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Attack Tree Analysis for mrdoob/three.js

Objective: To execute arbitrary JavaScript code within the context of the application using Three.js, leading to data exfiltration, denial of service, or client-side manipulation.

Attack Tree Visualization

[Attacker's Goal: Execute Arbitrary JavaScript]
    |
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    |								|
    [Exploit Vulnerabilities in Three.js]					  [Abuse Legitimate Three.js Features]
    |								|
    ---------------------------------						-------------------------------------------------
    |					|						|						|
**[1. Loader Vulnerabilities]**		   **[2. Shader Vulnerabilities]**				[5. Resource Exhaustion]						[6. Misconfigured Features]
    |					|						|						|
    |					-------------------------						-------------------------						-------------------------
    |					|				   |						|		   |		   |						|
**[1a. Malicious Model Loading]**	   **[2a. GLSL Inj. (Frag)]**	  **[2b. GLSL Inj. (Vert)]**	  [5a. Geom. Alloc. (DoS)] [5b. Tex. Alloc. (DoS)]						[6e. Improper Loading Logic]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Loader Vulnerabilities (Critical Node)

  • Description: Three.js relies on loaders (e.g., GLTFLoader, OBJLoader) to handle various 3D model formats. These loaders parse complex data structures, making them potential targets for exploitation.
  • 1a. Malicious Model Loading (CWE-73) (Critical Node):
    • Likelihood: High. Users often load models from external sources, and crafting malicious models is a well-known attack vector.
    • Impact: High. Successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary JavaScript execution, giving the attacker full control over the client-side application.
    • Effort: Medium. Requires knowledge of 3D model formats and potential vulnerabilities in the specific loader being used. Pre-made exploits or tools might be available.
    • Skill Level: Medium to High. Requires understanding of 3D model formats, parsing vulnerabilities, and potentially JavaScript exploitation techniques.
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium. Malicious code might be obfuscated within the model file. Requires careful inspection of loaded models and monitoring for unusual behavior.
    • Mitigation:
      • Strict Input Validation: Validate all model URLs and file contents before loading. Reject models from untrusted sources.
      • Sandboxing: If possible, load models in a sandboxed environment (e.g., a Web Worker) to limit the impact of any potential exploits.
      • Use a Secure Parser: Consider using a separate, security-focused library to pre-parse and validate models before passing them to Three.js.
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): Use CSP to restrict the origins from which models can be loaded.
      • Regular Updates: Keep Three.js and its loaders updated to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Shader Vulnerabilities (Critical Node)

  • Description: Shaders (written in GLSL) are programs that run on the GPU to control rendering. They offer significant power but also introduce a large attack surface.

    • 2a. GLSL Injection (Fragment Shader) (Critical Node):

      • Likelihood: High (if user input influences shader code). Even seemingly innocuous inputs like color values can be manipulated.
      • Impact: High. Allows arbitrary code execution within the GPU context, potentially leading to complete browser compromise.
      • Effort: Medium to High. Requires understanding of GLSL and how the application uses user input to generate shaders.
      • Skill Level: High. Requires expertise in shader programming and WebGL security.
      • Detection Difficulty: High. Malicious GLSL code can be subtle and difficult to detect without careful analysis.
      • Mitigation:
        • Avoid Direct Input: Never construct shader code directly from user input.
        • Use Parameterized Shaders: Pass user input as uniform variables, which are treated as data, not code.
        • Strict Input Validation: Validate and sanitize all uniform variable values.
        • Shader Sandboxing (if possible): Explore techniques for sandboxing shader execution (though this is challenging).
        • Code Review: Thoroughly review all shader code for potential injection vulnerabilities.

    • 2b. GLSL Injection (Vertex Shader) (Critical Node):

      • Likelihood: High (if user input influences shader code). Similar to fragment shader injection.
      • Impact: High. Similar to fragment shader injection.
      • Effort: Medium to High. Similar to fragment shader injection.
      • Skill Level: High. Similar to fragment shader injection.
      • Detection Difficulty: High. Similar to fragment shader injection.
      • Mitigation: Same as for fragment shader injection (2a).

Attack Tree Path: 5. Resource Exhaustion

  • Description: Attackers can attempt to crash the application or the user's browser by consuming excessive resources.

    • 5a. Geometry Allocation (DoS):

      • Likelihood: High. Relatively easy to create models with extremely high polygon counts.
      • Impact: Medium to High. Can cause the application to become unresponsive or crash, leading to denial of service.
      • Effort: Low. Can be achieved with readily available tools or by modifying existing models.
      • Skill Level: Low. Basic understanding of 3D models is sufficient.
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium. Requires monitoring resource usage and identifying unusually large models.
      • Mitigation:
        • Limit Model Complexity: Set limits on the number of polygons, vertices, and file size of uploaded models.
        • Server-Side Validation: Validate model complexity on the server before processing.
        • Rate Limiting: Limit the rate at which users can upload or load models.

    • 5b. Texture Allocation (DoS):

      • Likelihood: High. Similar to geometry allocation, large textures can consume significant memory.
      • Impact: Medium to High. Can lead to application crashes or unresponsiveness.
      • Effort: Low. Large image files are readily available.
      • Skill Level: Low.
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium. Requires monitoring memory usage and identifying unusually large textures.
      • Mitigation:
        • Limit Texture Size: Set maximum dimensions and file sizes for textures.
        • Server-Side Validation: Validate texture dimensions and file sizes on the server.
        • Use Compressed Textures: Encourage or require the use of compressed texture formats (e.g., DDS, KTX).
        • Progressive Loading: Load textures progressively to avoid sudden spikes in memory usage.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Misconfigured Features

  • 6e. Improper Loading Logic (HIGH RISK):
    • Likelihood: High. This is a common area for errors, especially in complex applications.
    • Impact: Medium to High. Depends on the specific vulnerability, but can range from information disclosure to arbitrary code execution.
    • Effort: Low to Medium. Depends on the complexity of the loading logic and the specific vulnerability.
    • Skill Level: Medium. Requires understanding of web security principles and how Three.js handles resource loading.
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to High. Requires careful code review and potentially dynamic analysis to identify vulnerabilities.
    • Mitigation:
      • Validate URLs: Ensure that all URLs used for loading resources are valid and point to trusted sources.
      • Sanitize Data: Sanitize all data loaded from external sources, even if they are considered trusted.
      • Handle Errors Gracefully: Implement robust error handling to prevent information leakage and unexpected behavior.
      • Avoid Race Conditions: Use appropriate synchronization mechanisms when loading multiple resources asynchronously.
      • Follow Security Best Practices: Adhere to general web security best practices, such as the principle of least privilege.