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Attack Tree Analysis for pixijs/pixi.js

Objective: To execute arbitrary JavaScript code within the context of the application, leading to data exfiltration, denial of service, or client-side manipulation.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      Attacker Executes Arbitrary JavaScript [CRITICAL]
                                                    |
                                      -------------------------------------
                                      |                                   |
                      ---------------------------------        ---------------------------------
                      |                               |                                     |
      1.  Exploit PixiJS  Vulnerabilities      2.  Manipulate PixiJS  Input          3.  Leverage PixiJS Features
                      |                               |                                     |
      ---------------------------------        ---------------------------------        ---------------------------------
      |                                       |                                     |
1.1  Known CVEs                           2.1  Malicious Texture Data               3.2  Abuse Resource Loading [HIGH RISK]
(e.g., XSS in                             (e.g., SVG injection)                               |
 older versions)                          [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]                     -------------------------
 [HIGH RISK]                                                                            |                       |
                                                                                    3.2.1  Load External     3.2.2  Load Data
                                                                                           SWF (if supported)   URI with JS
                                                                                           [CRITICAL]           [HIGH RISK]
                                                                                                                [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit PixiJS Vulnerabilities

  • 1.1 Known CVEs (e.g., XSS in older versions) [HIGH RISK]:
    • Description: Attackers exploit publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in older, unpatched versions of the PixiJS library. These vulnerabilities might allow for Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) or other code execution exploits. For example, older versions might have had weaknesses in how they parsed SVG images, allowing for JavaScript injection within the SVG.
    • Likelihood: Low (if PixiJS is kept up-to-date; significantly higher if using outdated versions).
    • Impact: High (Successful exploitation leads to arbitrary JavaScript execution).
    • Effort: Low (Public exploits and proof-of-concept code are often readily available).
    • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate (Attackers can often use existing exploit scripts without deep technical knowledge).
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Intrusion Detection Systems and Web Application Firewalls might detect known exploit patterns, but customized or obfuscated payloads could bypass these defenses).
    • Mitigation:
      • Crucially Important: Keep PixiJS updated to the latest stable version.
      • Use dependency management tools (npm, yarn) to track and update dependencies.
      • Regularly check for security advisories and updates from PixiJS.
      • Employ vulnerability scanning tools (e.g., npm audit, yarn audit) to identify known vulnerabilities in your project's dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Manipulate PixiJS Input

  • 2.1 Malicious Texture Data (e.g., SVG injection) [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]:
    • Description: If the application allows users to upload or specify images, particularly Scalable Vector Graphics (SVGs), an attacker can embed malicious JavaScript code within the SVG file. When PixiJS renders the SVG, the injected JavaScript executes in the context of the application.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on whether the application accepts user-supplied SVGs and the effectiveness of input sanitization).
    • Impact: High (Leads to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and arbitrary JavaScript execution).
    • Effort: Low (SVG injection is a well-known attack technique, and tools are readily available).
    • Skill Level: Intermediate (Requires understanding of XSS and how to craft malicious SVGs).
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Web Application Firewalls and browser security features might detect some basic XSS attempts, but sophisticated payloads can often bypass these defenses).
    • Mitigation:
      • Absolutely Essential: Sanitize all user-supplied SVG data before passing it to PixiJS.
      • Use a dedicated SVG sanitization library (e.g., DOMPurify) to remove potentially harmful elements and attributes.
      • Consider server-side rasterization of SVGs into bitmaps, eliminating the possibility of script injection.
      • Implement strict input validation to ensure that only valid SVG data is accepted.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Leverage PixiJS Features

  • 3.2 Abuse Resource Loading [HIGH RISK]: This category encompasses attacks that exploit PixiJS's resource loading mechanisms.

    • 3.2.1 Load External SWF (if supported) [CRITICAL]:

      • Description: If PixiJS is configured to load SWF (Flash) files (which is increasingly rare and discouraged), an attacker could attempt to load a malicious SWF file. This would exploit vulnerabilities in the Flash Player plugin, potentially leading to code execution.
      • Likelihood: Very Low (SWF support is deprecated and rarely enabled in modern web applications).
      • Impact: High (Successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution through Flash vulnerabilities).
      • Effort: Low (If SWF loading is enabled, exploiting existing Flash vulnerabilities is relatively straightforward).
      • Skill Level: Intermediate (Requires knowledge of Flash vulnerabilities and exploit techniques).
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Intrusion Detection Systems and Web Application Firewalls might detect attempts to load known malicious SWF files).
      • Mitigation:
        • Strongly Recommended: Disable support for loading SWF files entirely.
        • If SWF loading is absolutely necessary (which is highly discouraged), ensure the Flash Player plugin is up-to-date (though this is generally not a viable long-term solution).
        • Use a Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict the loading of object types (object-src) to prevent Flash from being loaded.

    • 3.2.2 Load Data URI with JS [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]:

      • Description: An attacker crafts a data URI containing JavaScript code (e.g., data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>) and tricks PixiJS into loading it as a resource (e.g., as a texture). This results in the execution of the embedded JavaScript.
      • Likelihood: Low (if the application uses a strong CSP and properly sanitizes URLs); Medium to High if these protections are absent or weak.
      • Impact: High (Leads to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and arbitrary JavaScript execution).
      • Effort: Low (Crafting a malicious data URI is trivial).
      • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate (Requires basic understanding of XSS and data URIs).
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Web Application Firewalls and browser security features might detect some basic attempts, but a strong Content Security Policy is the most effective defense).
      • Mitigation:
        • Essential: Implement a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) that restricts the sources from which resources can be loaded. Specifically, carefully configure img-src, script-src, and potentially object-src directives.
        • Sanitize all user-provided URLs before passing them to PixiJS's resource loading functions. Validate that URLs match expected patterns and do not contain potentially harmful schemes (like data:).
        • Avoid using data URIs for anything other than small, trusted, and internally generated resources. Never use data URIs based on user input.