious code, often by exploiting how Marked.js handles URLs within links and images.
    • Critical Node: Exploit Link Parsing for JavaScript Execution [CRITICAL]:
      • Attack Vector: Crafting Markdown links using javascript: URLs or data: URLs containing malicious HTML/JavaScript. If Marked.js doesn't block or sanitize these URL schemes, clicking the link will execute the embedded script.
      • Why Critical: javascript: URLs are a direct and often overlooked XSS vector in URL handling.
    • Critical Node: Exploit Image Parsing for JavaScript Execution [CRITICAL]:
      • Attack Vector: Similar to links, crafting Markdown images with javascript: URLs or data: URLs in the src attribute. Additionally, exploiting onerror event handlers within <img> tags generated by Marked.js.
      • Why Critical: Image URLs and event handlers can be exploited in similar ways to link URLs for XSS.
    • Why High-Risk:
      • Likelihood: Medium - Developers might not realize the XSS potential of javascript: and data: URLs in Markdown links and images.
      • Impact: High - Full XSS vulnerability.
      • Effort: Low - Easy to create Markdown links and images with malicious URLs.
      • Skill Level: Low - Requires basic Markdown knowledge.

    Attack Tree Path: Bypass Sanitization Mechanisms [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

    • Attack Vector: Even when sanitization is in place, attackers attempt to bypass it to inject malicious code. This often targets weaknesses in the sanitizer itself or inconsistencies in its application.
    • Critical Node: Exploit Weak Default Sanitizer [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]:
      • Attack Vector: The default sanitizer provided by Marked.js (if used) might be blacklist-based or have limitations. Attackers can identify patterns or encoding techniques that the default sanitizer fails to block, allowing them to inject malicious HTML or JavaScript.
      • Why Critical: Relying on default sanitizers is a common security mistake. They are often less robust and can be bypassed.
      • Why High-Risk:
        • Likelihood: Medium - Default sanitizers are often weaker and easier to bypass.
        • Impact: High - Full XSS vulnerability.
        • Effort: Low to Medium - Requires some research into sanitizer weaknesses and bypass techniques.
        • Skill Level: Intermediate - Requires understanding of sanitization bypass methods.

    Attack Tree Path: Denial of Service (DoS) - Resource Exhaustion via Complex Markdown [HIGH RISK PATH]

    • Attack Vector: Attackers craft extremely large or deeply nested Markdown documents. When Marked.js attempts to parse and convert this complex Markdown to HTML, it can consume excessive CPU and memory resources, leading to a Denial of Service.
    • Why High-Risk:
      • Likelihood: Medium - Applications might not have input size limits or parsing timeouts in place.
      • Impact: Medium - Service disruption, temporary unavailability of the application.
      • Effort: Low - Easy to generate large or deeply nested Markdown files programmatically.
      • Skill Level: Low - Requires basic understanding of how parsers can be overloaded.