Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
59 lines (47 loc) · 6.41 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

59 lines (47 loc) · 6.41 KB

Threat Model Analysis for nwjs/nw.js

Threat: Node.js API Exposure in Renderer Process

  • Threat: Node.js API Exposure in Renderer Process

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability (e.g., XSS, insecure IPC) in the renderer process (Chromium) to gain access to Node.js APIs that were not intended to be exposed. This is the core NW.js-specific risk. The attacker leverages the intended bridging of Chromium and Node.js in an unintended way.
    • Impact: Complete system compromise. The attacker can read/write files, execute system commands, access network resources, install malware, and steal sensitive data. Full control of the user's machine.
    • Affected Component: node-remote (if misused), lack of context-isolation, improperly configured preload scripts, insecure inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms specifically bridging Node.js and Chromium.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Disable node-remote entirely if possible. If required, restrict it to specific, trusted origins (not "*").
      • Ensure context-isolation is enabled (default in recent NW.js versions). This is a direct NW.js mitigation.
      • Use a carefully designed preload script to expose only the necessary, well-vetted APIs to the renderer process. Avoid exposing entire modules. This is a direct NW.js mitigation.
      • Implement secure IPC using window.postMessage with origin checks and structured cloning. Avoid passing raw functions or objects. Focus on the bridge between Node.js and the renderer.
      • Sanitize all user input and data received from external sources to prevent XSS vulnerabilities that could be used to access the Node.js bridge.

Threat: webview Tag with Node.js Integration

  • Threat: webview Tag with Node.js Integration

    • Description: The application uses the NW.js-provided <webview> tag with the nodeintegration attribute enabled. If the content loaded in the webview is compromised (e.g., via XSS or a malicious website), it gains access to Node.js APIs because of this NW.js-specific feature.
    • Impact: Similar to direct Node.js API exposure, this can lead to complete system compromise if the attacker can control the content within the webview.
    • Affected Component: <webview> tag specifically with the nodeintegration attribute (an NW.js feature).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Avoid using nodeintegration within <webview> tags whenever possible. This is the most crucial mitigation, and it directly addresses the NW.js-specific risk.
      • If absolutely necessary, load only trusted content into the webview.
      • Implement strict Content Security Policy (CSP) within the webview to limit its capabilities. This is important because the webview is a Chromium component within the NW.js context.
      • Use a separate process for the webview (if possible) to further isolate it. This leverages NW.js's process management.
      • Implement robust communication mechanisms between the main process and the webview process, avoiding direct API exposure. Again, focus on the bridge provided by NW.js.

Threat: Outdated Chromium Vulnerability (Impacting NW.js)

  • Threat: Outdated Chromium Vulnerability (Impacting NW.js)

    • Description: The NW.js application uses an outdated version of Chromium that is bundled within NW.js. An attacker exploits a known browser vulnerability in this bundled version to gain control of the renderer process. This is distinct from a general browser vulnerability because it's tied to the specific Chromium version shipped with NW.js.
    • Impact: Code execution within the renderer process, potentially leading to further exploitation if Node.js integration is also vulnerable (especially relevant due to the close coupling in NW.js).
    • Affected Component: The bundled Chromium version within NW.js.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Use the latest stable release of NW.js. This is the primary mitigation, directly addressing the NW.js component.
      • Monitor NW.js release notes for security updates and apply them promptly. This is specific to NW.js, not general browser updates.
      • If a critical vulnerability is disclosed and a patch is not immediately available, consider temporarily disabling affected features or using a custom NW.js build with a patched Chromium (a more advanced, NW.js-specific mitigation).

Threat: Dependency Vulnerability (Node.js Module within NW.js context)

  • Threat: Dependency Vulnerability (Node.js Module within NW.js context)
    • Description: The application uses a third-party Node.js module with a known vulnerability. An attacker exploits this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code within the Node.js context provided by NW.js. The key here is that the vulnerable module is running within the privileged Node.js environment integrated into the application by NW.js.
    • Impact: Varies depending on the module and vulnerability, but the tight integration with the desktop environment via NW.js significantly increases the potential impact, often leading to complete system compromise.
    • Affected Component: Any vulnerable third-party Node.js module included in the application's dependencies, specifically within the NW.js runtime environment.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regularly run npm audit or yarn audit to identify vulnerable dependencies.
      • Update all Node.js modules to their latest patched versions.
      • Use a Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tool for deeper dependency analysis and vulnerability detection.
      • Carefully vet third-party modules before including them, prioritizing well-maintained and widely-used packages.
      • Consider forking and patching critical modules if updates are not available. The key is to ensure the Node.js environment within NW.js is secure.