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Attack Tree Analysis for minimistjs/minimist

Objective: Compromise application by exploiting vulnerabilities introduced by or related to the minimist library (Focus on High-Risk Paths).

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via minimist Exploitation ├───[AND]─► Exploit minimist Parsing Logic │ ├───[OR]─► Prototype Pollution via Argument Parsing [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND]─► Supply Malicious Arguments │ │ └───► Craft Arguments to Overwrite Prototype Properties (proto, constructor.prototype) [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─► Argument Injection & Command Injection (Indirect via Application) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND]─► Inject Malicious Argument Values │ │ ├───► Identify Application Code Using Parsed Arguments in Unsafe Operations [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └───► Craft Argument Values to Inject Malicious Payloads [CRITICAL NODE] └───[AND]─► Exploit Application Misconfiguration/Misuse of minimist └───[OR]─► Lack of Input Validation Post-minimist Parsing [HIGH RISK PATH] └───[AND]─► Application Fails to Validate Parsed Arguments [CRITICAL NODE] ├───► Identify Application Code that Directly Uses minimist Output [CRITICAL NODE] └───► Exploit Lack of Validation on Parsed Arguments [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: Prototype Pollution via Argument Parsing

Attack Vector Description: This path exploits a vulnerability where minimist's parsing logic, when handling specific argument structures, can allow an attacker to modify the prototypes of JavaScript objects. This can lead to application-wide consequences.

  • Critical Node: Craft Arguments to Overwrite Prototype Properties (proto, constructor.prototype)
    • Attack Step: The attacker crafts command-line arguments specifically designed to target and overwrite properties of the __proto__ or constructor.prototype of JavaScript objects.
    • Example Arguments: --__proto__.polluted=true, --constructor.prototype.isAdmin=false
    • Impact: Successful prototype pollution can modify the behavior of all objects inheriting from the polluted prototype. This can lead to:
      • Denial of Service (DoS): By polluting properties that cause errors or infinite loops when accessed.
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE): If polluted properties are used in security-sensitive contexts (e.g., access control checks, code execution paths).
      • Information Disclosure: By modifying properties that control data access or visibility.
    • Mitigation:
      • Upgrade minimist to the latest version.
      • Implement strict input validation and sanitization of argument names and values.
      • Consider using alternative argument parsing libraries that are designed to prevent prototype pollution.
      • Perform code reviews and static analysis to identify potential prototype pollution vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Argument Injection & Command Injection (Indirect via Application)

Attack Vector Description: This path is not a direct vulnerability in minimist itself, but rather arises from how the application uses the arguments parsed by minimist. If the application uses these parsed arguments in unsafe operations (like executing shell commands, accessing files, or constructing database queries) without proper sanitization, it becomes vulnerable to injection attacks.

  • Critical Node: Identify Application Code Using Parsed Arguments in Unsafe Operations

    • Attack Step: The attacker analyzes the application's code to find locations where arguments parsed by minimist are used in potentially unsafe operations.
    • Examples of Unsafe Operations:
      • Executing shell commands using child_process.exec or similar functions with parsed arguments.
      • Constructing file paths using parsed arguments without proper validation (leading to path traversal).
      • Building database queries using parsed arguments without parameterization (leading to SQL injection).

  • Critical Node: Craft Argument Values to Inject Malicious Payloads

    • Attack Step: Once unsafe code locations are identified, the attacker crafts malicious argument values that, when processed by the application in those unsafe operations, will execute attacker-controlled commands or actions.
    • Example Argument for Command Injection: --file="; rm -rf / ;" (if the application uses args.file in a shell command).
    • Impact: Successful argument injection can lead to:
      • Command Injection: Execution of arbitrary commands on the server.
      • File System Access: Unauthorized reading, writing, or deletion of files.
      • Data Manipulation/Breach: Accessing or modifying sensitive data in databases or files.
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE): In many command injection scenarios, RCE is achievable.
    • Mitigation:
      • Robust Input Validation and Sanitization: Thoroughly validate and sanitize all parsed argument values before using them in any sensitive operations.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Run application processes with minimal necessary privileges.
      • Avoid Dynamic Command Construction: Use parameterized functions or safer APIs instead of dynamically building shell commands with user input.
      • Secure Coding Practices: Follow secure coding guidelines to prevent injection vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Lack of Input Validation Post-minimist Parsing

Attack Vector Description: This is the most common and often most critical vulnerability. Even if minimist parses arguments correctly, the application must validate and sanitize the parsed arguments before using them in any application logic. Failure to do so is a major security flaw.

  • Critical Node: Application Fails to Validate Parsed Arguments

    • Vulnerability: The application code directly uses the output of minimist (the args object) without implementing any checks to ensure the validity, type, or safety of the parsed arguments.
    • Common Scenario: Developers assume that because minimist parsed the arguments, they are inherently safe or valid for the application's purposes, which is a dangerous assumption.

  • Critical Node: Identify Application Code that Directly Uses minimist Output

    • Attack Step: The attacker identifies code sections where the args object (the result of minimist parsing) is directly accessed and used without prior validation.
    • Example Code Pattern: const filename = args.file; fs.readFileSync(filename); (without any validation on filename).

  • Critical Node: Exploit Lack of Validation on Parsed Arguments

    • Attack Step: The attacker crafts malicious argument values that exploit the lack of validation in the identified code locations.
    • Example Argument for Path Traversal: --file="../etc/passwd" (if the application uses args.file to access files without path validation).
    • Impact: Exploiting the lack of input validation can lead to a wide range of vulnerabilities, including:
      • File System Access Vulnerabilities (Path Traversal): Accessing files outside of the intended application directory.
      • Command Injection (as described in Path 2): If unvalidated arguments are used in shell commands.
      • Data Manipulation/Breach: If unvalidated arguments are used to access or modify data.
      • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): If unvalidated arguments are used to generate web page content.
    • Mitigation:
      • Mandatory Input Validation: Implement robust input validation for every parsed argument before using it in any application logic.
      • Use Validation Libraries: Utilize input validation libraries to simplify and standardize validation processes.
      • Security Training for Developers: Educate developers about the critical importance of input validation and secure coding practices.