Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
155 lines (137 loc) · 11.4 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

155 lines (137 loc) · 11.4 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for pixijs/pixi.js

Objective: Compromise Application Using PixiJS

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application Using PixiJS **[CRITICAL NODE]**
* Exploit PixiJS Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE]**
    * Exploit Asset Loading/Processing Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        * Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Assets **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH-RISK PATH]
            * Inject Malicious Asset (e.g., SVG, JSON data file)
                * Exploit Asset Loading Mechanism (e.g., URL parameter injection)
                * Asset Loaded by PixiJS
            * PixiJS Processes Malicious Asset
                * PixiJS Parses Asset
                * Malicious Payload in Asset Executed in User's Browser Context
                    * Steal Session Tokens/Cookies
                    * Redirect User to Malicious Site
                    * Deface Application Content
        * Path Traversal during Asset Loading **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH-RISK PATH]
            * Control Asset Path Input
                * Exploit Input Parameter (e.g., URL, configuration)
            * PixiJS Loads Asset from Unintended Location
                * PixiJS Uses User-Controlled Path
                * Access Sensitive Files/Directories on Server (if server-side asset loading)
                * Load Malicious Assets from Unintended Location
        * Resource Exhaustion via Rendering **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH-RISK PATH]
            * Trigger Complex Rendering Operations
                * Exploit API to Create Large Number of Objects/Complex Scenes
            * Exhaust Client-Side Resources
                * Cause Browser/Application Freeze or Crash (DoS)
                * Degrade User Experience
    * Exploit API Misuse/Logic Flaws in Application Code Using PixiJS **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        * Insecure Configuration of PixiJS **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH-RISK PATH]
            * Application Uses Insecure PixiJS Configuration
                * Misconfigured Security Settings (e.g., CORS, asset loading origins)
            * Exploit Insecure Configuration
                * Bypass Security Restrictions
                * Gain Unauthorized Access to Resources
        * Improper Input Sanitization for PixiJS API **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH-RISK PATH]
            * Application Passes User Input Directly to PixiJS API
                * Lack of Input Validation/Sanitization
            * Inject Malicious Input via PixiJS API
                * Cause Unexpected PixiJS Behavior
                * Trigger Application Logic Errors
                * Potentially Achieve XSS if PixiJS renders user-controlled text unsafely
        * Logic Flaws in Game/Application Logic Interacting with PixiJS **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH-RISK PATH]
            * Identify Logic Flaws in Application Code
                * Code Review, Dynamic Analysis of Application Logic
            * Exploit Logic Flaws via PixiJS Interaction
                * Manipulate Game State/Application Flow
                * Gain Unauthorized Access/Privileges
        * Event Handling Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE]** [HIGH-RISK PATH]
            * Exploit PixiJS Event System
                * Manipulate Event Listeners or Event Propagation
            * Trigger Unexpected Application Behavior via Event Exploitation
                * Cause Logic Errors
                * Potentially Achieve DoS by Flooding Events

Attack Tree Path: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Assets

  • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious JavaScript code into assets (like SVGs or JSON files) that are loaded and processed by PixiJS. When PixiJS parses these assets, the malicious script can be executed within the user's browser context.
  • Exploitation Steps:
    • Attacker finds a way to inject a malicious asset. This could be through:
      • Exploiting a vulnerability in the asset loading mechanism (e.g., URL parameter injection if the application uses URL parameters to specify asset paths without proper validation).
      • Compromising the asset storage location if assets are served from a server.
    • PixiJS loads and parses the malicious asset.
    • The malicious JavaScript code embedded in the asset executes in the user's browser.
  • Potential Impact: Full XSS, allowing the attacker to:
    • Steal session tokens and cookies, leading to account hijacking.
    • Redirect the user to a malicious website (phishing, malware distribution).
    • Deface the application content.
  • Mitigation Focus: Strict Content Security Policy (CSP), robust asset sanitization, secure asset loading mechanisms, and context-aware output encoding if PixiJS renders data from assets.

Attack Tree Path: Path Traversal during Asset Loading

  • Attack Vector: Manipulating asset paths to load files from unintended locations on the server or from external malicious sources.
  • Exploitation Steps:
    • Attacker gains control over the asset path used by PixiJS. This could be through:
      • Exploiting input parameters (e.g., URL parameters, configuration settings) if the application uses user-controlled input to construct file paths for asset loading.
    • PixiJS uses the attacker-controlled path to load an asset.
    • Depending on the path manipulation, the attacker can:
      • Access sensitive files and directories on the server if server-side asset loading is used and permissions are misconfigured.
      • Load malicious assets from an attacker-controlled server, potentially leading to XSS or other attacks.
  • Potential Impact:
    • Information disclosure (accessing sensitive server files).
    • Loading malicious assets, leading to XSS or other client-side attacks.
  • Mitigation Focus: Strict input validation and sanitization for asset paths, whitelisting allowed asset paths, secure asset storage outside the web root, and principle of least privilege for file access.

