Mitigation Strategy: Strict Origin Validation (Socket.IO cors
option)
- Identify Trusted Origins: Determine the exact domains (including protocol and port) from which your Socket.IO clients will legitimately connect.
- Configure Server-Side
cors
: In your Socket.IO server initialization, use thecors
option to explicitly list the allowed origins. Never use a wildcard (*
) in production. This is a Socket.IO-specific configuration.const io = require('socket.io')(server, { cors: { origin: ["https://your-app.example.com", "https://another-domain.com"], // Example methods: ["GET", "POST"] } });
- Automatic Rejection: Socket.IO automatically handles the
Origin
header check and rejects connections from disallowed origins. - Regular Review: Periodically review and update the allowed origins list.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH): (Severity: High) - Prevents WebSocket connections from malicious origins.
- Unauthorized Access (Limited): (Severity: Medium) - Basic access control by origin.
-
Impact:
- CSWSH: Near elimination if implemented correctly.
- Unauthorized Access: Reduces risk, but further authentication is needed.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Yes, in
server/index.js
within the Socket.IO server initialization.
- Yes, in
-
Missing Implementation:
- Add staging/development origins during development, remove before production.
- Mechanism for dynamic origin updates if the application's domain changes.
Mitigation Strategy: Token-Based Authentication (Socket.IO auth
and Middleware)
- Token Generation: After user authentication, generate a secure token (e.g., JWT).
- Client-Side Inclusion (Socket.IO
auth
): The client includes the token in theauth
object during the Socket.IO connection:const socket = io({ auth: { token: "your_jwt_token" } });
- Server-Side Middleware (Socket.IO
io.use
): Implement Socket.IO middleware usingio.use
to intercept every connection attempt and potentially every message:io.use((socket, next) => { const token = socket.handshake.auth.token; if (isValidToken(token)) { // Your validation logic socket.user = decodeToken(token); // Attach user info to the socket next(); } else { next(new Error("Authentication error")); } });
- Token Validation: The middleware validates the token (signature, issuer, audience, expiration).
- Rejection/Authorization: Reject the connection/message or attach user information to the
socket
object for later use. - Per-message validation (optional, but recommended): You can extend the middleware, or add separate event listeners, to validate a token on every message, not just the initial connection. This is crucial for robust security.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- CSWSH: (Severity: High) - Attacker cannot send valid messages without a token.
- Unauthorized Access: (Severity: High) - Prevents unauthorized actions.
- Replay Attacks (Partial): (Severity: Medium) - Short-lived tokens reduce the replay window.
-
Impact:
- CSWSH: Significantly reduces risk.
- Unauthorized Access: Near elimination.
- Replay Attacks: Reduces risk; combine with other measures.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially. JWT authentication for the initial connection in
server/middleware/auth.js
, but not for every message.
- Partially. JWT authentication for the initial connection in
-
Missing Implementation:
- Modify
server/middleware/auth.js
to validate the JWT for every message. - Implement a refresh token mechanism.
- Modify
Mitigation Strategy: Connection and Message Rate Limiting (Socket.IO Events and Custom Logic)
- Connection Limits (Per IP/User):
- Track active connections per IP/user (using a data structure).
- Use Socket.IO's
connection
anddisconnect
events to increment/decrement counters. - Reject new connections if the limit is exceeded (using
socket.disconnect(true)
).
- Message Rate Limiting (Per Socket/User):
- Track messages sent per socket/user within a time window.
- Use Socket.IO event listeners (
socket.on('eventName', ...)
). - Increment counters for each received message.
- If the limit is exceeded:
- Throttle: Delay processing (using
setTimeout
or a queue). - Drop: Discard the message.
- Disconnect: Disconnect the client (use with caution). You might emit a custom event before disconnecting.
- Throttle: Delay processing (using
- Configuration: Define appropriate limits based on expected usage.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) / Resource Exhaustion: (Severity: High)
-
Impact:
- DoS: Significantly reduces the risk.
