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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for mochajs/mocha

Threat: Malicious Test Code Execution (via Mocha Runner)

  • Description: An attacker injects malicious code into test files or test dependencies. Mocha, as the test runner, executes this code, leading to a compromise. The attacker might achieve this through a compromised developer machine, a supply chain attack targeting a test dependency, or by exploiting a vulnerability in the version control system. The key here is that Mocha is the execution engine.
  • Impact:
    • Compromise of development or CI/CD environments.
    • Data theft (source code, credentials, etc.).
    • Installation of malware.
    • Manipulation of build processes (injecting malicious code into production builds).
  • Mocha Component Affected: Mocha's core test runner (mocha.run(), the CLI, and any internal mechanism that loads and executes test files). This is about Mocha executing untrusted code, not a vulnerability within Mocha's code itself.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Sandboxing: Run tests in strictly isolated environments (Docker containers, VMs) with minimal privileges. This is the primary mitigation. Mocha's execution model makes sandboxing essential.
    • Dependency Management: Use npm audit or yarn audit to identify and resolve vulnerabilities in test dependencies. Regularly update dependencies. Use dependency locking.
    • Code Reviews: Thoroughly review all test code and changes to test dependencies.
    • Least Privilege: Run Mocha (and the tests it executes) with the absolute minimum necessary permissions. Never run tests as root/administrator.
    • Static Analysis: Use static analysis tools to scan test code for potential vulnerabilities.

Threat: Vulnerable Mocha Reporter (XSS - HTML Reporters)

  • Description: An attacker exploits a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in a third-party Mocha HTML reporter. The attacker crafts malicious test output (e.g., a specially crafted test name or error message) that, when rendered by the vulnerable reporter, executes arbitrary JavaScript in the browser of anyone viewing the test report. This directly involves Mocha because the reporter is a core extension point of Mocha.
  • Impact:
    • Compromise of the user's browser (if viewing reports locally).
    • Potential for session hijacking or data theft if reports are hosted and viewed by other users (e.g., on a CI/CD dashboard).
  • Mocha Component Affected: Third-party Mocha reporters that generate HTML output. While built-in reporters are less likely to be vulnerable, it's still a risk. The vulnerability lies in the reporter, but the reporter is a direct extension of Mocha.
  • Risk Severity: High (especially if reports are shared or publicly accessible)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Well-Known Reporters: Prefer built-in reporters or well-maintained, widely-used third-party reporters from trusted sources.
    • Regular Updates: Keep Mocha and all reporter dependencies updated to the latest versions. This is crucial for patching known vulnerabilities.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): If displaying reports in a browser, implement a strict CSP to mitigate XSS risks. This is a critical defense-in-depth measure.
    • Input Sanitization (Reporter-Specific): If you are developing a custom reporter, ensure that all user-provided input (test names, error messages, etc.) is properly sanitized before being included in the HTML output. This is the reporter's responsibility, but it directly impacts Mocha's security.