Attack Tree Path: Resource Exhaustion via Rendering

  • Attack Vector: Triggering computationally expensive rendering operations through the PixiJS API to exhaust client-side resources (CPU, GPU, memory), leading to Denial of Service (DoS).
  • Exploitation Steps:
    • Attacker exploits the PixiJS API to create a very large number of objects or complex scenes. This could be achieved by:
      • Manipulating API calls directly if the application exposes PixiJS API in a vulnerable way.
      • Crafting malicious input that, when processed by the application, results in the creation of excessive rendering elements.
    • The browser attempts to render the complex scene, leading to resource exhaustion.
  • Potential Impact:
    • Browser or application freeze or crash (DoS).
    • Degraded user experience due to slow performance.
  • Mitigation Focus: Input validation and rate limiting for rendering parameters, resource management in application code (object pooling, culling), client-side limits on rendering complexity, and performance optimization.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Configuration of PixiJS

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting insecure configuration settings in the application's PixiJS setup, such as allowing asset loading from untrusted origins without proper CORS configuration.
  • Exploitation Steps:
    • Attacker identifies insecure PixiJS configuration settings in the application. This could involve:
      • Reviewing application code or configuration files.
      • Observing network requests and responses.
    • Attacker exploits the misconfiguration to bypass security restrictions. For example, if CORS is not properly configured, an attacker might be able to load malicious assets from their own domain.
  • Potential Impact:
    • Bypass security restrictions (e.g., CORS).
    • Gain unauthorized access to resources.
  • Mitigation Focus: Secure configuration practices for PixiJS, proper CORS configuration on asset servers, and principle of least privilege in configuration.

Attack Tree Path: Improper Input Sanitization for PixiJS API

  • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious input through user-controlled data that is directly passed to PixiJS API calls without proper sanitization.
  • Exploitation Steps:
    • Attacker identifies points in the application where user input is directly passed to PixiJS API functions without validation or sanitization.
    • Attacker crafts malicious input designed to cause unexpected PixiJS behavior or trigger application logic errors. In some cases, if PixiJS renders user-controlled text unsafely, this could potentially lead to XSS (though less likely).
  • Potential Impact:
    • Unexpected PixiJS behavior.
    • Triggering application logic errors.
    • Potentially XSS (in specific scenarios).
  • Mitigation Focus: Strict input validation and sanitization for all user-provided data used in PixiJS API calls, and context-aware output encoding if PixiJS renders user-controlled text.

Attack Tree Path: Logic Flaws in Game/Application Logic Interacting with PixiJS

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting logic flaws in the application's code that interacts with PixiJS, leading to manipulation of game state, unauthorized actions, or other unintended consequences.
  • Exploitation Steps:
    • Attacker identifies logic flaws in the application code that governs the game or application flow and interacts with PixiJS. This requires understanding the application's logic.
    • Attacker exploits these logic flaws through interactions with PixiJS. For example, manipulating game state by sending specific API calls or events to PixiJS in an unexpected sequence.
  • Potential Impact:
    • Manipulation of game state or application flow.
    • Gaining unauthorized access or privileges within the application.
  • Mitigation Focus: Secure coding practices, thorough code reviews, comprehensive testing (unit, integration, functional), and robust application logic design.

Attack Tree Path: Event Handling Vulnerabilities

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in PixiJS's event system by manipulating event listeners or event propagation to trigger unexpected application behavior or Denial of Service (DoS).
  • Exploitation Steps:
    • Attacker identifies vulnerabilities in how the application handles PixiJS events. This could involve:
      • Manipulating event listeners (e.g., adding or removing listeners in unexpected ways).
      • Manipulating event propagation (e.g., stopping or redirecting event flow).
    • Attacker exploits these vulnerabilities to:
      • Cause logic errors by triggering unexpected application behavior through event manipulation.
      • Achieve DoS by flooding the application with events, overwhelming the event handling system.
  • Potential Impact:
    • Application logic errors and malfunction.
    • Denial of Service (DoS) through event flooding.
  • Mitigation Focus: Secure event handling practices, careful management of event listeners and propagation, rate limiting for event handling, and input validation for event data if derived from user input.