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Attack Tree Analysis for phaserjs/phaser

Objective: To manipulate the game state or client-side behavior of a Phaser.js game to gain an unfair advantage, steal in-game assets, or disrupt the experience for other players.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     [Manipulate Game State/Client Behavior] [CN]
                                                    |
          ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          |                                         |                                  
[Exploit Phaser API Misuse/Vulnerabilities]  [Manipulate Game Assets/Data]                
          |                                         |                                  
  -----------------                   ------------------------------------
  |               |                   |                                     
[Scene]     [Physics]        [Loader/Cache]     [Input]           [Game Object]   
[Injection] [Manipulation]      [Tampering]      [Spoofing]        [Modification]
  |               |                   |                  |                  |
  |               |                   |                  |                  |
[A1][CN]       [A2][HR][CN]          [A3][CN]           [A4][HR]           [A6][HR][CN]

Attack Tree Path: [A1] Scene Injection [CN]

  • Description: The attacker attempts to inject malicious code into a Phaser scene or force the game to load an unintended scene. This could be achieved by exploiting vulnerabilities in how the game handles scene transitions or by manipulating data used to determine which scene to load.
  • Phaser-Specific Threat: Phaser's scene management system, if not used carefully with proper input validation, can be vulnerable to attacks where scene loading is controlled by untrusted data.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Highly dependent on implementation details).
  • Impact: High to Very High (Potential for arbitrary code execution, complete game takeover).
  • Effort: Low to Medium (Easier if user input directly controls scene loading).
  • Skill Level: Intermediate (Requires understanding of Phaser's scene management and injection techniques).
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Server-side logging might detect unusual requests; client-side detection is harder).
  • Mitigation:
    • Strictly validate all input used to determine scene loading.
    • Use a whitelist of allowed scene names.
    • Avoid dynamically creating scene names from untrusted input.
    • Sanitize data passed between scenes.

Attack Tree Path: [A2] Physics Manipulation [HR][CN]

  • Description: The attacker modifies client-side physics calculations to gain an unfair advantage (e.g., increased speed, altered gravity, walking through walls). This is highly effective against games that rely solely on client-side physics.
  • Phaser-Specific Threat: Phaser's physics engines (Arcade, Matter.js, Impact) are used to simulate movement and collisions. If the game logic trusts client-side physics results without server-side validation, an attacker can easily manipulate these calculations.
  • Likelihood: High (Very common in games without server-authoritative physics).
  • Impact: Medium to High (Unfair advantages, disrupted gameplay).
  • Effort: Low to Medium (Easy with browser developer tools).
  • Skill Level: Beginner to Intermediate (Basic JavaScript knowledge is often sufficient).
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Detectable with server-side sanity checks on player positions and velocities).
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement server-authoritative physics.
    • Perform server-side sanity checks on player positions, velocities, and other physics-related data.
    • Don't trust client-side physics calculations completely.

Attack Tree Path: [A3] Loader/Cache Tampering [CN]

  • Description: The attacker attempts to replace legitimate game assets (images, sounds, data files) with malicious ones or corrupt the game's cache. This could lead to the execution of malicious code or unexpected game behavior.
  • Phaser-Specific Threat: If asset loading is not secured, an attacker could inject malicious assets. Phaser's caching mechanisms, if misconfigured, could be exploited.
  • Likelihood: Low to Medium (Requires compromising the server or intercepting network traffic).
  • Impact: High to Very High (Potential for malicious code execution, game corruption).
  • Effort: Medium to High (Requires more sophisticated attack techniques).
  • Skill Level: Advanced (Requires knowledge of network security and potentially server-side vulnerabilities).
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard (Requires robust integrity checks and network monitoring).
  • Mitigation:
    • Use checksums or digital signatures to verify asset integrity.
    • Load assets only from trusted sources.
    • Configure the cache securely.
    • Use Content Security Policy (CSP).

Attack Tree Path: [A4] Input Spoofing [HR]

  • Description: The attacker simulates user input (keyboard, mouse, touch events) to trigger actions in the game that they shouldn't be able to, or to automate actions for an unfair advantage.
  • Phaser-Specific Threat: Phaser's input handling, if not validated on the server-side, can be vulnerable to spoofed events.
  • Likelihood: High (Common in games without server-side input validation).
  • Impact: Medium (Unfair advantages, automation of actions).
  • Effort: Low (Achievable with simple scripts or browser extensions).
  • Skill Level: Beginner to Intermediate (Basic scripting knowledge).
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Detectable with server-side rate limiting and input validation; anti-cheat systems can help).
  • Mitigation:
    • Validate input events on the server-side, especially for critical actions.
    • Implement anti-cheat measures to detect rapid or impossible input sequences.
    • Don't rely solely on client-side input validation.

Attack Tree Path: [A6] Game Object Modification [HR][CN]

  • Description: The attacker directly modifies the properties of game objects (sprites, text, etc.) on the client-side to change their behavior or appearance, gaining an unfair advantage or disrupting the game.
  • Phaser-Specific Threat: If the game logic doesn't protect game object properties and relies on client-side values, an attacker can easily manipulate them using browser developer tools.
  • Likelihood: High (Very common without server-authoritative state).
  • Impact: Medium to High (Unfair advantages, modification of game logic).
  • Effort: Low (Direct manipulation in the browser's console).
  • Skill Level: Beginner to Intermediate (Basic JavaScript knowledge).
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires server-side validation of game object properties).
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement server-authoritative state management.
    • Validate game object properties on the server-side, especially critical values like health, position, and score.
    • Use a state management system that enforces data integrity.