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Attack Surface Analysis for phaserjs/phaser

Attack Surface: Malicious Asset Injection

1. Malicious Asset Injection

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious files disguised as legitimate game assets, which are then loaded and processed by Phaser. This exploits Phaser's asset loading mechanisms to introduce harmful content.
  • Phaser Contribution: Phaser's core functionality is asset loading (images, audio, JSON, etc.). If the application allows user-controlled asset paths or uploads that are then used with Phaser's asset loading functions (e.g., load.image, load.audio, load.json), Phaser becomes the direct conduit for loading and potentially executing malicious content.
  • Example: An application allows users to customize game backgrounds by providing a URL. This URL is directly passed to phaser.load.image(). An attacker provides a URL pointing to a malicious image file hosted on their server. This "image" is crafted to exploit a browser vulnerability or trigger XSS when processed by the browser after being loaded by Phaser. Alternatively, a malicious JSON file loaded via phaser.load.json() could contain JavaScript code that the application might inadvertently execute if it processes the JSON data unsafely.
  • Impact:
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - leading to account compromise, data theft, redirection to malicious sites.
    • Denial of Service (DoS) - crashing the game or consuming excessive resources due to malformed or excessively large assets loaded by Phaser.
    • Client-Side Resource Exploitation - using the game to perform malicious actions on the user's machine via malicious assets loaded by Phaser.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strictly Control Asset Sources: Avoid allowing user input to directly dictate asset paths or URLs used in Phaser's asset loading functions.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strong CSP to restrict the origins from which Phaser can load assets, significantly limiting the impact of malicious URL inputs.
    • Asset Whitelisting and Validation: If user-provided assets are necessary, strictly whitelist allowed asset types and extensions. Validate file content and metadata to detect potentially malicious files before Phaser loads them.
    • Secure Asset Hosting: Ensure that the server hosting game assets is securely configured to prevent unauthorized modification or replacement of legitimate assets with malicious ones.

Attack Surface: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Phaser Rendering of Unsanitized Input

2. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Phaser Rendering of Unsanitized Input

  • Description: User-provided input is rendered within the game's UI or content using Phaser's display objects (e.g., Text objects, Sprites with text textures) without proper sanitization. This allows attackers to inject and execute malicious JavaScript code in the user's browser through the rendered game elements.
  • Phaser Contribution: Phaser is responsible for rendering the game's visual elements, including text and UI. If the application uses Phaser's text rendering capabilities to display user-generated content or reflects user input directly into text objects without encoding, Phaser becomes the rendering engine that displays and potentially executes the XSS payload.
  • Example: A game displays player names using Phaser's Text objects. If the application directly sets the text content of these objects using player names received from user input or an external source without HTML escaping, an attacker can register with a name like <img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>. When Phaser renders this name, the onerror event will trigger, executing the JavaScript alert in other players' browsers.
  • Impact:
    • Account Hijacking - stealing session cookies or credentials.
    • Data Theft - accessing sensitive information displayed within the game.
    • Malware Distribution - redirecting users to malicious websites.
    • Defacement - altering the game's appearance or content for other users.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Output Encoding/Escaping for Phaser Text Objects: Always encode or escape user-provided input before setting it as the text content of Phaser's Text objects or any other display object that renders text. Use appropriate encoding functions (e.g., HTML escaping) to neutralize potentially malicious HTML or JavaScript within the text.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a CSP to further reduce the impact of XSS by restricting script execution and other potentially harmful actions, even if XSS is injected into Phaser rendered content.
    • Avoid Direct HTML Rendering within Phaser (if possible): Minimize or avoid using Phaser features that might directly interpret HTML or allow for direct HTML injection, as this increases the risk of XSS. Focus on using Phaser's text rendering API with proper encoding.

Attack Surface: Vulnerabilities in High-Risk Third-Party Phaser Plugins

3. Vulnerabilities in High-Risk Third-Party Phaser Plugins

  • Description: Phaser applications often utilize third-party plugins to extend functionality. Certain plugins, especially those dealing with networking, data handling, or UI interactions, can introduce critical security vulnerabilities if they are poorly written, outdated, or intentionally malicious.
  • Phaser Contribution: Phaser's plugin system allows seamless integration of external code. If the application uses plugins from untrusted sources or plugins with known high-severity vulnerabilities, these plugins become part of the application's attack surface through Phaser's plugin integration mechanism.
  • Example: An application uses a Phaser plugin for handling user authentication and session management. A critical vulnerability is discovered in this plugin that allows for session hijacking or authentication bypass. Any application using this vulnerable plugin becomes susceptible to these critical authentication flaws through Phaser's plugin system. Another example could be a networking plugin with a remote code execution vulnerability.
  • Impact:
    • Remote Code Execution (RCE) - allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code on the client's machine.
    • Authentication Bypass - allowing attackers to bypass login mechanisms and access user accounts.
    • Data Breach - exposing sensitive user data handled by the vulnerable plugin.
    • Complete Compromise of the Phaser Application.
  • Risk Severity: Critical (for plugins with RCE, Authentication Bypass, or Data Breach vulnerabilities)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rigorous Plugin Vetting and Security Audits: Thoroughly vet and, ideally, perform security audits of all third-party plugins, especially those handling sensitive operations. Prioritize plugins from reputable sources with strong security track records and active maintenance.
    • Minimize Plugin Usage: Only use plugins that are absolutely necessary and avoid using plugins with overly broad permissions or functionalities that are not essential.
    • Keep Plugins Updated and Monitor for Vulnerabilities: Actively monitor for security updates and vulnerability disclosures for all used Phaser plugins. Promptly update plugins to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • Isolate Plugin Functionality (if possible): If feasible, isolate plugin functionality and limit the permissions and access granted to plugins to minimize the potential blast radius of a plugin vulnerability. Consider using sandboxing or other isolation techniques if applicable.