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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for mrdoob/three.js

Attack Surface: Shader (GLSL) Injection

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious GLSL code into WebGL shaders.
  • How Three.js Contributes: Three.js's core functionality relies on GLSL shaders. Any user-provided data that influences shader code (directly or indirectly) creates a direct injection point within Three.js's rendering pipeline. This is inherent to how Three.js uses WebGL.
  • Example: A user-customizable material allows direct input of a GLSL code snippet, or a seemingly safe parameter like a color is directly concatenated into shader source code without sanitization.
  • Impact:
    • Denial of Service (browser/GPU crash).
    • Information disclosure (reading pixel data, potentially cross-origin).
    • GPU fingerprinting.
    • Potential (rare) arbitrary code execution (via browser/driver exploits).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Never directly embed user input into shader code.
    • Use uniforms exclusively to pass data to shaders. Treat uniforms as the only safe way to parameterize shaders.
    • Strict input validation and sanitization: Validate all data that influences shader behavior, even if it's passed via uniforms. Use whitelists and strong typing.
    • Avoid dynamic shader compilation: Pre-compile shaders whenever possible.
    • Shader parameterization: Design shaders to accept parameters (uniforms) rather than constructing them dynamically from user input.

Attack Surface: Malicious 3D Model Files

  • Description: Attackers upload or provide links to maliciously crafted 3D model files that exploit vulnerabilities in Three.js's loaders.
  • How Three.js Contributes: This is a direct attack on Three.js's provided loaders (e.g., GLTFLoader, OBJLoader, FBXLoader). The vulnerability lies within the Three.js code responsible for parsing these model formats.
  • Example: An attacker uploads a specially crafted glTF file designed to trigger a buffer overflow or other memory corruption vulnerability within the GLTFLoader's parsing logic.
  • Impact:
    • Denial of Service (application/browser crash).
    • Potential (though less likely) arbitrary code execution by exploiting vulnerabilities within the Three.js loader code.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use the latest Three.js version: This is paramount. Security fixes for loaders are often included in updates.
    • Strict file type and size validation: Enforce strict limits on allowed file types and sizes before Three.js processes them.
    • Server-side validation (pre-Three.js): Ideally, perform validation and sanitization on the server before the model data ever reaches the client-side Three.js code. This adds a crucial layer of defense.
    • Fuzz testing: Use fuzz testing techniques on loaders.

Attack Surface: Resource Exhaustion (GPU)

  • Description: Attackers provide input (models, textures, shader parameters) designed to consume excessive GPU resources.
  • How Three.js Contributes: Three.js is the direct interface to the GPU via WebGL. The complexity of the scene rendered by Three.js directly impacts GPU resource usage. User-provided data that controls scene complexity (e.g., model uploads, texture choices) directly affects this.
  • Example: An attacker uploads a model with an extremely high polygon count and numerous large, uncompressed textures, causing Three.js to attempt to render a scene that overwhelms the user's GPU.
  • Impact: Denial of Service (application/browser unresponsiveness, potential system instability).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Limit model complexity: Enforce strict limits on the number of vertices, polygons, and materials in user-provided models before they are processed by Three.js.
    • Texture size and format restrictions: Limit texture dimensions and enforce compressed texture formats before passing them to Three.js's texture loading mechanisms.
    • Shader complexity analysis: Analyze shaders (especially those influenced by user input) for potential performance bottlenecks. Simplify shaders where possible. This is a Three.js-specific concern because Three.js uses these shaders.
    • Resource monitoring and throttling (within Three.js context): Monitor GPU memory usage and frame rates within your Three.js application. Implement mechanisms to throttle or reject rendering updates that exceed predefined limits.

Attack Surface: Using Outdated Three.js Version

  • Description: Using an old version of the library with known vulnerabilities.
  • How Three.js Contributes: This is a direct vulnerability related to the Three.js library itself. Older versions may contain security flaws in loaders, renderers, or other components.
  • Example: Using a version of Three.js with a known vulnerability in its OBJLoader that allows for arbitrary code execution.
  • Impact: Varies depending on the specific vulnerability, but could range from DoS to code execution.
  • Risk Severity: High (depending on the specific vulnerabilities)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regularly update Three.js: Keep Three.js up to date with the latest stable release. This is the primary mitigation.
    • Use a package manager: Use npm, yarn, or a similar tool to manage Three.js as a dependency and easily update it.
    • Monitor security advisories: Stay informed about security vulnerabilities in Three.js and its dependencies.