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Threat Model Analysis for mrdoob/three.js

Threat: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via three.js misuse or vulnerabilities.

  • Description: An attacker injects malicious JavaScript code into the application, which is then executed in the user's browser. This can occur if user-controlled data is improperly used within three.js to dynamically generate scene elements or if vulnerabilities exist within three.js itself (though less common in core, more likely in examples or extensions). For example, if application code uses user input to construct a URL for a texture loaded by TextureLoader without proper sanitization, it could be exploited for XSS.
    • Impact: Account takeover, session hijacking, data theft, website defacement, redirection to malicious sites, further attacks on the user's system.
    • Affected three.js component: Application code using three.js Loaders (e.g., TextureLoader, ObjectLoader), potentially examples or extensions, indirectly core three.js if vulnerabilities exist.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep three.js updated to the latest stable version to patch potential vulnerabilities.
      • Strictly sanitize and validate all user-provided data before using it to construct URLs, parameters, or any data that influences three.js scene generation or manipulation.
      • Implement a strong Content Security Policy (CSP) to significantly reduce the impact of XSS by controlling the sources from which scripts and other resources can be loaded.
      • Regularly perform security code reviews and static/dynamic analysis to identify potential XSS vulnerabilities in application code interacting with three.js.

Threat: Code Execution via three.js vulnerability.

  • Description: A critical vulnerability exists within the three.js library itself, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the user's machine when they interact with a three.js powered application. This could be triggered by processing maliciously crafted 3D models, textures, or through specific API calls that exploit a flaw in three.js's core logic or its interaction with browser APIs. For example, a hypothetical buffer overflow in a model loader could be exploited to execute code.
    • Impact: Full compromise of the user's machine, data theft, malware installation, complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
    • Affected three.js component: Core three.js modules, Loaders (e.g., GLTFLoader, OBJLoader, TextureLoader), potentially WebGLRenderer or other core components depending on the specific vulnerability.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Immediately update three.js to the latest patched version as soon as security updates are released.
      • Subscribe to three.js security mailing lists or monitor security advisories to be promptly informed about critical vulnerabilities.
      • Implement robust input validation and sanitization for all external data processed by three.js, even if it seems to be in trusted formats (like 3D models).
      • In extreme cases, if a critical vulnerability is suspected and no patch is immediately available, consider temporarily disabling or limiting the use of the affected three.js components until a fix is applied.
      • Employ browser-level security features and operating system security best practices to limit the potential impact of code execution vulnerabilities, such as using sandboxed browser environments.