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Attack Tree Analysis for sortablejs/sortable

Objective: Compromise Application Using SortableJS

Attack Tree Visualization

└── Compromise Application Using SortableJS [CRITICAL NODE] ├── Client-Side Attacks (Directly Exploiting SortableJS in Browser) [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── DOM Manipulation Attacks [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── Inject Malicious Items into Sortable List [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └── Inject Script Tags (XSS) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── Event Manipulation Attacks │ └── Event Listener Hijacking (If Application Vulnerable) [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── Overwrite or Inject Malicious Event Listeners [HIGH-RISK PATH - Potential] └── Server-Side Attacks (Exploiting Backend via SortableJS Interaction) [CRITICAL NODE] ├── Data Integrity Attacks via Reordered Data [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── Manipulate Order to Gain Unauthorized Access [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── Privilege Escalation by Reordering Permissions/Roles [HIGH-RISK PATH - Potential] [CRITICAL NODE] └── Server-Side Logic Vulnerabilities Exposed by Reordering [CRITICAL NODE] └── Insecure Deserialization if Order Data is Deserialized [CRITICAL NODE] └── Inject Malicious Payloads via Serialized Order Data (If Applicable) [HIGH-RISK PATH - Potential] [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: Inject Script Tags (XSS)

Attack Vector: Client-Side -> DOM Manipulation Attacks -> Inject Malicious Items into Sortable List -> Inject Script Tags (XSS)

  • Threat Description: An attacker injects malicious JavaScript code into a sortable list item. When the application renders this item in the DOM, the script executes in the user's browser.
  • Attack Scenario Example: A task management application allows users to name tasks. If task names are directly inserted into the DOM without encoding, an attacker creates a task named <img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>. When this task is displayed in the sortable list, the JavaScript alert('XSS') executes.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Output Encoding: Always encode user-provided data before rendering it into the DOM, especially within sortable list items. Use HTML encoding to prevent script execution.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strong CSP to restrict script sources and inline script execution, mitigating XSS impact.

Attack Tree Path: Event Listener Hijacking (If Application Vulnerable)

Attack Vector: Client-Side -> Event Manipulation Attacks -> Event Listener Hijacking -> Overwrite or Inject Malicious Event Listeners - [HIGH-RISK PATH - Potential]

  • Threat Description: If the application is vulnerable to client-side vulnerabilities (like prototype pollution or DOM-based flaws), an attacker could overwrite or inject malicious event listeners for SortableJS events.
  • Attack Scenario Example: In a vulnerable application, an attacker exploits prototype pollution to modify the prototype of event listener objects. They inject malicious JavaScript code to be executed whenever SortableJS events are triggered, potentially leading to account takeover or data theft.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Secure Coding Practices: Follow secure coding practices to prevent client-side vulnerabilities like prototype pollution and DOM-based XSS.
    • Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits of client-side JavaScript code to identify and remediate potential vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Privilege Escalation by Reordering Permissions/Roles

Attack Vector: Server-Side -> Data Integrity Attacks via Reordered Data -> Manipulate Order to Gain Unauthorized Access -> Privilege Escalation by Reordering Permissions/Roles

  • Threat Description: The application incorrectly uses the order of items (e.g., roles, permissions) in a sortable list to determine user privileges. An attacker reorders these items to elevate their own privileges.
  • Attack Scenario Example: A role management system displays user roles in a sortable list. If the application mistakenly grants higher privileges based on the position in the list (e.g., first role = admin), an attacker reorders the list to move their low-privilege role to the top, gaining admin access.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Robust Access Control: Never rely on client-side order for access control. Implement secure server-side access control mechanisms independent of client-side manipulations.
    • Principle of Least Privilege (Server-Side): Grant users only necessary permissions on the server-side, regardless of client-side order.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Deserialization if Order Data is Deserialized

Attack Vector: Server-Side -> Server-Side Logic Vulnerabilities Exposed by Reordering -> Insecure Deserialization if Order Data is Deserialized -> Inject Malicious Payloads via Serialized Order Data (If Applicable) - [HIGH-RISK PATH - Potential, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat Description: The application deserializes order data received from the client without proper security measures. An attacker injects malicious payloads into the serialized data, leading to server-side vulnerabilities like Remote Code Execution (RCE).
  • Attack Scenario Example: The application uses Java deserialization to process order data sent as a serialized object. An attacker crafts a malicious serialized object containing code to execute on the server. When the server deserializes this object, the malicious code runs, potentially compromising the server.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Avoid Deserialization of Untrusted Data: Minimize or eliminate deserializing untrusted data from the client.
    • Secure Deserialization Libraries and Practices: If deserialization is necessary, use secure deserialization libraries and implement robust validation and sanitization of deserialized data.