-
Currently Implemented:
- No.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Implement connection limiting in
server/index.js
. - Implement message rate limiting (potentially as middleware in
server/middleware/rateLimit.js
). - Consider using a library like
rate-limiter-flexible
.
- Implement connection limiting in
Mitigation Strategy: Room/Namespace Authorization (Socket.IO join
and Middleware)
- Authentication Prerequisite: Users must be authenticated (e.g., via token-based auth) before joining rooms/namespaces.
- Authorization Logic: Implement server-side logic to determine if a user can join a specific room/namespace. This might be based on roles, group membership, or resource ownership.
- Server-Side Enforcement (Socket.IO
join
):- Use Socket.IO event listeners for room join requests (e.g.,
socket.on('joinRoom', ...)
). - Retrieve the user's identity (from the
socket
object, if using token-based auth). - Execute the authorization logic.
- If authorized, call
socket.join(roomName)
. - If unauthorized, reject the request (send an error to the client).
- Use Socket.IO event listeners for room join requests (e.g.,
- Dynamic Room Names (Securely): If rooms are created dynamically, use cryptographically secure random identifiers (UUIDs) to prevent guessing.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Access to Rooms/Namespaces: (Severity: High)
-
Impact:
- Unauthorized Access: Near elimination.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially. Basic checks based on user IDs in some event handlers, but no centralized mechanism.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Create a centralized authorization module (
server/authorization.js
). - Refactor event handlers to use this module.
- Implement role-based or group-based access control.
- Create a centralized authorization module (
Mitigation Strategy: Using Namespaces Appropriately (Socket.IO Namespaces)
- Logical Separation: Use namespaces to logically separate different parts of your application or different groups of users. This helps to organize your code and improve security by isolating different contexts.
- Avoid Overuse: Don't create a new namespace for every user or every small group. This can lead to performance issues and make it harder to manage your application. Use rooms within namespaces for finer-grained control.
- Authentication and Authorization: Implement authentication and authorization before allowing clients to connect to a namespace. This is similar to room authorization, but at a higher level.
- Server-Side Control: Manage namespace creation on the server-side. Avoid allowing clients to create namespaces directly, as this can lead to security vulnerabilities.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Access (to specific application areas): (Severity: Medium)
- Resource Exhaustion (from excessive namespace creation): (Severity: Medium)
-
Impact:
- Unauthorized Access: Reduces the risk of unauthorized access to specific parts of the application.
- Resource Exhaustion: Prevents excessive namespace creation, improving performance and stability.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially. Namespaces are used, but not always consistently or with clear authorization checks.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Review and refactor the use of namespaces to ensure they are used logically and consistently.
- Implement authentication and authorization checks for all namespace connections.
- Ensure that namespace creation is managed on the server-side.
Mitigation Strategy: Proper Disconnect Handling (Socket.IO disconnect
event)
- Resource Cleanup: Use the Socket.IO
disconnect
event to clean up any resources associated with the disconnected client. This includes:- Removing the client from any rooms they are in.
- Releasing any locks or resources held by the client.
- Updating any data structures that track connected clients.
- Security Considerations:
- If the client was performing a sensitive operation, ensure that the operation is properly terminated or rolled back.
- If the client was holding any sensitive data, ensure that the data is securely cleared.
- Graceful Degradation: Design your application to handle client disconnections gracefully. The application should continue to function correctly even if some clients disconnect unexpectedly.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Resource Exhaustion (from orphaned resources): (Severity: Medium)
- Data Inconsistency (from incomplete operations): (Severity: Medium)
- Security Vulnerabilities (related to orphaned resources or data): (Severity: Low to Medium)
-
Impact:
- Resource Exhaustion: Prevents resource leaks and improves server stability.
- Data Inconsistency: Ensures data integrity and consistency.
- Security Vulnerabilities: Reduces the risk of vulnerabilities related to orphaned resources or data.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially. Some disconnect handling is implemented, but it may not be comprehensive or consistent across all parts of the application.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Review and refactor all disconnect handlers to ensure they are comprehensive and consistent.
- Implement robust error handling and logging for disconnect events.
- Test the application's behavior under various disconnect scenarios.