attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for markedjs/marked

Objective: [G] Execute Arbitrary JavaScript (XSS or Server-Side) [!]

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 [G] Execute Arbitrary JavaScript (XSS or Server-Side) [!]
                                              /       
                                             /        
                                            /         
                                           /          
       ------------------------------------            
       | [C] Exploit misconfiguration  |   
       |     or insecure usage        | [!] 
       ------------------------------------            
                      |                 
                     |                
                     |                 
   ---> -----------------  
   | [C2]  Use of  |  
   --->|  unsafe      |  
   |  extensions  |  
   [!] |  or custom   |  
       |  renderers   |  
       -----------------  
                     |
                     |
          ---> --------------------------
          | [C2a]  Override default |
          |        renderer with   |
          |        malicious code  | [!]
          --------------------------
                     |
          ---> --------------------------
          | [C2b]  Use a vulnerable|
          |        3rd-party       |
          |        extension       | [!]
          --------------------------
                     |
          ---> --------------------------
          | [C2c]  Insecurely      |
          |        handle user     |
          |        input within    |
          |        extensions      | [!]
          --------------------------

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 1: [G] -> [C] -> [C2]

• Description: This path represents the attacker exploiting misconfigurations or insecure usage of the marked library, specifically focusing on the use of unsafe extensions or custom renderers. This is a high-risk path due to the combination of the likelihood of misconfigurations and the high impact of vulnerabilities in extensions/renderers.
• Steps:
  1. [C] Exploit misconfiguration or insecure usage: The attacker identifies that the application using marked has been configured insecurely or uses the library in a way that introduces vulnerabilities. This could involve a lack of input validation, improper output encoding, or other security oversights.
  2. [C2] Use of unsafe extensions or custom renderers: The attacker leverages the misconfiguration to introduce or exploit vulnerabilities within custom renderers or third-party extensions. This is the critical step where the vulnerability is introduced or exploited.
• Mitigations:
  • Strictly validate and sanitize all user input, both before and after processing with marked.
  • Avoid custom renderers if possible; use built-in features.
  • Thoroughly vet any third-party extensions before using them.
  • Implement a strong Content Security Policy (CSP).
  • Regularly review the application's configuration and code for security best practices.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 2: [G] -> [C] -> [C2] -> [C2a]

• Description: This is a specific instance of High-Risk Path 1, where the attacker overrides a default renderer function with malicious JavaScript code. This leads directly to code execution.
• Steps:
  1. [C] Exploit misconfiguration or insecure usage: (Same as above).
  2. [C2] Use of unsafe extensions or custom renderers: (Same as above).
  3. [C2a] Override default renderer with malicious code: The attacker finds a way to inject their own JavaScript code into a renderer function. This could be through a configuration vulnerability, a flaw in how the application handles user input, or a vulnerability in a custom extension.
• Mitigations:
  • Prevent users from influencing or providing renderer functions.
  • If custom renderers are necessary, rigorously sanitize any user-provided data used within them.
  • Use a code review process to ensure that renderer functions are secure.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 3: [G] -> [C] -> [C2] -> [C2b]

• Description: This path involves the attacker exploiting a vulnerability in a third-party marked extension.
• Steps:
  1. [C] Exploit misconfiguration or insecure usage: (Same as above).
  2. [C2] Use of unsafe extensions or custom renderers: (Same as above).
  3. [C2b] Use a vulnerable 3rd-party extension: The attacker identifies and utilizes a third-party extension that contains a known or unknown vulnerability. They then craft input that triggers this vulnerability.
• Mitigations:
  • Only use extensions from trusted sources.
  • Thoroughly review the code of any third-party extensions for potential vulnerabilities.
  • Keep extensions updated to the latest versions.
  • Monitor for security advisories related to any extensions used.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 4: [G] -> [C] -> [C2] -> [C2c]

• Description: This path focuses on vulnerabilities introduced by insecurely handling user input within a custom extension or renderer, even if the extension itself is not inherently malicious.
• Steps:
  1. [C] Exploit misconfiguration or insecure usage: (Same as above).
  2. [C2] Use of unsafe extensions or custom renderers: (Same as above).
  3. [C2c] Insecurely handle user input within extensions: The attacker provides specially crafted input that, while not directly exploiting a known vulnerability in the extension, takes advantage of poor input sanitization or validation within the extension's code.
• Mitigations:
  • Ensure that all user input processed by extensions or custom renderers is rigorously sanitized and validated.
  • Follow secure coding practices when developing extensions, paying close attention to input handling.
  • Use a linter and static analysis tools to identify potential security issues in extension code.