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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for mochajs/mocha

Attack Surface: Untrusted Test Code Execution

  • Description: Execution of JavaScript test code from untrusted sources (e.g., user-submitted tests, compromised repositories).
  • Mocha Contribution: Mocha's core function is to execute JavaScript code, making it the direct enabler of this attack if used with untrusted input. Mocha provides no built-in protection against malicious code within tests.
  • Example: A user uploads a Mocha test file containing require('child_process').exec('rm -rf /'), attempting to delete the entire filesystem.
  • Impact:
    • Arbitrary file read/write.
    • System command execution.
    • Environment variable access.
    • Network access.
    • Denial of Service (DoS).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Sandboxing: Execute untrusted tests within highly restricted environments like isolated VMs or containers with minimal privileges and no network access. This is the primary defense.
    • Dedicated User Account: Run tests as a dedicated, low-privilege user account with no access to sensitive files or system resources.
    • Resource Limits: Enforce strict limits on CPU, memory, and network usage for the test execution environment.
    • Never Run Untrusted Tests: The most secure approach is to completely avoid running tests from untrusted sources. This is the ideal mitigation.

Attack Surface: Insecure Reporter Usage

  • Description: Exploitation of vulnerabilities in custom or third-party Mocha reporters, or exfiltration of data through malicious reporters.
  • Mocha Contribution: Mocha's support for custom reporters, and its mechanism for passing test results to these reporters, directly enables this attack vector. The reporter runs within the Mocha process.
  • Example: A custom reporter that generates HTML output without proper sanitization is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if test names or error messages contain malicious JavaScript. A malicious reporter could send test results (including sensitive data) to an attacker-controlled server.
  • Impact:
    • XSS (if the reporter generates HTML or interacts with a browser).
    • Template injection.
    • Data exfiltration.
    • Potentially RCE, depending on the reporter's functionality and vulnerabilities.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Trusted Reporters: Only use reporters from reputable sources and well-maintained projects. Avoid lesser-known or unmaintained reporters.
    • Code Review: Thoroughly review the code of any custom reporters for security vulnerabilities, paying critical attention to input handling and data output.
    • Sanitization: Rigorously sanitize all data displayed by the reporter, especially if it generates HTML or interacts with a web browser. Use appropriate escaping techniques for the target context.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): If the reporter generates HTML, implement a strong CSP to mitigate XSS risks.
    • Network Restrictions: If possible, restrict the network access of the reporter process to prevent unauthorized data exfiltration. This can be done at the OS level or through containerization.

Attack Surface: Sensitive Data Exposure in Test Output

  • Description: Tests inadvertently printing sensitive information (API keys, passwords, database credentials, etc.) to the console or logs, which are then handled by Mocha's reporting mechanism.
  • Mocha Contribution: Mocha's reporters are directly responsible for displaying and handling the test output. While the tests themselves generate the output, Mocha's reporting is the mechanism through which the sensitive data becomes visible.
  • Example: A test that interacts with an API logs the API key to the console for debugging purposes, and this output is captured and displayed by the default Mocha reporter.
  • Impact:
    • Exposure of sensitive credentials.
    • Unauthorized access to systems or services.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid Logging Secrets: Never log sensitive information directly in tests. This is the most important mitigation.
    • Environment Variables: Use environment variables or secrets management tools to store sensitive data, and access them within tests without printing their values.
    • Reporter Configuration: Configure the Mocha reporter (if possible) to suppress or redact sensitive information from the output. Some reporters offer options for filtering or masking specific patterns.
    • Log Review: Regularly review test logs and output (even if redaction is attempted) to ensure no sensitive data is being leaked.
    • Mocking: Use mocking techniques to avoid interacting with real services that require sensitive credentials during testing. This reduces the need to handle real credentials in the first place.