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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for sortablejs/sortable

Attack Surface: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Configuration Options

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious JavaScript code through SortableJS configuration options, leading to script execution in the user's browser.
  • How Sortable Contributes: SortableJS allows dynamic configuration through JavaScript objects. If application code uses unsanitized user input to set these configuration options, particularly those related to HTML attributes or class names, it creates a direct pathway for XSS injection.
  • Example: Application code takes a URL parameter sortableClass and directly sets it as the ghostClass option in SortableJS: Sortable.create(el, { ghostClass: urlParams.get('sortableClass') });. An attacker could craft a URL with `?sortableClass="<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>". When SortableJS applies the ghost class, the injected JavaScript executes.
  • Impact: Full compromise of the user's browser session, including stealing cookies, session tokens, performing actions on behalf of the user, defacing the website, and potentially further attacks against the user's system.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Input Sanitization: Never directly use unsanitized user input to set SortableJS configuration options.
    • Input Validation: Validate user inputs against a strict whitelist of allowed values or patterns before using them in configuration.
    • Output Encoding (Context-Specific): If dynamic configuration is absolutely necessary, carefully encode user inputs based on the context where they are used. For class names, treat them as literal strings, not HTML or JavaScript.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strong CSP to restrict inline script execution and control script sources, mitigating the impact of XSS.

Attack Surface: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Event Handlers

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious JavaScript code by exploiting vulnerabilities in application code that handles data from SortableJS event callbacks.
  • How Sortable Contributes: SortableJS triggers events (e.g., onAdd, onUpdate, onSort) and provides data related to drag and drop operations within these events. If application event handlers directly use this data to manipulate the DOM without proper sanitization, it creates a critical XSS vulnerability.
  • Example: An application uses the onAdd event to display a notification with the name of the added item. The event handler directly uses item.textContent from the onAdd event to set the innerHTML of a notification element. If an attacker can control the content of a draggable item (e.g., by injecting data into the application's data source), they can insert malicious HTML/JavaScript into the item's text. When the onAdd event fires and the application displays this unsanitized content using innerHTML, the injected script executes.
  • Impact: Full compromise of the user's browser session, similar to XSS via configuration options.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Output Sanitization: Always sanitize and encode data received from SortableJS event callbacks before using it to manipulate the DOM. This is paramount.
    • Use Safe DOM Manipulation Methods: Prefer textContent to set text content, which automatically encodes HTML entities. Avoid innerHTML with unsanitized data. If innerHTML is unavoidable, use a robust and actively maintained HTML sanitization library.
    • Input Validation (Data Source): Sanitize and validate data at the source where draggable items are created or loaded to prevent malicious content from entering the application's data.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): CSP remains a crucial defense-in-depth measure against XSS.