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Attack Tree Analysis for mochajs/mocha

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code (RCE) or Exfiltrate Sensitive Data via Mocha

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code (RCE) or Exfiltrate Sensitive Data via Mocha

├── 1. RCE on Server/Client Running Mocha (High Impact, Medium Likelihood Overall)
│   ├── 1.2. Exploit Mocha's Configuration and Features (HIGHEST RISK PATH)
│   │   ├── 1.2.1.  Use `--require` or `--file` to Load Malicious Code
│   │   │   ├── 1.2.1.1.  (Local Access) Modify Mocha configuration
│   │   │   └── 1.2.1.2.  (Repository Access) Inject malicious `--require` or `--file`
│   ├── 1.3. Exploit Dependencies of Mocha or Test Code (CRITICAL NODE)
│   │   └── 1.3.2.  Supply Chain Attack on Test Dependencies (HIGHEST RISK)
│   │       └── 1.3.2.1.  The test code itself might `require` a malicious package.
│   └── 1.4.  Mocha in Production (Major Misconfiguration) (CRITICAL NODE)
│       └── 1.4.1.  If Mocha is accidentally included in the production build...

└── 2. Exfiltration of Sensitive Data (Medium Impact, Medium Likelihood Overall)
    ├── 2.2.  Access Sensitive Data Through Test Execution
    │   └── 2.2.1.  Tests that Access Production Databases or APIs (CRITICAL NODE)
    │       └── 2.2.1.1.  If tests are configured to run against production systems...
        └── 2.2.2 Tests that Read Sensitive Files
            └── 2.2.2.1 If tests read configuration files or other files containing secrets...
    └── 2.3 Abuse Test Environment Variables
        └── 2.3.1 (Local/Repository Access) Modify tests to print or otherwise expose sensitive environment variables set for testing.

Attack Tree Path: 1. RCE on Server/Client Running Mocha

  • 1.2. Exploit Mocha's Configuration and Features (HIGHEST RISK PATH)

    • 1.2.1. Use --require or --file to Load Malicious Code:
      • Description: Mocha allows preloading modules using the --require or --file command-line options (or equivalent configuration file settings). An attacker who can modify the test execution environment can use this to load arbitrary JavaScript code before the tests run. This code executes with the same privileges as the test runner.
      • Sub-Attack Vectors:
        • 1.2.1.1. (Local Access):
          • Description: If the attacker has local access to the machine running the tests (e.g., a compromised developer machine or CI/CD server), they can directly modify the Mocha configuration files (e.g., mocha.opts, package.json, or environment variables) to add a --require or --file flag pointing to a malicious script.
          • Likelihood: Medium. Requires local access, but configuration files are often not heavily protected.
          • Impact: High. Grants full code execution in the context of the test runner.
          • Effort: Low. Modifying a configuration file is a simple operation.
          • Skill Level: Intermediate. Requires understanding of Mocha's configuration and basic scripting.
          • Detection Difficulty: Medium. Requires monitoring configuration files for changes or using file integrity monitoring tools.
        • 1.2.1.2. (Repository Access):
          • Description: If the attacker has write access to the project's source code repository, they can directly inject the malicious --require or --file directive into the test configuration. This is particularly dangerous because it can affect all developers and CI/CD pipelines.
          • Likelihood: Medium. Requires compromising repository access (which is a significant hurdle), but once achieved, the attack is easy to execute.
          • Impact: High. Grants full code execution in the context of the test runner, potentially affecting multiple users and systems.
          • Effort: Low. A simple code change.
          • Skill Level: Intermediate. Requires understanding of Mocha's configuration and basic scripting.
          • Detection Difficulty: Medium. Relies on code review processes and CI/CD pipeline checks to detect the malicious configuration change.

  • 1.3. Exploit Dependencies of Mocha or Test Code (CRITICAL NODE)

    • 1.3.2. Supply Chain Attack on Test Dependencies (HIGHEST RISK):
      • Description: This is the most significant threat. Test code often uses various helper libraries, mocking frameworks, and assertion libraries. If an attacker can compromise one of these dependencies (e.g., by publishing a malicious package to npm with a similar name, or by compromising an existing package), they can inject arbitrary code that will be executed when the tests run. This is particularly dangerous because test dependencies are often less scrutinized than production dependencies.
      • 1.3.2.1. The test code itself might require a malicious package:
        • Likelihood: Medium. Developers may be less cautious about the security of test-only dependencies. Typosquatting and malicious package publication are ongoing threats.
        • Impact: High. Grants full code execution in the context of the test runner.
        • Effort: Medium. Requires creating and publishing a malicious package or compromising an existing one.
        • Skill Level: Intermediate. Requires knowledge of package management and potentially social engineering.
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium. Relies on dependency auditing, vulnerability scanning, and careful review of new dependencies.

  • 1.4. Mocha in Production (Major Misconfiguration) (CRITICAL NODE)

    • 1.4.1. If Mocha is accidentally included in the production build:
      • Description: Mocha is not intended for production use. If it's accidentally included in a production deployment, all of the vulnerabilities described above become significantly more dangerous because they are now exposed to external attackers. This is a critical configuration error.
      • Likelihood: Low. Proper build processes should prevent this, but mistakes happen.
      • Impact: Very High. Exposes all Mocha-related vulnerabilities to the public internet.
      • Effort: Varies (depends on the specific vulnerability being exploited).
      • Skill Level: Varies (depends on the specific vulnerability being exploited).
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy. Checking the production dependencies should reveal the presence of Mocha.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exfiltration of Sensitive Data

  • 2.2. Access Sensitive Data Through Test Execution (CRITICAL NODE)
*   **2.2.1. Tests that Access Production Databases or APIs (CRITICAL NODE):**
    *   **Description:** Running tests against production systems is extremely dangerous.  An attacker who can modify the tests could extract sensitive data, modify data, or cause denial-of-service.
    *   **2.2.1.1. If tests are configured to run against production systems:**
        *   **Likelihood:** Low (should be very low, but unfortunately happens).  This is a severe misconfiguration.
        *   **Impact:** Very High.  Potential for data breaches, data corruption, and service disruption.
        *   **Effort:** Low.  Requires modifying test code to access and exfiltrate data.
        *   **Skill Level:** Intermediate.  Requires understanding of the application's data model and API.
        *   **Detection Difficulty:** Easy.  Monitoring network traffic and database access logs should reveal this activity.

* **2.2.2 Tests that Read Sensitive Files**
    * **Description:** Tests might read configuration files, environment variables, or other files that contain secrets (API keys, passwords, etc.). An attacker could modify the tests to output this information.
    * **2.2.2.1 If tests read configuration files or other files containing secrets:**
        * **Likelihood:** Medium. It's common for tests to need access to configuration data.
        * **Impact:** High. Secrets could be exposed, leading to further compromise.
        * **Effort:** Low. Modifying tests to print file contents is trivial.
        * **Skill Level:** Novice. Basic scripting knowledge is sufficient.
        * **Detection Difficulty:** Medium. Requires code review and monitoring of test output.
  • 2.3 Abuse Test Environment Variables
    • Description: Tests often use environment variables to configure behavior or access secrets. An attacker could modify the tests to print or otherwise expose these variables.
    • 2.3.1 (Local/Repository Access) Modify tests to print or otherwise expose sensitive environment variables set for testing:
      • Likelihood: Medium. Requires access to modify tests.
      • Impact: High. Secrets could be exposed.
      • Effort: Low. Simple code modification.
      • Skill Level: Novice.
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium. Requires code review and monitoring of test output.