Attack Surface: Altered Item Order
- Description: Malicious manipulation of the order of sortable elements to achieve an unauthorized outcome.
- SortableJS Contribution: SortableJS is the mechanism that enables client-side reordering, making this attack directly dependent on its functionality.
- Example: An attacker reorders steps in a workflow to bypass a required approval step, or changes the priority of tasks to gain an unfair advantage, or modifies the order of financial transactions.
- Impact: Unauthorized actions, incorrect processing, data corruption, potential financial loss, or privilege escalation. The impact is directly tied to how the application uses the order.
- Risk Severity: High to Critical (Critical if order affects security-critical operations or financial data).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Server-Side Order Validation: The server must independently verify the received order against a known-good state or a set of business rules. Never trust the client-provided order.
- Cryptographic Hashing (Optional, but Recommended): Hash the initial, valid order and compare it to a hash of the received order to detect any unauthorized changes.
- Auditing: Log all order changes, including the user, timestamp, and before/after states.
Attack Surface: Injection of Invalid Data (via Data Attributes)
- Description: Modification of data attributes associated with sortable elements to inject malicious values.
- SortableJS Contribution: SortableJS allows elements to have data attributes, and these attributes are transmitted during drag-and-drop operations. The library itself doesn't validate these attributes, making it a conduit for this attack.
- Example: An attacker changes a
data-id
attribute to point to a different, unauthorized resource, or injects JavaScript code into adata-description
attribute that is later rendered without sanitization (leading to XSS). - Impact: Indirect XSS, unauthorized access to resources, data corruption, potential for code execution (if XSS is successful).
- Risk Severity: High to Critical (XSS is typically High; unauthorized resource access can be Critical).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Data Attribute Whitelisting: The server should only accept a predefined, strictly limited set of data attributes.
- Data Attribute Validation: Rigorously validate the content of each allowed data attribute (type, length, format, allowed values).
- Input Sanitization (for Rendering): If data attributes are ever rendered back to the user, use proper output encoding/sanitization to prevent XSS. This is crucial.
- Content Security Policy (CSP): Use a strong CSP to restrict the execution of inline scripts, significantly mitigating the impact of XSS.
Attack Surface: Malicious Event Handler Exploitation (Indirect XSS)
- Description: Injecting malicious JavaScript code into SortableJS event handlers.
- SortableJS Contribution: SortableJS provides the event system (
onAdd
,onUpdate
,onRemove
, etc.) that allows developers to attach JavaScript code. This event system is the direct vector for this attack. - Example: If the application dynamically generates event handler code based on user input without any sanitization, an attacker could inject malicious script (e.g.,
<div ondrag="alert('XSS'); //maliciousCode()">
). - Impact: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the victim's browser.
- Risk Severity: High.
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Avoid Dynamic Event Handlers: Strongly prefer static event handlers. Dynamic generation is extremely risky.
- Extremely Rigorous Input Sanitization (If Unavoidable): If dynamic event handlers are absolutely necessary, use a robust sanitization library and a very strict whitelist of allowed characters. This is a very high-risk approach and should be avoided if at all possible.
- Content Security Policy (CSP): A strong CSP is essential to prevent the execution of inline scripts, significantly mitigating the risk of XSS. This is the most important mitigation for this attack.